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The M innesota M utual Life Insurance Company
400 Robert Street North
St . Paul, M innesota 55101-2098
Ph 612/298-3671
Fax 612/298-7938
Jaymes G. Hubbell, FSA
Second V ice President and A ctuary Minnesota Mutual
November 1, 1993
Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal government Division 
File Q-l-505, AICPA 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue NW 
Washington D.C. 20004-1081
RE: COMMENTS REGARDING PROPOSED STATEMENT OF POSITION REGARDING REPORTING OF 
INVESTMENT CONTRACTS HELD BY HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS AND 
DEFINED-CONTRIBUTION PENSION PLANS
Dear Ms. Hicks,
I have been working with retirement plans for the past 21 years in several 
different capacities. It is from this accumulated experience I conclude that 
the above-mentioned proposal, if implemented, will (1) provide financial 
statement users less meaningful information than is provided today, (2) cause 
considerable confusion and misunderstandings among plan participants (assuming 
participant-level reporting utilizes fair value instead of account value), (3) 
potentially force lower interest rates on plan participants and (4) result in 
increased expenses to the plans due to the compliance cost.
Financial information can be provided in numerical form or in verbal form. It 
is common for financial statements to be footnoted with additional information 
of interest to the users of the financial statements. Investment contracts 
may contain features which cause them to be something other than benefit 
responsive contracts. Those features can be presented verbally in financial 
statements. Instead, the proposal contemplates quantifying these features in 
a "fair value”.
Susan Hicks 
November 1, 1993 
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In most situations this will result in less meaningful information than the 
reporting of account value accompanied by a verbal description of the 
limitations on accessibility of funds. Why? First, because there is no right 
fair value. Consider an investment contract which has as its only limitation 
a limit on the amount of funds which can be transferred to another investment 
option during the year. These restrictions disqualify the contract as a 
benefit responsive contract. Ask ten different CPAs (or ten actuaries or ten 
of anything) to determine fair value and you will get ten different answers. 
Unless AICPA wants to prescribe how to determine the projected benefit stream 
for every conceivable contract and plan feature, there will be no consensus on 
how to determine fair value.
Secondly, the use of fair value can produce some very peculiar results. 
Consider a company which has two plans, one a defined contribution pension 
plan and the other a profit sharing plan. Suppose the defined contribution 
plan has a guaranteed investment contract as its only investment option. This 
contract provides that the participant can withdraw his/her funds at contract 
value at any time. Hence, it is benefit responsive and is reported at 
contract value. The profit sharing plan uses the identical guaranteed 
investment contract. Here, too, the participant can withdraw his/her funds at 
any time. However, this plan also provides additional investment options such 
as a money market fund, a bond fund and a stock fund. To protect against 
interest rate antiselection the insurer limits transfers from the guaranteed 
investment contract to these other investment options to 20% per year.
According to the proposal, this is not a benefit responsive contract and must 
be reported at fair value. In an increasing interest rate environment this 
fair value will likely be less than contract value, so reported values under 
the profit sharing plan will be less than reported values under the defined 
contribution plan (assuming identical contributions). This would be the case 
even though the profit sharing plan provides the same access to the contract 
value as the defined contribution plan participant. Indeed, the profit 
sharing participant has the added flexibility of being able to transfer at 
least some of his/her funds to other investment options. That features adds 
value— but the proposal would have the plan report less value. This is an 
illogical result.
In the above example it would be better to report the profit sharing plan at 
contract value and note verbally the restricted access. That would be far 
more meaningful than reporting fair value.
The proposal relates to the audited financial report. It does not address the 
values reported directly to each participant for their own account. If the 
application of "fair value" were limited to just the audited financial 
statements the confusion would be limited to the relatively few plan 
participants who review the audited financial report. Will an auditor find it
Susan Hicks 
November 1, 1993 
Page 3
acceptable to report fair value in the audited financial statement while the 
plan reports contract value to participants? The SOP should address the 
matter of consistency between participant level reporting and financial 
statement reporting.
Fair value would make no sense to plan participants whatsoever. The vast 
majority of plan participants are not CPAs. Few have any concept of present 
values. Many do not invest in stock and bond investment options because they 
do not understand the fluctuations in market value. Many have a poor 
understanding of how compound interest works. The most, and probably the 
only, meaningful thing to them is account value.
Imagine a participant in the profit sharing plan used in the example above 
trying to make sense out of a fair value which exceeds the account value.
This could happen in today's environment where current market rates are well 
below the contract's crediting rate. Fair value can't be borrowed. It won't 
be paid as a death benefit. It's not available in case of lump sum 
distribution at termination. It isn't even used in determining what amounts 
can be transferred to other investment options. It doesn't relate to anything 
the plan participant will understand. Anything that is different than 
deposits minus withdrawals accumulated at interest will not be useful to plan 
participants. Indeed, reporting fair value to plan participants would be so 
confusing and meaningless that plan sponsors would be compelled to abandon 
investment contracts which were not benefit responsive.
This leads to my third point. The proposal would deny participants the higher 
yields available from non-benefit responsive investment contracts. To ensure 
the accessibility needed to qualify for benefit responsiveness, prudent 
insurance companies will maintain relative short duration assets to avoid 
capital losses should large withdrawals be made from the guaranteed investment 
contract. Under a benefit-responsive contract the insurer cannot assume 
investments can be made for the long haul. The traditionally higher yielding 
investments commonly used for funding retirement plans would entail too much 
risk for the insurer. Many participants are adverse to risk and will not use 
the marked to market investment options providing higher yield potential. 
Hence, they will opt for the benefit responsive guaranteed investment 
guaranteed contract no matter what.
The last point is that non-benefit responsive contracts would be burdened with 
the additional expense of calculating fair value. This cost becomes quite 
significant if the determination must be made on the i n d i v i d u a l  participant 
level.
Susan Hicks 
November 1, 1993 
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In summary, the proposal, if adopted, will not provide the intended more 
meaningful information to financial statement users. If adoption results in 
the reporting of fair value at the participant level, participants using 
non-benefit responsive contracts will be totally confused. Fair value, as 
presented in this proposal will be totally meaningless information. I 
encourage you to reconsider the entire proposal.
Hubbell, FSA
Vice President and Actuary
JGH/dc
cc: Melissa Kahn, Senior Counsel— American Council of Life Insurance
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Becker & Rooney
Becker & Rooney, Inc. Glenpointe Centre East Teaneck, NJ 07666-6768 (201) 907-6880
Murray L. Becker, FSA 
President
November 1 0 , 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division
Files Q-1-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20004-1081
Re: Reporting of Investment Contracts Held by Health and Welfare 
Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution Pension Plans
Dear Ms. Hicks:
Becker & Rooney is a consulting and investment management firm specializing in de­
veloping competitive bidding strategies for investment contracts in defined contribution 
plans. In terms of major corporate clients, number of plan participants, and amount of 
dollars involved, our firm has by far the largest consulting practice in this field. Our 
clients include many Fortune 100 companies as well as other organizations of compa­
rable size and stature. Their plans cover many millions of employees.
In general, our role is to act as a consultant to plan fiduciaries who exercise their re­
sponsibilities under ERISA for establishing investment policies and strategies on be­
half of plan participants. Since our consulting advice is limited to defined contribution 
plans, the ultimate beneficiaries of our service are the millions of plan participants who 
enjoy the advantages of a competitive marketplace. We estimate that the total GIC/BIC 
and similar investment-contract holdings among our clients is about $13 billion. We 
are thus able to speak on behalf of a substantial segment of the plan participant popu­
lation and their employers.
In general, we are in agreement with the SOP. We believe it meets the objective of re­
porting values that are meaningful to financial statement users, including plan partici­
pants. We have several comments to improve the end product.
1. The SOP ( 1 5e) states that Defined Contribution Plans should report fully benefit 
responsive investment contracts at contract value, which may or may not be equal to 
fa ir  value. This wording could conceivably create a conflict with IRS Revenue 80-155, 
which requires participant account balances in defined contribution plans to be 
ascertained at “fair market value.” We believe that the contract value of a fully benefit 
responsive investment contract is indeed fair value, and the SOP should not be am­
biguous on this fundamental point.
Ms. Susan W. Hicks 
November 10,1993
Clearly, the fair value of an investment contract must reflect its terms. If the contract is 
fully benefit responsive, the participant is given the right to receive—and the obligation 
to accept—contract value. For the participant, contract value is fair value because the 
contract sets this value as the agreed-upon price for the transaction.
2. The effective date—plan years commencing after December 1 5 , 1993—is impracti­
cal. Many plans hold contracts that are not fully benefit responsive, but can be 
amended by negotiation. Plan sponsors will need a reasonable period of time to bring 
their contracts into compliance. To remain on a calendar-year basis, we suggest set­
ting back the effective date one year.
3. A.8, Sub-section c, of the Appendix is ambiguous. For a plan that pays for 
benefits up to 30% of the contract at contract value, what are the “guaranteed" and 
“residual" amounts? Does this mean that 30% of the contract is fully benefit respon­
sive and the remainder should be carried at some other fair value? The language 
should be clarified.
Aside from these points, we are fully supportive of the SOP’s substance and intent.
Cordially,
MLB/cs
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Landmark Strategies 
24 Westland Road 
Weston, MA 02193 
Tel/Fax:617-899-2519
Judith Markland 
President
November 9 ,  1993
Susan Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q -1-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N W
Washington, D.C 20004-1081
re: Comments on the AICPA Proposed SOP Reporting o f  Investment 
Contracts Held by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution 
Pension Plans
Dear Ms. Hicks:
As someone w ith  lengthy professional experience w ith  defined contribution plans 
and guaranteed investment contracts and whose firm  works w ith  institutional providers o f  
such instruments, I  am pleased to  have the opportunity to  comment on such a well-drafted 
document. The Task Force that developed the SOP obviously did their homework 
extremely well.
The principles established in the exposure draft capture the essence o f  stable value 
funds in defined contribution plans: that when participants are assured book value fo r 
their transactions, where benefit responsiveness is assured, the investments should be 
reported at contract value. The SOP recognizes that, because the financial statements are 
ultimately fo r the benefit o f  the participants, showing the values that they can actually 
expect to  realize is vital. Establishing these principles preserves the unique risk-reward 
benefit that book value investment contracts provide to  defined contribution plan 
participants.
Moreover, the SOP does an excellent job  o f  defining benefit responsiveness, both 
conceptually and practically. I t  should give clear and explicit guidance to  those working 
w ith  it, while allowing sufficient flexibility to deal w ith  future product variations.
The follow ing are specific comments on various parts o f  the exposure draft.
Comments on AIC PA Exposure Draft, page 2
I. Clarification o f ’’guarantee"
One slight clarification that the A ICPA might wish to  make before the final SOP is 
released concerns the use o f  the word "guarantee” . Paragraph 9 defines a fu lly  benefit 
responsive contract as one which "provides a guarantee by a financially responsible third 
party o f  principal and previously accrued interest fo r liquidation, transfer, loans, or 
hardship withdrawals initiated by plan participants". Paragraph 10 further explains that the 
financial risk entailed in supporting benefit responsiveness must be effectively transferred 
to a financially responsible third party, neither the plan nor the participant.
The word "guarantee' has come to  have fa irly specific technical meanings in some 
parts o f  the financial community. Some feel that only financial guaranty insurance 
companies or certain types o f  life insurance contracts can offer "guarantees", as distinct 
from firm  contractual commitments made by the same firm  or others, such as an asset 
purchase agreement o r an interest rate swap. Both o f  the latter instruments have been used 
by financial institutions to  assume benefit risk.
The intent o f  the SOP is obviously to  create a level playing field fo r all types o f  
financial institutions to  provide book value investment contracts. The examples indicate 
that it is anticipated that a wide variety o f  "financially responsible" th ird parties are 
contemplated to  assume the benefit risk. To remove any possible lingering doubt that this 
was the intent, it  would help to  modify the definition o f  a benefit responsive contract to  
"one which provides a guarantee or assurance by a financially responsible th ird party".
II. Disclosure of Current Market Yields for Investment Contracts
The A IC P A requested comments on the desirability o f  requiring disclosure o f  
market rates o f  interest fo r fu lly  benefit responsive contracts in addition to  the current 
crediting rates. The intent o f  this requirement is to  give the participant a better sense o f  
the current value o f  his assets in the marketplace, fo r better informed investment decisions.
M y personal opinion is that such a disclosure requirement would cause more harm 
than benefit. I t  would be exceedingly d ifficult fo r a plan sponsor to  explain why the 
additional information is made available, and what it represents. I t  would also be very 
difficult fo r plan sponsors to  obtain a current market yield fo r a stable value portfo lio o f  
their current duration and quality.
The information is not readily available from the asset managers. GIC issuers 
typically provide only a market value at surrender to  defined contribution plan customers, 
and are reluctant to  provide a market value on an ongoing basis because they do not 
believe it meaningful fo r plan sponsor transactions and fo r fears that it  w ill produce 
confusion and legal difficulties. (Surrender value is typically lower than ongoing value.) 
Providing a market yield fo r the contract would present a similar problem. Separate 
account and synthetic GICs often provide contract market values that are adjusted fo r 
past gains and losses on any asset o r benefit risks shared by the plan.
Comments on A IC P A Exposure Draft, page 3
The alternative, publishing a money market yield, would indicate a possible market 
opportunity fo r plan participants but would be misleading, since the yield would be 
reflective o f  an instrument w ith  different credit, maturity and interest rate volatility 
characteristics. Publishing this rate would be doubly deceptive i f  the money market option 
were not available to  plan participants as a fund option. Many plan sponsors do not 
believe that money market fluids are a suitable investment fo r retiree savings.
In  addition, the presence o f  a market comparison rate would undoubtedly increase 
risk charges by providers o f  the benefit wrap fo r participant anti-selection risk. Where 
these anti-selection risks are passed through to  the fund's blended rate via rate resets, any 
activity prompted by the market rate disclosure would lead to  reduced returns fo r 
participants who choose not to  act.
III. Reporting for Funds with ’'Limited” Participant Access
The A IC P A also solicited comments whether plans which "lim it" participant 
access to  funds should be required to  report investment contracts at market value. The 
primary concern seems to  be single-fund plans, where participants do not have investment 
transfer capability while they are investors in the plan. In  such cases, benefit 
responsiveness is limited to  withdrawal activity.
There are many types o f  single-fund defined contribution plans. Many o f  these are 
capital accumulation plans rather than retirement plans, and employees may withdraw both 
their contribution and their employer's prior to  termination or retirement. There is 
opportunity fo r many participant transactions. Even fo r retirement plans where there are 
limits on withdrawal o f  employer contributions or other fund assets before retirement, IRS 
rules now require that many tax-qualified plans allow participants to  leave funds invested 
in the plan after retirement o r termination o f  employment. Participants typically then have 
access to  these funds fo r partial as well as fu ll withdrawal.
There are also special purpose retirement funds. Some defined contribution plans 
have special stable value fund options fo r their employees nearing or at retirement. Other 
plans lim it retiree investments to  the stable value fund that is available to  all plan 
participants. Both variations are intended to  provide principal protection fo r the 
participant during retirement as well as ease o f  administration fo r non-employee plan 
participants, who can constitute a major expense fo r plan sponsors.
A  requirement to  report investment contracts at market value in any o f  these 
situations would create chaos. The funds were created specifically so that participants 
could receive principal protection, and participants have been promised that they w ill 
receive the principal value o f  their assets upon withdrawal from  the plan. Reporting a 
different fund value in the meantime would be disruptive and counterproductive.
Comments on A IC P A Exposure Draft, page 4
Some stable value funds contain assets both o f  participants w ith  the right to 
transfer investments and participants who do not share this right. H ow  would those 
contracts be valued?
The principle adopted in the SOP is that, when participants can reasonably expect 
to  receive contract value fo r their transactions, those assets should reasonably be reported 
at contract value. It's a good principle. There is no reason to  weaken it  fo r single-fund 
plans or fo r participants restricted to  single fund options, especially when these situations 
were created originally because principal stability was perceived to  be o f  paramount 
importance fo r those participants. Including an example in the SOP illustrating that 
contract value is appropriate in these circumstances would be o f  enormous benefit to  the 
defined contribution community.
Thank you again fo r the opportunity to  comment on the exposure draft. Overall 
the SOP is extremely well designed and drafted and an excellent addition to  accounting 
guidelines.
Sincerely yours,
Judith Markland,
President, Landmark Strategies
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MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, Inc.
105 C hauncy Street, Boston, MA 02111 (617)556-4000 FAX (617) 556-4126 Toll Free 1-800-392-6145
November 22. 1993
Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division
File Q-l-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Dear Ms. Hicks: RE: Exposure Draft - Proposed Statement o f Position Reporting of
Investment Contracts Held by Health and Welfare Benefits Plans 
and Defined Contribution Plans.
The Accounting Principles and Auditing Procedures committee is the senior technical committee of 
the Massachusetts Society of Certified Public accountants (MSCPA). The Committee consists of over 
thirty members who are affiliated with public accounting firms of various sizes from the sole 
practitioner to the international "big six" firms, as well as members in both industry and academia.
The Committee has reviewed and discussed the exposure draft on the proposed statement of position 
and is in substantial agreement with its content.
The Committee has the following comments and suggestions in the areas where they were specifically 
requested:
1. Paragraph 17 effective date and transition
It seems appropriate to have one effective date on a prompt basis since 
it is important to have the revised basis of reporting implemented as 
soon as possible; and the method of implemention is appropriate so 
that the financial statements for the year of change will reflect the 
effect of the change and the current year results will be presented in 
accordance with the revised basis of reporting.
We also agree with not permitting restatement of financial statements 
of prior years since that would not result in presenting meaningful 
information since the purpose of the financial statements is to present 
the values of investment contracts held by health and welfare benefit 
plans and defined contribution pension plans as of the balance sheet 
date.
Very truly yours.
P. Daniel Hurley, Jr. Chairman 
Accounting Principles and Auditing 
Procedures Committee of the MSCPA
SAFECO
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SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
15411 N.E. 51ST STREET 
REDMOND. WA 98052
November 22, 1993
TELEPHONE: (206) 86 7 -8 000  
MAILING ADDRESS: P.O. BOX 34690 
SEATTLE. WA 98124-1 690
Susan W. Hicks, Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q-l-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Re: Exposure Draft - Reporting of Investment Contracts Held by Health and Welfare
Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution Pension Plans
Dear Ms. Hicks:
This is a response to your invitation for comments regarding the above referenced AICPA 
Exposure Draft. The following comments describe the negative impact of the Exposure Draft 
on pension plans, participants and insurance companies.
(1) For unallocated contracts, Appendix A.8.c does not adequately handle the situation 
where a portion of the contract value is benefit responsive. The provision requires 
the contract to be valued as if the entire amount would surrender immediately, as the 
sum of the benefit responsive portion valued at contract value and the non-benefit 
responsive portion valued at fair value. However, in most situations, only a portion 
of the contract is expected to surrender, leaving little or no surrender or market value 
adjustment charges.
It is unreasonable to value the contract assuming a contingency (100% surrender) 
which is not anticipated to occur. Often accounting standards relating to pension 
plans (e.g. FAS 87) allow use of reasonable assumptions and methods. The same 
approach should be taken here.
An example of how a plan’s withdrawal rates can impact the surrender charges 
assessed under the contract under both book value accounting and under the Exposure 
Draft is shown in Attachment A. Where market value adjustments are operational, 
the illustrated impact would be greater.
(2) The nature of insurance company surrender charge schedules will ensure that in the 
first year of a contract, the contract will suffer an immediate loss. Each year’s 
investment experience will be greater than that actually experienced under the contract 
as the plan emerges out of surrender charges and surrender value grades into contract 
value. This portrayal of investment experience may have the effect of distorting 
participant and employer decision-making. An example of how investment experience 
can be distorted is portrayed in Attachment B.
(3) The Exposure Draft thus directly impacts the payout of benefits under the plan. The 
effect is that lower paid, more mobile participants who terminate while surrender 
charges are in effect will get lower payouts, to the advantage of higher paid plan
participants whose tenure might normally outlast surrender charges. Such a bias 
against non-highly compensated employees appears to be inconsistent with AICPA’s 
mission of protecting plan participants through accounting standards. Attachment C 
illustrates this situation.
(4) Required disclosure of a market rate of interest for fully benefit responsive contracts 
would be more costly to report. It may also require additional risk margins which 
would lower returns to participants. Consequently, requiring such a disclosure would 
actually be harmful to plan participants by increasing expenses and lowering returns.
(5) Appendix A.8.b discusses valuation of benefit responsive contracts where early 
retirement or layoff benefits are not guaranteed at contract value. Where such 
benefits are expected to be utilized significantly, the Exposure Draft precludes contract 
value treatment. Consistency would suggest that only the portion of the contract 
anticipated to be utilized for such employer-initiated events should be subject to fair 
market valuation.
(6) The requirement that plans be totally benefit responsive in order to receive book value 
treatment on their insurance contracts, seems to be outside the scope of this Exposure 
Draft. AICPA should avoid this attempt to influence plan provisions which justifiably 
fall under the purview of ERISA.
(7) Grandfather and transition rules similar to those adopted in FAS 110 should be 
incorporated into any final rules adopted by AICPA. Employers and participants with 
existing contracts should not be penalized as a result of the transition to new 
accounting rules under AICPA guidelines.
Additionally, insurance companies should be granted additional time in order to 
develop the fully benefit responsive contracts which would satisfy AICPA proposed 
requirements. The availability of such contracts is of particular importance in the 
smaller plan market where usage of insurance company general account products is 
high.
In summary, the Exposure Draft, as written, does not appear to be serving it’s primary 
objective as outlined in item 7. under Reporting of Contracts. Item 7 states ’’The primary 
objective of a defined contribution plan’s financial statements is to provide information that 
is useful in assessing the plan’s present and future ability to pay benefits when they are due" 
(emphasis added). As indicated above, the Exposure Draft requires valuation as if all benefits 
were due on the valuation date rather than taking into account reasonable assumptions as to 
the benefit timing. Plan participants desire stability in their fixed investment vehicles and 
financial reporting in the fashion proposed would defeat that purpose.
Sincerely,
Michael J. Kinzer
Vice President and Chief Actuary
Attachment A
Illustration of Fair Value versus Book Value Surrender 
Values for Various Withdrawal Rates
Consider a contract with a 30% benefit responsive feature as discussed in Appendix 
A .8.C , with a $100,000 account value and a 9% surrender charge. Assume no market 
value adjustment. The following surrender charges and surrender values result where 
withdrawal rates are as indicated.
Market Value under 
Exposure Draft
Book Value under 
Contract Provisions
Withdrawal —Surrender— —Surrender—
Rates Charge Value Charge Value
5 % 315 4685 0 5000
10 % 630 9370 0 10000
20 % 1260 18740 0 20000
30 % 1890 28110 0 30000
40 % 2520 37480 900 39100
50 % 3150 46850 1800 48200
100 % 6300 93700 6300 93700
Note that where withdrawals are under the benefit responsive cap, losses which are 
not expected to be incurred are locked in for the affected plan participants who would 
otherwise be paid out at book value. Where withdrawals exceed the benefit 
responsive cap (until reaching 100%), losses are still greater than would otherwise be 
experienced by correctly assessing withdrawals first against the portion of the contract 
subject to benefit responsive provisions. If market value adjustments were assumed, 
the impact would be greater.
Attachment B
Illustration of Annual and Cumulative Return for 
Assuming use of Fair Value
Assume a $100,000 contract, a 6% interest rate, a 10% surrender charge grading off 
to 0 in 10 years, and 10% benefit responsiveness, assume no market value adjustment.
Accumulation Contract Annual Cum
Year Value SC Value Return
0 100,000 10 91,000
1 106,000 9 97,414 -2.59% -2.59
2 112,360 8 104,270 7.04 2.11
3 119,102 7 111,599 7.03 3.73
4 126,248 6 119,431 7.02 4.54
5 133,823 5 127,801 7.01 5.03
6 141,852 4 136,745 7.00 5.35
7 150,363 3 146,303 6.99 5.59
8 159,385 2 156,516 6.98 5.76
9 168,948 1 167,427 6.97 5.89
10 179,085 0 179,085 6.96 6.00
11 189,830 0 189,830 6.00 6.00
Note how the annual return starts out negative at -2.59%, then increases to a level 
(7.04%) above the underlying investment return (6.0%), decreases gently for eight 
years and then falls back to the underlying investment return (6.0%) a year after 
surrender charges have worn off. The cumulative return grades into the investment 
return during this period. The assumptions of a market value adjustment in any of 
the years would change the pattern of investment returns.
Appendix C
Payouts to Non-Highly Compensated and Highly-Compensated Employees 
Comparing Fair Value and Contract Value Treatment
Assume a plan with one highly compensated employee and one non-highly 
compensated employee. The unallocated investment product has an initial 10% 
surrender charge, decreasing at 1% annually. There is a 10% benefit responsive 
provision in the contract. Assume that the investment return on the contract is 6% 
annually.
The plan has two employees. Employee "A" is highly compensated, starting with a 
$100,000 account balance, with $10,000 annual contributions. Employee "A" 
maintains employment through the end of surrender charges. Employee "B" is a non- 
highly compensated position which terminates every three years at the beginning of 
the year and is replaced by a rehire.
Assume that earnings are allocated based on the beginning of the year account 
balance. Assume there is no market value adjustment.
The following payout patterns result:
Book Value Market Value
Surrender
Year Charge "A"
Payout
"B" "A"
Payout
"B"
1 .10 0 0 0 0
2 .09 0 6367 0 5921
3 .08 0 0 0 0
4 .07 0 0 0 0
5 .06 0 6367 0 6055
6 .05 0 0 0 0
7 .04 0 0 0 0
8 .03 0 6367 0 6189
9 .02 0 0 0 0
10 .01 0 0 0 0
11 .00 310893 6367 312432 6323
Total Percent
Pavouts Book Value Market Value Increase
Highly Compensated 310893 312432 0.5
Non-Highly Compensated 25469 24488 -3.8
Total 336362 336920 0.1
Note that total benefits paid to non-highly compensated employees decrease by 3.8 
percent due to the imposition of fair market value accounting where contract value 
would otherwise have been paid. The results would be more extreme if a market 
value adjustment was applicable.
U.S. Agency for
International
Development
November 30, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division
File Q—1—505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue 
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Dear M s . Hicks:
We have read the exposure draft, "Proposed Statement of Position - 
Reporting of Investment Contracts Held By Health and Welfare 
Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution Pension Plans" and offer no 
comment on it as presented.
Sincerely
Reginald Howard
Director, Financial Audits 
Office of the Inspector General
cc J. Durnil, AIG/A
320 Twenty-First Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20523
Hallmark
Cards
December 6, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q -1-505, A IC PA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W .
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Dear Ms. Hicks,
This memo is in response to  David Walker’s and Gerard Yarnall's letter o f  September 15, 
1993 (re: SOP Exposure D raft on Reporting o f  Investment Contracts) and, in particular, 
to their instruction to  give special attention to the requirement to  value investment 
contracts that are deemed not to  be fu lly  benefit responsive because o f  plan restrictions at 
fa ir value (paragraph 10).
Paragraph 10 o f  the 9/15/93 SOP draft addresses a situation that was described by M r. 
Ken Dakdduk to FASB board members in a letter dated M ay 10 1993 (copy attached).
M r. Dakdduk noted that "...the proposed SOP does not address situations in which limits, 
restrictions, or conditions result from  the terms o f  the p lan" (italics mine). Specifically, 
M r. Dakdduk objected that "...it is inappropriate to  use contract value i f  there is any event 
that upon occurrence could result in participants receiving an amount that is less than 
contract value, regardless o f  the probability o f  such an event occurring." AICPA's 
apparent response to  this objection was an addition to  paragraph 10 which attempts to 
define "reasonable access" by plan participants to  their funds in defined contribution plans. 
An example is cited in paragraph 10 which states: " ... if  plan participants are allowed 
access at contract value to all or a portion o f  their account balances only upon termination 
o f  their participation in the plan, it would not be considered reasonable access and, 
therefore, investment contracts held by that plan would generally not be deemed to  be 
fu lly benefit responsive."
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The example quoted above places new conditions on whether investment contracts w ill be 
deemed benefit responsive, i.e. i f  a ll o r even a portion  o f  account balances are not 
accessible until termination, investment contracts held by the plan would not be considered 
benefit responsive. The Hallmark Profit Sharing plan has used investment contracts 
extensively and has the follow ing access provisions: (1) Hardship withdrawals o f  up to 
25% o f  the total account balance are permitted after 5 years o f  service; (2) Up to  100% o f  
the participant's balance may be transferred at 50 years o f  age and w ith  15 years o f  
service; and (3) 100% o f  balances are immediately available upon termination. The 
motivation behind these plan rules is to  encourage participants to  accumulate value fo r use 
in their retirement years (as, fo r example, the way restrictions on 401(k) withdrawals do). 
However, the Hallmark plan includes no provisions fo r a "penalty" (i.e. use o f  some value 
other than contract value that could result in valuation below contract value) regardless o f  
the volume o f  dollars transferring from  or being paid out by the plan in response to 
participant-initiated transactions. I t  is conceivable that all contracts held in the Hallmark 
plan would have to be liquidated; in such an event all participants would receive contract 
value.
I t  seems unnecessary to me to  use a broad definition o f  "fund access" in order to 
determine when investment contracts should or should not be reported at contract value. 
There are legitimate reasons fo r plans in governing access to  plan assets. In  our view it 
may be proper i f  (again citing the revised SOP paragraph 10) "...plan participants are 
allowed access at contract value to all or a portion o f  their account balances only upon 
termination o f  their participation in the plan.” The existence o f  a plan rule such as this 
should not, o f  itself, cause investment contracts to  be valued at market. In  Hallmark's case 
participants can only receive contract value, and, in fact, w ill never receive market value.
In summary, we view the accounting pursuant to  paragraph 10 as revised September 15, 
1993 as not appropriate because it  places an unduly harsh restriction on the ability o f  
benefit plans to  reasonably lim it participant access to  funds. The example used to  define 
"substantially restricted" access implies that participants must have complete access to  all 
assets at any time prior to  termination in order fo r the plans' contracts to  be considered 
benefit responsive and fo r contracts to be held at contract value. We would suggest one 
o f  tw o actions to  correct this situation: (1) "substantially restricted" and "access" should 
be more clearly defined so as to  allow reasonable lim itation by plans on participant access, 
or (2) the February 17, 1993 draft o f  paragraph 10 should be adopted and the wording 
dealing w ith  participant access omitted
Please let me know i f  you have any questions concerning these comments.
Sincerely,
Douglas M . Browning 
Benefit Trusts D irector 
Hallmark Cards, Inc. 
Tel: (816)-274-3381
aicpa931
memorandum
Financial Accounting 
Standards Board
To: Board Members
From: Ken Dakdduk
Subject: Proposed Statement of Position on Date: May 10, 1993 
Reporting of Investment Contracts 
Held By H&W Benefit Plans and 
Defined-Contribution Pension 
Plans
CC: Lucas, Ball, Vernuccio
For Discussion at the May 1 9 , 1993 
Board Meeting
At its May 19, 1993 meeting, the Board will discuss the attached draft of a 
proposed AICPA Statement of Position (SOP) on reporting of investment 
contracts held by health and welfare benefit plans and defined-contribution 
pension plans. The AICPA undertook this project at the Board's request and now 
is asking the Board to clear this proposed SOP for exposure for public comment
The proposed SOP would amend Chapters 3,4, and 7 of the AICPA Audit and 
Accounting Guide Audits of Employee Benefit Plans, and Statement of Position 
92-6, Accounting and Reporting by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans. It requires 
health and welfare benefit plans and defined-contribution pension plans to report 
investment contracts issued by an insurance enterprise or other entity at fair value 
and stipulates that contract value, which is defined as principal plus accrued 
interest, approximates fair value if an investment contract is fully benefit 
responsive. Contracts that incorporate mortality or morbidity risk can also be 
reported at contract value.
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Relationship to Other Pronouncements
The proposed SOP would constitute Level B in the GAAP hierarchy. Accounting 
guidance for financial statements of defined-contribution pension plans and health 
and welfare benefit plans is not addressed by Level A GAAP. Thus, the proposed 
SOP would not conflict with existing professional literature in a higher category of 
GAAP. However, it would affect accounting literature in the same category of * 
GAAP (i.e., Level B), by amending Chapters 3,4, and 7 of the AICPA Audit and 
Accounting Guide Audits of Employee Benefit Plans and SOP 92-6, Accounting 
and Reporting by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans.
The requirement for defined contribution plans to report investment contracts at 
fair value is generally consistent with the requirements for defined benefit pension 
plans contained in FASB Statement No. 110, Reporting by Defined Benefit 
Pension Plans of Investment Contracts. Also consistent is the exception to the fair 
value requirement applicable to insurance contracts (i.e., contracts that 
incorporate mortality or morbidity risk) under both Statement 110 and the 
proposed SOP.
Improve or Prevent Deterioration in Practice
The staff understands that most plans now report investment contracts at 
contract value, which may or may not be fair value. Requiring the use of fair value 
at each reporting date can facilitate a financial statement user's assessment of the 
plan’s ability to pay benefits and would provide information necessary for 
assessing both annual investment performance and the stewardship 
responsibility of plan administrators and other fiduciaries. To that extent, fair 
value reporting would result in an improvement in existing accounting practice.
The proposed SOP indicates that fair value can be contract value if investment 
contracts have fully benefit responsive features. Thus, the degree of 
improvement in practice arising from fair value reporting will depend on whether 
or not investment contracts are fully benefit responsive. Assuming that most 
plans report investment contracts at contract value under current guidance, there 
would be no change in the reported value of those contracts under the proposed 
SOP if they are fully benefit responsive. On the other hand, if most contracts are 
not fully benefit responsive and are being reported at contract value under current 
guidance, a switch to fair value reporting could be a significant change and, thus, 
could result in an improvement in practice. The staff cannot determine the extent 
to which defined contribution plans currently hold contracts that are fully benefit 
responsive.
Benefit responsiveness is discussed in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the proposed 
SOP.
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The extent to which a contracts terms or related agreement 
permit and require withdrawals at contract value tor benefit 
payments, loans, or transfers to other investment options offered 
to the participant by the plan. Investment contracts must transfer 
principal and accrued interest risk to a financially responsible 
third party (that is, they provide for all participant-initiated 
transactions permitted by an ongoing plan at contract value with 
no conditions, limits, or restrictions) to be considered fully benefit 
responsive.
A fully benefit responsive investment contract (whether with an 
insurance enterprise or other entity) provides a guarantee by a 
financially responsible third party of principal and previously 
accrued interest for liquidations, transfers, loans, or hardship 
withdrawals initiated by plan participants exercising their rights to 
withdraw, borrow, or transfer funds under the terms of the 
ongoing plan.
These paragraphs state that the "contract" must provide for all participant-initiated 
transactions permitted under the terms of the ongoing plan at contract value with 
no conditions, limits, or restrictions in order to be considered fully benefit 
responsive and, thus, be reported at contract value. This provision focuses on 
the contract itself and stresses that the contract cannot place limits, conditions, or 
restrictions on a participants ability to access the full amount of his or her account 
balance at contract value. However, the proposed SOP does not address 
situations in which limits, restrictions, or conditions result from the terms of the 
plan. For instance, a plan may stipulate that if more than one-third of its 
participants request a hardship withdrawal, the amount of funds available to those 
participants will be limited. That stipulation may be necessary to prevent the plan 
from having to liquidate certain underlying contracts at a penalty (i.e., subject to a 
market value adjustment) if cash or other benefit responsive contracts would be 
insufficient to meet the large cash demand. In that situation, the proposed SOP 
would appear to support the use of contract value even though "under the terms 
of the ongoing plan" the dollar amount of funds the participants would receive or 
have access to would be limited by the plan and, therefore, be less than contract 
value.
The staff believes that the use of contract value under a document that requires 
the use of fair value is inappropriate in any situation in which a market value 
adjustment could be required at any time during the contract period, regardless of 
its probability and regardless of the limits of the plan, because in those situations 
participants are not guaranteed to receive the full amount of principal plus 
accrued interest in their accounts and contract value would not equal fair value. 
Further, if the contract cannot have limits on participant-initiated transactions to 
be fully benefit responsive, it is inconsistent to allow the plan itself to impose such
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limits and still get the use of contract value reporting. If the underlying motivation 
is to use contract value, the proposed SOP should simply require its use and not 
attempt to equate contract value with fair value. Alternatively, if the document is 
suggesting that contract value is appropriate in some circumstances and fair 
value is appropriate in others, it does not clearly distinguish those circumstances. 
Need for the Proposed SOP
The staff believes that there is a need for guidance in this area. Many defined 
contribution plans have invested funds in investment contracts and, in light of the 
guidance in Statement 110 with respect to defined benefit plans, reevaluating the 
accounting treatment of investment contracts for defined contribution plans is 
appropriate. The FASB decided not to address this matter as part of the 
development of Statement 110 because doing so would have significantly slowed 
and expanded that project Instead, the Board asked the AICPA to address the 
reporting issue for defined contribution plans in view of its experience with those 
plans. No new developments or events have occurred to reduce the need for the 
proposed SOP.
Cost/Benefit Considerations
The staff believes that the cost of complying with the proposed SOP is diminished 
since the guidance would allow the continued use of contract value reporting for 
fully benefit responsive contracts. Thus, only investment contracts that are not 
fully benefit responsive would have to be valued and, therefore, it would not be 
necessary for all plans to generate valuations of all contracts. However, the staff 
cannot determine the extent to which contract value will continue to be used.
STAFF RECOMMENDATION
The staff recommends that the Board not object to exposure of this proposed 
SOP if it is clarified regarding whether its requirement is to use contract value, fair 
value, or something in between. The staff believes that part of that clarification 
would involve addressing whether the terms of the ongoing plan would make it 
inappropriate to use contract value to report contracts held by plans whose terms 
may limit the amount a participant has access to.
If fair value reporting is to be required, the proposed SOP should make it clear 
that if a transaction or event that is permitted under the terms of the ongoing plan, 
including a plan-initiated transaction, could trigger a penalty at any time during the 
contract period, contract value is not fair value regardless of the probability of 
such an event occurring. Further, the staff disagrees with the use of probability in 
Example 2 in the Appendix. The guidance in this example under paragraph A.8 
says that contract value approximates fair value unless it is probable that the plan 
will be terminated, spunoff, or amended, or a significant number of employees will 
terminate. The staff believes it is inappropriate to use contract value if there is any
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event that upon occurrence could result in participants receiving an amount that is 
less than contract value, regardless of the probability of such an event occurring.
If the task force desires contract value to be used, the proposed SOP should 
simply require its use rather than require the use of fair value and the document 
should not try to equate contract value with fair value.
If the task force believes contract value is appropriate in some instances and fair 
value in other instances, the staff believes the document should better distinguish 
the circumstances under which each would be appropriate.
The proposed SOP adequately complies with the remaining criteria required by 
the Board for clearance of AICPA accounting proposals.
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Employee Benefit Plans Committee 
Federal Government Division
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants
8
Exposure Draft: Reporting of Investment Contracts Held 
By Health and Welfare Benefit Plans
And Defined Contribution Pension Plans 
September 15, 1993
Response by: Accounting and Auditing Standards Committee
Louisiana Society of Certified Public Accountants 
2400 Veterans Blvd., Ste. 500
Kenner, LA 70062 504-464-1040
General We basically concur with the provisions of this SOP. 
However, we have the following comments:
Paragraph, #
1 - 2  No comment. Informational - introduction and scope.
4 Good guidance. Defined benefit plans should report 
investment contracts at fair value. Defined contribution 
plans, including both health and welfare and pension 
plans should report fully benefit responsive investment 
contracts at contract value and all other investment 
contracts at fair value.
5 - 7  Good guidance. Informational concerning certain aspects 
of defined benefit and contribution plans.
8 Agree that plan assets of defined contribution plans 
should be measured and reported at values that are 
meaningful to financial statement users.
9 - 1 0  Good guidance. Informational related to a fully benefit 
responsive investment contract.
11 Agree that health and wealth benefit plans and defined 
contribution pension plans should report insurance 
contracts in the same manner required by ERISA annual 
reporting requirements of DOL Form 5500 or 5500-C/R.
12 - 13 No comment. Background information.
14 Disclosure should be required to include a market rate of 
interest for fully benefit responsive contracts reported 
at contract value. The plan should disclose the money 
market rate as of the most recent statement of net assets 
date.
15 - 16 Good guidance.
17 No comment on the effective date and transition. 
Appendix Good guidance.
9December 1, 1993
Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Accounting Standards Division 
File Q-l-505
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
The Committee on Accounting Principles of the Illinois CPA 
Society ("Committee") with the assistance of the Committee on 
Employee Benefits is pleased to have the opportunity to comment 
on the Exposure Draft of the Proposed Statement of Position, 
Reporting of Investment Contracts Held by Health and Welfare
Plans and Defined-Contribution Pension Plans ("Proposed
Statement"). The organization and operating procedures of the 
Committee are reflected in the Appendix of this letter. These 
recommendations and comments represent the position of the 
Illinois CPA Society rather than any of the members of the 
Committee and of the organizations with which they are 
associated.
The Committee supports the AICPA in its efforts to conform 
reporting of health and welfare plans and defined contribution 
pension plans ("defined contribution plans") with defined benefit 
plans. The Committee concurs with the requirements of the 
Proposed Statement. The Committee agrees'with the document as 
drafted in not requiring disclosure of market rates of interest 
for fully benefit responsive contracts. This information would 
not be meaningful to plan participants. The Committee also 
concurs with the proposed transition rules and effective date.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments and recommendations 
with members of the Employee Benefit Plans Committee or staff of 
the Federal Government Division.
Very truly yours,
2 r\£ _ .
2 2   \
s o u t h  Bernard Revsine, Chairman 
r i v e r Committee on Accounting
s i d e  p l a za Principles
S U I T E  1 6 0 0  
C H I C A G O ,  I L .
6 0 6 0 6 - 6 0 9 8  
T E L :  3 1 2 - 9 9 3 - 0 3 9 3
F A X  - 3 1 2 - 9 9 3 - 9 9 5 A
APPENDIX
ILLINOIS CPA SOCIETY 
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES COMMITTEE 
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATING PROCEDURES
1993-1994
The Accounting Principles Committee of the Illinois CPA Society 
(the Committee) is composed of 27 technically qualified,
experienced members appointed from industry, education and public 
accounting. These members have Committee service ranging from 
newly appointed to 15 years. The Committee is a senior technical 
committee of the Society and has been delegated the authority to 
issue written positions, representing the Society, on matters 
regarding the setting of accounting principles.
The Committee usually operates by assigning a subcommittee of its 
members to study and discuss fully exposure documents proposing 
additions to or revisions of accounting principles. The 
subcommittee ordinarily develops a proposed response which is 
considered, discussed and voted on by the full Committee.
Support by the full Committee then results in the issuance of a 
formal response, which, at times, includes a minority viewpoint.
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Wil l ia m  A . M u t c h
C E R T IF IE D  P U B L IC  A C C O U N T A N T
P.0. Box 33 
Oceanport, N J • 07757 
(908) 747 - 6580
December 9 , 1993
Susan W. Hicks, Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q-l-505, AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW.
W ash in g to n , DC. 20004-1081
Dear Ms. H icks:
Here are my comments on reporting of Investment contracts 
re: Exposure Draft 9/15/93-
Regarding paragraph 1 5 g  a market rate of Interest for fully 
benefit responsive contracts reported at contract value would 
not be useful for users of defined-contribution plan statements. 
That would be comparing apples and oranges. Reporting the yield 
rate for other options within the plan would be beneficial.
Regarding paragraph 10, there are no Internal Revenue Code 
implications. Contract value should be disclosed for investment 
contracts that are not fully benefit responsive where a plan 
also contains contracts that are fully benefit responsive to 
be comparable.
Sincerely,
William A . Mutch
INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTANTS 
10 PARAGON DRIVE 
MONTVALE, NEW JERSEY 07645-1760 
(201) 573-9000
I l
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 
PRACTICES COMMITTEE
1993-94 MEMBERS
Frank C. Minter, Chairman  
AT&T International (Ret.)
-  Samford University 
Birmingham, A labam a
Martin Abrahams 
Coopers & Lybrand 
New York, N ew  York
Philip D. Am een  
General Electric Com pany  
Fairfield, Connecticut
Victor H. Brown 
George Mason University 
Fairfax, Virginia
Diane M. Butterfield 
Chem ical Bank 
N ew York. N ew  York
Patricia P. Douglas 
University o f M ontana  
Missoula, M ontana
Kenneth J. Johnson 
Motorola. Inc.
Schaumberg. Illinois
Thomas H. Kelly 
Schering-Plough Corporation 
Madison. N ew  Jersey 
Alfred M. King
Valuation Research Corporation 
Princeton. N ew  Jersey
Ronald L. Leach 
Eaton Corporation 
Cleveland. Ohio
John J. Lordan 
Johns Hopkins University 
Baltimore. Maryland 
Fred J. Newton
Defense Contract Audit Agency  
Alexandria. Virginia
John J. Perrell. Ill 
American Express C om pany  
New York. N ew  York
Stanley A. Ratzlaff 
Pacific Enterprises 
Los Angeles. California
L. Hal Rogero. Jr.
M e ad  Corporation 
Dayton. Ohio
Fred S. S ch u tte  
Oshkosh Truck Corporation 
Oshkosh, Wisconsin
Joseph J. Smith 
IBM Corporation 
Armonk. N ew  York
John E. Stewart
Arthur Andersen & C om pany
C hicago. Illinois
Norman N. Strauss 
Ernst & Young 
N ew York. N ew  York
Edward W. Trott 
KPMG Peat Marwick  
White Plains. N ew  York
Decem ber 8 , 1 9 9 3
M s. Susan W . H icks
Techn ica l M anager
Federal G overnm ent D iv is ion , File Q -1 -505
A m erican  In s titu te  o f C e rtified  Public A cco u n ta n ts
1 4 5 5  Pennsylvania A venue, N .W .
W ash ing ton , DC 2 0 0 0 4 -1 0 8 1
Re: PSOP: R eporting o f Inves tm en t C on trac ts  
Held by Health and W e lfa re  B ene fit Plans and 
Defined - C o n trib u tion  Pension Plans
Dear M s. H icks:
The M anagem ent A cco u n tin g  Practices C o m m itte e  (M AP) o f th e  
In s titu te  o f M anagem ent A cco u n ta n ts  is pleased to  respond to  
the  referenced Proposed S ta tem en t o f Position .
M A P  believes th a t fo r  de fined co n tr ib u tio n  p lans, the
fundam en ta l th ru s t o f the  PSOP is m isp laced. Rather than  try in g  
(unsuccessfu lly ) to  m eet plan p a rtic ip a n ts ’ needs by de te rm in ing  
if  ind iv idua l in ves tm en t co n tra c ts  are be n e fit responsive , the  
th ru s t o f re levant reporting  shou ld  be aim ed a t w h e th e r o r n o t 
th e  plan as a w h o le  is ben e fit responsive. M A P  s tro n g ly  urges 
AcSEC to  ca re fu lly  reconsider a rule th a t, as exp la ined b e low , 
w o u ld  fo rce  plan m anagers to  e ithe r repo rt m is lead ing 
in fo rm a tio n  to  pa rtic ipan ts , or change th e ir  in ves ting  s tra teg ies , 
w h ich  w ill (and, in fa c t, has already begun to ) needlessly resu lt 
in a ve ry  real financ ia l co s t to  the  va s t m a jo rity  o f the  pub lic  w h o  
pa rtic ip a te  in de fined c o n tr ib u tio n  plans.
S pec ifica lly , em ployers/p lan  sponsors s trive  to  se lec t p ruden t 
fund  m anagers to  m anage in ves tm en t veh ic les  on beha lf o f th e  
p a rtic ip an ts  w h o  o w n , and have in ves tm en t veh ic le  se lec tion  
respon s ib ility  fo r, th e ir  plan accoun ts . T ra d itiona lly , those  
m anagers con tin u a lly  fo re cas t liq u id ity  needs fo r  all in ve s tm e n t 
veh ic les, inc lud ing  y ie ld -typ e  veh ic les th a t ty p ic a lly  inc lude  th e  
in ve s tm e n t co n tra c ts  covered by the  PSOP, and in ve s t in
Staff-
M anagem ent Accounting Practices 
Louis Bisgay. Director
appropria te  in s trum en ts  accord ing  to  those  needs. For ins tance , liq u id ity  
fo r  accou n t tran s fe rs , p a rtic ip an t w ith d ra w a ls , e tc ., can be sa tis fied  by  (in 
add ition  to  fu tu re  cash in flo w s  fro m  co n tr ib u tio n s  and m a tu ring  co n tra c ts ) 
a m ix  be tw e en  cash-like  in ves tm en ts  (e.g ., m oney m arke t funds) and 
guaranteed in ve s tm e n t co n tra c ts  th a t have the  guaranteed liq u id ity  
fea tu res  described by th e  PSOP. The resu lting  liq u id ity  p o rtfo lio  m ay, fo r 
exam ple, accou n t fo r  2 0 %  o f the  ve h ic le ’s princ ipa l. The rem ain ing 
p rinc ipa l m ay then  be invested  in in ves tm en t co n tra c ts  th a t do n o t 
guarantee im m ed ia te  liq u id ity  and, the re fo re , do n o t m eet th e  PSOP’s fu lly  
b e n e fit responsive c rite ria . H ow eve r, these  co n tra c ts  p rov ide  a grea te r 
y ie ld  to  plan pa rtic ip an ts  than  fu lly  b en e fit responsive c o n tra c ts  w h ose  
guaranteed liq u id ity  fea tu res  are expensive . A s a resu lt o f th e  m anager's  
e ffo rts , the  plan is fu lly  be n e fit responsive w h ile  a t th e  sam e tim e  
p rov id ing  a h igh y ie ld . U n fo rtuna te ly , as described b e low , th e  pa rtic ip a n ts  
o f these  plans w ill be undu ly  penalized because 8 0 %  o f p rinc ipa l does n o t 
m ee t th e  PSOP crite ria .
C oncep tua lly , the re  should be no increm en ta l co s t to  p a rtic ip an ts  s tr ic t ly  
because in ve s tm e n t co n tra c ts  do n o t m eet the  be n e fit responsiveness 
crite ria  o f th e  PSOP. H ow ever, because o f th e ir fid u c ia ry  respons ib ilitie s  
to  p rov ide  accura te  in fo rm a tion  to  plan pa rtic ipan ts , p lan m anagers m u s t 
e x it or res truc tu re  all non -bene fit responsive in ve s tm e n t co n tra c ts  th a t 
w o u ld  be reported  a t fa ir  va lue under the  PSOP, and in th e ir  p lace, in ve s t 
in the  m ore expensive fu lly  ben e fit responsive co n tra c ts . (W hile  th is  
w o u ld  resu lt in less princ ipa l invested  in cash-type  in ve s tm e n ts  and a 
resu lting  re-coup o f som e o f the  lo s t y ie ld  in to d a y 's  in te re s t rate 
env ironm en t, the  a b ility  to  m axim ize y ie lds on beha lf o f th e  p a rtic ip a n ts  
w h ile  s till m a in ta in ing  overa ll plan ben e fit responsiveness is severe ly 
d im in ished .) The reason fo r  ex iting  or re s truc tu ring  those  co n tra c ts  is 
th a t repo rting  them  a t fa ir  va lue w o u ld  n o t on ly  p rov ide  each p a rtic ip a n t 
w ith  irre levan t in fo rm a tio n , it  w o u ld  c o n s titu te  gross neg ligence by 
m is lead ing  pa rtic ip an ts  in to  erroneous in ves tm en t dec is ions. Th is  is 
because th e  plan canno t, and thus  the  pa rtic ip a n t canno t, receive 
any th ing  m ore than  c o n tra c t va lue. The fa c t is th a t these  plans 
tra d it io n a lly  hold in ves tm en t co n tra c ts  to  m a tu rity  and, barring im pa irm en t 
p rob lem s o f the  issuer, receive no m ore or less than  th e  o rig ina lly  
con tra c te d  princ ipa l and in te res t. To h igh ligh t th is  po in t, im ag ine  th e  
p a rtic ip a n t w h o , in to d a y 's  lo w  in te res t ra te  env ironm en t, exam ines his or 
her qua rte rly  401 (k) s ta te m e n t and fin d s  a fa ir  va lued "gua ran teed  incom e 
fu n d "  am oun t th a t is in a c tu a lity  5%  greater than  c o n tra c t va lue  and, 
upon re ly ing  on th is  in fo rm a tio n , m akes a change in in ve s tm e n t veh ic les  
or takes o u t a hardsh ip  loan. The p a rtic ip an t then  rece ives th e  lo w e r 
c o n tra c t va lue paym en t (or, if  th e y  receive the  reported  va lue , w o u ld  be 
s h o rt chang ing  the  rem ain ing plan pa rtic ipan ts  w h o  w ill receive an am oun t 
lo w e r than  c o n tra c t va lue upon c o n tra c t m a tu rity ).
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T here fo re , to  avoid reporting  erroneous in fo rm a tio n  under th e  PSOP, plan 
m anagers m u s t replace or res truc tu re  ex is ting  in ve s tm e n t co n tra c ts  w ith  
th e  m ore expensive fu lly  b en e fit responsive co n tra c ts  so th a t th e y  can 
con tin ue  to  repo rt re levan t in fo rm a tio n , u n fo rtu n a te ly  a t th e  c o s t to  plan 
p a rtic ip an ts . (This rep lacem ent process has a lready begun in an tic ip a tio n  
o f th is  accou n ting  ru le.) This resu lt seem s to  us to  be unacceptab le .
To rem edy th is  s itu a tio n , M AP recom m ends th a t AcSEC cons ide r a h igher 
level approach by p rov id ing  gu idance fo r  accoun ting  fo r  th e  assets o f 
de fined  c o n tr ib u tio n  p lans on a un ified  p o rtfo lio  basis. For ins tance , th e  
c rite ria  o f FAS 1 15 , A cco u n tin g  fo r  Inves tm en ts , cou ld  be app lied to  
de te rm ine  th e  a b ility  o f th e  plan to  hold in ve s tm e n t co n tra c ts  to  m a tu rity  
a fte r assuring th a t all fo reseeab le liq u id ity  needs are m e t w ith  
in s tru m e n ts  th a t w o u ld  be fa ir  va lued. Th is  approach w o u ld  m im ic  th e  
resu lts  o f e ffic ie n t plan m anagers th a t co n tin u o u s ly  m a in ta in  a fu lly  
b e n e fit responsive p o rtfo lio .
Failing accep tance o f th a t recom m endation , it  is im pera tive  th a t AcSEC 
prov ide  fo r  p rospective  app lica tion  o f the  proposed accou n ting  to  
in ve s tm e n t co n tra c ts  purchased a fte r the  PSOP's e ffe c tiv e  da te , th u s  
g rand fa the ring  ex is ting  in ves tm en t co n tra c ts  (w h ich  o fte n  have a 5 year 
m a tu rity ) so as to  p reven t plan pa rtic ip an ts  fro m  incu rring  losses fro m  the  
p rem atu re  rep lacem ent o r res truc tu re  o f those  co n tra c ts . Please be 
m in d fu l th a t th is  a lte rna tive  so lu tion  (as w e ll as a th ird  cho ice  - m aking  
th e  PSOP e ffe c tiv e  a fte r Decem ber 3 1 ,  199 8 ) does n o t p reven t the  
add itiona l co s t to  plan pa rtic ipan ts  o f paying c o n tra c t m anu fac tu re rs  a 
prem ium  fo r  fu lly  b en e fit responsive co n tra c ts  in th e  fu tu re .
W ith  respect to  o the r spec ific  po in ts  in the  PSOP, M A P  agrees th a t fu lly  
b e n e fit responsive  in ves tm en t co n tra c ts , w h e th e r issued by insurance 
com pan ies or o the r c re d it w o rth y  in s titu tio n s , c learly  shou ld  be reported  
a t c o n tra c t va lue in the  financ ia l s ta te m en ts  o f de fined  co n tr ib u tio n  
re tire m en t plans. W e also agree th a t plan re s tr ic tio n s  th a t severe ly  lim it 
plan p a rtic ip a n ts ' access to  th e ir  accoun ts  fo r  in ve s tm e n t dec is ions, such 
as tra n s fe rs  be tw een  plan in ves tm en t veh ic les, can preclude be n e fit 
responsiveness. W e recom m end th a t a plan w h ic h  lim its  access to  less 
than  once per year be considered non -bene fit responsive.
F inally, regard ing the  question  posed by th e  PSOP abou t th e  use fu lness o f 
d isc los ing  th e  m arke t in te res t rate o f in ve s tm e n t c o n tra c ts  carried a t 
c o n tra c t va lue , M AP sees no m erit to  p rov id ing  th is  in fo rm a tio n  s ince  it  
w o u ld  be con fus ing  to  plan pa rtic ipan ts .
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W e w o u ld  be pleased to  d iscuss w ith  you any o f th e  po in ts  raised in th is  
response or any o the r m a tte rs  o f in te res t to  you.
C hairm an,
M anagem ent A cco u n tin g  P ractices C om m ittee
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Mobil Corporation 3225 GALLOWS ROAD 
FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA 22037-0001
December 3, 1993
ROBERT C. MUSSER 
CONTROLLER
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager,
Federal Government Division 
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 
Washington, DC 20004-1081
FILE Q-l-505 - PROPOSED SOP 
REPORTING OF INVESTMENT 
CONTRACTS HELD BY 
HEALTH AND WELFARE 
BENEFIT PLANS AND 
DEFINED-CONTRIBUTION 
PENSION PLANS
Dear M s . Hicks:
We have reviewed the proposed Statement of Position (SOP) - 
"Reporting of Investment Contracts Held by Health and Welfare 
Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution Pension Plans."
We agree that defined benefit health and welfare plans should 
value investment contracts at fair value, and that defined 
contribution plans (health and welfare as well as pension plans) 
should value fully benefit responsive investment contracts at 
contract value. These valuation methods will provide users of 
the financial, statements with highly relevant information. Also 
the accounting for contracts held by defined benefit health and 
welfare plans would be consistent with the requirements of FAS 
110 for defined benefit pension plans.
While the proposed SOP effectively addresses the issues of 
accounting for investment contracts, we are somewhat concerned 
with the expansive definition of full benefit responsiveness in 
paragraph 10. We believe that a contract is benefit responsive 
if its contract value will be realized by plan participants.
Plan provisions that restrict how a contract can be realized but 
do not alter the amount of realization should not have an impact 
on whether a contract is fully benefit responsive for reporting 
purposes. For example, plans with older type class period, fixed 
rate investment contract options typically restrict transfers to 
other investments before maturity, but allow and provide contract
Mobil
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value for ongoing participant loans or withdrawals. Those with 
more m o d e m  "blended" or "floating" rate investment contract 
options typically provide contract value for all participant- 
initiated transactions but require a three or six month "equity 
wash" before funds can be transferred to competing fixed income 
investments. These types of restrictions do not impair contract 
value payments and should not result in "fair" rather than 
contract value reporting. Only if Plan actions or restrictions 
cause the contract not to be benefit responsive (i.e., reali­
zation at a value other than contract value), would we then agree 
to a fair value measurement.
You specifically requested comments on the need to disclose 
market rates of interest for fully benefit responsive contracts. 
In our view, the addition of these disclosures would add an 
unnecessary complexity without providing meaningful information. 
Since contract value is the amount that participants will receive 
from fully benefit responsive contracts, we fail to see how 
market value disclosures would enhance the investing and 
borrowing decisions of the plan participants.
In conclusion, we believe that by correlating the underlying 
economic relationships of these investment contracts with the 
type of plans that hold them, this proposed SOP, along with FAS 
110, establishes well reasoned accounting guidance.
Very truly yours
Robert C. Musser
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Shell Oil Company
One Shell Plaza
P. O. Box 2463 
Houston.Texas 77252
W .J .Ih iamfeldt
Assistant Comptroller December 10, 1993
Ms. Susan W . Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division
F i l e  Q -1-505
American Institute of CPA's
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 2 0 0 0 4 - 1 0 8 1
Dear Ms. Hicks:
Shell Oil Company is pleased to have the opportunity to 
comment on the AICPA's September 15, 1993 proposed Statement of 
Position (SOP) entitled "Reporting of Investment Contracts Held by 
Health and Welfare Plans and Defined-Contribution Pension Plans."
We are in general agreement and particularly supportive 
of features allowing the reporting at contract value of investment 
contracts with fully benefit-responsive features for defined- 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  pension plans. However, the cover letter to the ED 
asks that consideration be given to requiring disclosure of a 
market rate of interest for such fully benefit-responsive contracts 
reported at contract value. We feel that this would not be 
beneficial or relevant to plan participants. We continue to stress 
that the only relevant market value for such fully benefit- 
responsive contracts is the contract rate- Implying otherwise by 
disclosure of the market rate would only serve to confuse 
participants and clutter the financial footnotes with non-value 
added data at an unnecessary cost.
Another issue that concerns us is the disclosure 
requirements for benefit-responsive investment contracts in the 
last sentence of paragraph 14 that calls for providing "a general 
description of . . .  . and any limitations on guarantees (for
example, premature termination of the contracts by the plan, plant 
closings, layoffs, plan termination, bankruptcy, mergers, and early 
retirement incentives)." Every contract written has some type of 
limitations that are typically employer initiated. We feel that 
t h e  w o r d  "probable" should be added after the word "any." This 
would prevent this disclosure requirement from becoming boiler­
plate and causing plan participants undue concerns by implying 
risks when the risks are only remote possibilities.
.WPD
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If you would like to discuss this further, please contact 
me at (713) 241-3219.
H. J . Ihlanfel dt
MK3 2 9 4 0 3 .W P D
Bankers Trust Company
One Bankers Trust Plaza, New York, New York 10006
Tami Pearse
Vice President 
GIC Derivatives 
Tel: 212-250-1711 
Fax: 212-250-8309
December 13, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q-l-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Dear M s . Hicks:
The Bankers Trust GIC Derivatives Group is a leading 
provider of BICs and synthetic GIC products to the defined 
contribution marketplace and we welcome the opportunity to 
respond to the AICPA Exposure Draft of the Proposed 
Statement of Position, "Reporting of Investment Contracts 
held by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined 
Contribution Plans” (the "Exposure Draft” or "ED”) . We 
broadly agree with the guidance provided in the Exposure 
Draft, in particular with the AI C P A 's views on the 
objectives of defined contribution financial statements and 
regarding the reporting at contract value. However, we have 
several comments to present with regard to Paragraph 10 of 
the Exposure Draft. In discussions both internally and with 
our clients we have focused on two concepts as they relate 
to full benefit responsiveness: 1) reasonable access and 2) 
the requirement of a zero percent crediting rate floor on 
variable rate products. The arguments which follow are 
intended to bring about further clarification of issues 
related to contract value accounting.
Reasonable Access and Full Benefit Responsiveness
In paragraph 10 of the Exposure Draft, the committee asserts 
that reasonable access by participants to make withdrawals 
at contract value for benefit payments, loans or transfers 
to other investment options is an required element in 
determining full benefit responsiveness. Following this 
logic, plan structure may impact on the determination of 
full benefit responsiveness of the contracts held by the 
plan.
However, ERISA does not mandate specific terms regarding 
plan structure, including access. Section 404(c) concerning 
the structure of defined contribution pension plans was 
offered as guidance, not as a requirement, to plans. 
ERISA allows each plan sponsor to make decisions regarding 
the structure of their plan and we believe many plan 
sponsors will choose not to adopt 404(c) recommendations. 
Participants in the plan have the ability to participate (or 
not) given the plan structure. Therefore, in a plan which 
offers more restrictive access to funds relative to some 
undefined standard, a participant does not expect to access 
the funds unless a plan-qualified withdrawal event occurs. 
The fact that the terms of the plan restrict a participant’s 
access in certain circumstances does not alter the fact 
that, if withdrawals were to occur, the funds available to a 
participant in a benefit responsive contract would be paid 
out at book value.
We believe, therefore, that the proposed requirement of 
reasonable access under the terms of the plan for a contract 
to be considered fully benefit responsive would result in 
misleading financial statements. Paragraph 7 of the ED 
notes that ” [t]he primary objective of a defined- 
contribution p l a n ’s financial statements is to provide 
information that is useful in assessing the p l a n ’s present 
and future ability to pay benefits when they are due.” 
Paragraph 8 continues ” [iInformation that is useful to plan 
participants includes the amount they would receive 
currently if they were to withdraw or borrow funds from or 
transfer funds within the plan.” When participants invest in 
contracts which cover withdrawals at book value under the 
terms of the plan, the funds which would be available to 
them for a withdrawal would be the book value amount. 
Restricted access to funds does not affect their value in 
the case of a withdrawal. If contracts which cover 
withdrawals at book value have to be reported at fair value 
because they are not considered fully benefit responsive, 
the financial statements would reflect unrealized gains or 
losses which, under the contract’s terms, would never be 
passed on to the participant. Therefore, carrying such a 
contract at a value other than book value would give 
participants misleading and inaccurate information as to the 
amount available for withdrawal. A contract which is benefit 
responsive in accordance with the withdrawal terms of the 
plan should be considered fully benefit responsive and 
should be carried at contract value because that is the fair 
value to the participant if he were to withdraw the funds. 
The value of the potential withdrawal is the information 
which is most useful to the participant in assessing 
benefits availability.
Zero Percent Crediting Rate Floor and Full Benefit 
Responsiveness
Paragraph 10 also proposes a requirement that a contract 
which provides for prospective interest rate adjustments 
must have a zero percent interest crediting rate floor 
("zero floor”) to be considered fully benefit responsive and 
to qualify for contract value accounting. There are several 
reasons why this proposed requirement would result in 
misleading financial statements and may actually hurt 
participants.
For reasons similar to those stated above we believe that 
contracts which provide for prospective interest rate 
adjustments and which do not include a zero floor would 
still need to be reported at contract value. In the event 
of a withdrawal by a plan participant, the absence of a zero 
floor does not make the contract value equal to the fair 
value of the securities. The amount available to a 
participant upon a withdrawal from the plan is, and remains, 
the contract value whether or not there is a zero floor. 
Under Examples 4 and 5 of the ED (pp. 18-19), the logic is 
drawn that contract value accounting is appropriate in the 
event "that participants can, and must, execute plan 
transactions at contract value." Therefore it would be 
misleading to present any value other than contract value on 
a participant’s statement, whether or not a zero floor 
exists.
Paragraph 4 of the ED supports the idea that certain events 
which may affect the value of a contract may make it 
appropriate to value the contract at something less than 
contract value. This rationale is sound for events in which 
the value realized upon a participant withdrawal could 
result in a payout which is less than the expected contract 
value on any given day. This difference in valuation would 
not result simply from the absence of a zero floor. The 
p l a n ’s crediting rate may decline, but the participant 
continues to realize the value shown on his statement. In 
particular, if the crediting rate is announced at the 
beginning of each reset period, any participant withdrawal 
made prior to the next reset would be honored at the 
expected value. If there is a difference between market and 
book value at the time of withdrawal, the participant is 
paid out at book value. Therefore, showing other than 
contract value would be misleading and incorrect.
Examples 4 and 5 of the ED emphasize the importance of the 
guaranteed return of principal and accrued interest. 
Synthetic GIC products structured with zero floors and an 
undefined and flexible maturity (which characterizes the 
majority of products currently being offered), however, are 
allowed to be carried at contract value. In effect, 
products with these terms are simply passing what would be
current negative crediting rate adjustments into the future. 
The zero floor is assumed to provide risk reduction that in 
practice does not exist. In the event of a withdrawal by 
the contractholder when market value is below book value, in 
order to preserve contract value accounting, the issuer of 
the benefit-responsive feature simply requires the contract 
to be held at a crediting rate of zero for some period to be 
determined at that time.
Paragraph 5 of the ED states that "defined contribution 
plans provide benefits based on amounts contributed to an 
employee's individual account plus or minus forfeitures, 
investment experience, and administrative expenses. The 
Internal Revenue Code generally requires that all investment 
experience under defined-contribution plans be allocated to 
individual account balances." In a product with a zero 
floor, actual portfolio returns are not credited to 
participants during this undefined zero percent holding 
period. Indeed, the crediting rate will not change, 
regardless of the performance of the portfolio. In light of 
these statements in Paragraph 5 of the ED, the plan 
fiduciary may not believe a zero crediting rate floor of 
this type is beneficial to the participants. Therefore, we 
believe that contracts without zero percent crediting rate 
floors which honor participant directed withdrawals at 
contract value should be carried at contract value.
As a practical concern, a structure which includes a zero 
percent holding period has potential credit risk. To 
preserve contract value accounting, the plan is forced to 
accept the credit risk of the issuer or of the wrap provider 
for an indeterminate period. If the plan sponsor, in his 
fiduciary role, determines it to be appropriate to accept 
some risk of a negative crediting rate instead of an 
undefined and potentially long period at a zero percent 
crediting rate, there should be no impact on the accounting 
treatment.
Also, requiring a zero floor would force the plan to pay for 
a feature which may or may not be needed or desired. A zero 
floor could, in some cases, provide true protection against 
the investment risk in the portfolio. However, in most 
cases, the contract is constructed so the investment and 
default risk is almost completely borne by the plan. Due to 
the perception that the zero percent floor reduces the risk 
to the plan, it must pay for the floor. The plan, however, 
continues to shoulder the risk. It is not usually in the 
interest of the participants to incur this expense.
Finally, requiring a zero floor may inhibit the ability of 
the plan to diversify the portfolio into certain investments 
which are expected to give added value to the participants 
in the plan. Many plan sponsors would like to diversify 
into other classes of securities to reduce the overall
investment risk of the portfolio. Defined benefit plans are 
able to use these asset classes because of their long 
investment horizon. Much has been written of late in the 
press about the risk of overly conservative investments 
(read: GICs/fixed income) being chosen by participants who 
are risk averse. Plan sponsors are concerned about the 
ability of participants to accumulate enough savings to 
retire with financial security. Many plan sponsors would 
like to offer their employees the opportunity to diversify 
conservatively into some classes of investments with higher 
risk in the short term and higher reward in the long term. 
A zero floor, however, may add significant cost to a product 
aimed at achieving more diversification for participants. 
The inability to carry at contract value such products 
greatly impedes the effort of plan sponsors to diversify and 
the requirement of a zero crediting rate floor is a 
significant roadblock. In its role as fiduciary the plan 
sponsor should be allowed to determine whether a zero floor 
is necessary or beneficial within the context of the plan, 
but the decision should not be driven primarily by 
accounting treatment if the end result is detrimental to the 
plan and its participants.
Summation
The decision of whether a contract should be carried at 
contract value or fair value should be based on what amount 
participants realize in the event of a plan-qualified 
withdrawal. Participants use financial statements to 
determine the amount of funds available for withdrawal and 
that is the information which should be given to them. 
Consistent with the statements cited above from Paragraphs 
5, 7 and 8, the values reported to participants are only 
useful if participants realize those values when a qualified 
withdrawal is made in accordance with the terms of the plan. 
Where a contract provides that all participant-directed, 
plan-qualified withdrawals are to be paid at book value, 
such contract should be valued at book value.
Thank you for taking our position into consideration. 
Please feel free to contact me with any questions or 
comments.
Sincerely,
15
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Liberty Jam es L. Veerkamp 
Vice-President 
1405) 231-6102 
FAX (405/ 231-6293
December 13, 1993
Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division 
File Q-I-505, AICPA 
1455 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W 
Washington, DC 20004-1081 
Dear Board,
On behalf of Liberty Bancorp (Liberty Bank and Trust Company of 
Oklahoma City, N.A., Liberty Bank and Trust Company of Tulsa, 
N.A., and Liberty Bank and Trust Company of Midwest City, N.A.), 
I want to express comments against the A I C P A ‘s Statement of 
Position (SOP) proposal to the extent that it sanctions the use 
of contract price for the valuation of guaranteed investment 
contracts owned by defined contribution (retirement) plans. Such 
a v a l u a t i o n  practice is a great disservice to those whose dollars 
are really invested in the contracts, the financially 
unsophisticated workers of America. We also feel that insurance 
companies and extremely large financial institutions enjoy an 
unfair competitive advantage over smaller investment institutions 
because of. the non-valuation privilege. Liberty Bancorp is 
especially concerned with some of the misguided logic being 
promulgated to justify the exception.
Guaranteed investment contracts in substance are merely debt 
instruments like any other corporate bond. The fact that they 
will never pay more than the contracted benefit merely puts a cap 
on t h e i r  market value.
The proposed SOP will allow valuation of these contracts at 
contract price if the contracts are "fully benefit responsive". 
As defined, the term "fully benefit responsive" glosses over the 
reality that the contracts are not fully responsive. They are 
dependent upon the creditworthiness of the issuers and 
guarantors, no matter how sound those companies appear to be. 
They do not pay at contract prices under all conditions.
There is a simple test as to whether the concept of contract 
price accounting is appropriate, whether or not the contracts 
are "fully benefit responsive". Would you allow a retirement 
trust to use contract pricing for any other corporate debt 
instrument if the maturity of the instrument coincides with the 
date payment is due and interim payments were generally 
impermissible? Do you allow corporations to price debt
Liberty Bank and T rust Com pany of Oklahoma City, N.A.
P. 0 . Box 25648 •  Oklahoma City, O K  73125
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securities at book price if they d o n ’t intend to liquidate them 
prior to maturity. The same rationale that restricts book-price 
reporting in these situations applies to guaranteed investment 
contracts.
Also, the term "benefit responsive” is misleading when it d oesn’t 
require book price payments in the event of real life 
contingencies such as plant closings, plan terminations or other 
premature contract withdrawals. Calling a conditional contract 
"fully benefit responsive" is like terming the following 
statement as "fully benefit responsive”, "We guarantee to pay 
100% plus interest on your investment except when you ask us to 
respond in less than ideal circumstances for us financially.” 
Such a guarantee is not responsive; it is contingent.
One market factor that can cause an investment contract to have a 
fair value that is lower than its contract price is the effect 
that interest rate changes in the market place have on the 
underlying collateral for the contract. You have asked for 
comments as to the need for disclosure of current market rates. 
The cleanest and easiest-to-understand disclosure would occur if 
the market value of the contracts were disclosed. Thus, if 
current interest rates were higher, the negative impact of this 
differential would be disclosed. If current interest rates were 
lower, the positive impact would be disclosed. To not require a 
prominent disclosure of some kind would be a travesty of 
integrity.
The proposed SOP calls for a disclosure of valuation reserves. 
This disclosure takes into consideration (belatedly) the obvious 
impairment in an investment contract's value due to significant 
credit problems of the issuer or guarantor. It does not address 
the effect of an issuer's financial condition upon the value of 
the contracts when reserves for valuation haven't occurred. Yet, 
when the issuer or guarantor's creditworthiness is not highest, 
the market value of its investment contracts are less than their 
contract prices. In addition, it is unrealistic to expect the 
average participant to be able to appreciate, much less quantify, 
the impact that a reserve has upon his or her benefit. On the 
other hand, market value reporting measures and discloses the 
effect of the issuer and guarantor's financial condition in a 
straight forward manner.
The proposed SOP seems to assume that, if a contract is issued by 
a c o m p a n y  that has the appearance of being financially sound, 
there is no risk of loss to plan participants. The risk that the 
" f i n a n c i a l l y  sound" issuers of guaranteed investment contracts 
will not be able to pay the promised returns according to the 
terms of the contract is still real today. The examples of 
E x e c u t i v e  Life Insurance Company a n d  M u t u a l  Benefit Life 
Insurance Company, etc., should have broken the illusion that 
negative scenarios of credit risk never occur. Executive Life 
Insurance Company became insolvent due to its risky investments 
going sour. It is generally surmised that Mutual Benefit Life
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became insolvent because many of their contract owners withdrew 
from its contracts in a short period of time. The insolvency of 
Mutual Benefit Life surprised everyone, including the guaranteed 
investment contract experts. There have been numerous other 
companies since then who have been quietly absorbed by other 
companies, with transferred annuity holders getting less than 
face value for their annuities.
Regarding the solvency of guaranteed investment contract issuers, 
any particular company that issues guaranteed investment 
contracts might be called upon to pay on a large number of their 
guaranteed investment contracts in a short period of time. There 
is never any assurance that a Defined Contribution Plan's 
contracts will not need to be liquidated in a shorter period of 
time than anticipated. When participants of a plan are able to 
direct their investments, they can all choose to withdraw from a 
particular guaranteed investment contract fund, motivated only by 
whim. Even when plan participants do not have the right to 
direct investments, they could all simultaneously be entitled to 
benefits under a scenario such as a plan termination or a site 
disaster resulting in the death of many participants. In 
addition, when many plans elect to not renew their guaranteed 
investment contracts with a particular guaranteed investment 
contract issuer, that issuer may incur a major cash flow problem. 
If an issuing company is required to pay on a substantial number 
of guaranteed investment contracts when insolvent or when there 
has been a fall in the value of the issuer's assets (the only 
significant collateral for the guaranteed investment contracts), 
the terms of the contract will not be able to be m e t . The only 
"guarantee" of a guaranteed investment contract is the issuer's 
general assets and sometimes the marginal possibility of 
assistance from the local state insurance fund. Even in those 
states that have insurance funds capable of assisting an 
insolvent guaranteed investment contract issuer, most state funds 
will not give preferred creditor status to guaranteed investment 
contract owners. The bottom line is: a $1 million guaranteed 
investment contract is not worth a million dollars when the 
issuer’s credit rating is less than perfect or when the assets in 
which it invests the guaranteed investment contract proceeds have 
declined in value.
One invalid argument used to justify the contract price 
valuations of guaranteed investment contracts is that when the 
underlying assets backing the guaranteed investment contract go 
up in market value, the plan participants do not receive a 
greater return than what is promised in the contract. In the 
same breath, the converse is added, "And when the underlying 
assets go down in value, the plan participants still receive the 
return contracted for in the guaranteed investment contract". 
This converse thought incorrectly assumes that market risk never 
has any victims and that negative scenarios never happen. 
Putting aside the issue of market risk for a moment but conceding 
that fair value does fluctuate during the life of a guaranteed
Page 3 o f 5
D EC -15-1993 1 6 :3 8  FROM LIBERTY BANK -  TRUST DEPT TO 1624865912026384512 P .0 5
investment contract, it is further invalidly argued that if 
Defined Contribution Plan participants who withdraw from a 
guaranteed investment contract investment fund before the 
maturity of the guaranteed investment contract are paid a return 
that is greater or lesser than the stated rate of the contract, 
then there will be a shortfall or surplus to be allocated to the 
remaining participants when the plan receives the full contract 
amount from the guaranteed investment contract. This is 
supposedly unfair. Rather than unfair, this allocation of 
unrealized appreciation/depreciation as of each allocation-of- 
earnings date is exactly what fairness requires. It is exactly 
what occurs for all other non-short term investments (even secure 
U S Treasury Notes) which Defined Contribution Plans invest in. 
Rather than justifying contract price valuation, the fact that 
guaranteed investment contracts state a fixed return should only 
dictate that their fair value is never higher than their contract 
price as well as not ever being higher than their market value 
which is significantly impacted by interest rate changes and by 
the value of their collateral (the guaranteed investment 
contract’s share of the net worth of the guaranteed investment 
contract issuer).
A second invalid argument used to justify contract price 
valuation for guaranteed investment contracts is the 
impracticality or impossibility of determining a fair value that 
can be allocated to plan participants, because of the absence of a 
secondary market to determine market value. There are two flaws 
in this “p r a c t i c a l i t y ” argument. The first flaw is that the 
existence of a readily ascertainable contract price (in the face 
of an elusive fair value) does not justify calling the contract 
p r ice w h a t  it is not. The contract’s terms are not definitive of 
its fair v a l u e  just like the terra of a U.S. Treasury Note does 
not define its fair value. The fact that it is universally 
agreed (feared) that the contract price of a guaranteed 
i n v e s t m e n t  contract will not equal its fair value is the 
strongest of evidence that contract price does not reflect 
economic reality. The second flaw in the "practicality" argument 
is that the argument supposes that expediency justifies 
deception. It is deceptive to hide the reality of market risk.1
A  third invalid argument used to support the contract price 
v a l u a t i o n  of guaranteed investment contracts is that the status 
quo is the best. It is not “best" to let plan participants 
retain the illusion that they are getting the higher earnings of 
a longer term investment without the increased risk of a longer 
term investment. The status quo is only "best” for those who 
truly profit from the existence of guaranteed investment 
contracts, i.e., insurance companies and guaranteed investment 
c o n t r a c t  analysts.
There is a final thought to consider regarding the risk of owning 
guaranteed investment contracts. The ongoing viability of 
insurance companies in general is not guaranteed, much less the 
viability of any one company. Up until 1991, the average
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American lived longer than those of earlier years. Sophisticated 
analysts are beginning to realize the impact that the halt in the 
growth of the national average life expectancy might have on 
insurance companies. Historically, insurance companies have had 
their earnings subtly (and substantially) propped up by the fact 
that their obligation to pay benefits under life insurance 
policies have occurred at a later point in time than their 
actuarial tables assumed because the tables were always based on 
outdated data. The extra earnings that the insurance companies 
have made on the delayed payments of benefits will no longer be 
available when life insurers' cost projections occur as 
projected. This is occurring as the national life expectancy 
average continues to remain the same.
In summary, when the Board issued Statement 110, it noted that a 
guaranteed investment contract is not a true insurance product 
and that the original rationale behind Statement 35 does not 
apply to guaranteed investment contracts. In reality, Statement 
35 became a loophole that was grabbed upon by promoters. The 
loophole should have been closed a long time ago. Just because 
it has expanded into a billion dollar industry that employs vocal 
lobbyists does not justify the continued existence of the 
loophole now that there is an awareness of the problems with the 
accounting exception.
_J ames L. Veerkamp
it might be noted that there are many investments which prudent plan 
fiduciaries shun solely due to the difficulty in determining market values. 
Difficulty in determining the market value of an investment is actually an 
indicator that there are not willing buyers for the particular investment in 
question,- and, by definition, a lack of willing buyers indicates that the 
investment in question has less market value than the seller/owner wants to 
admit. It is foreseeable that if the Board required the fair valuation of 
guaranteed investment contracts, a secondary market might spring up as 
guaranteed investment contract issuers redesign their contracts to make them 
assignable and marketable, and as buyers appear who are willing to assume 
guaranteed investment contracts at discount which would reflect the true 
market value of the guaranteed investment contracts.
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Lincoln National Life Insurance Company 
1300 South Clinton Street 
P.O.Box 208
Fort Wayne. Indiana 46801
LINCOLN NATIONAL 
PENSION INVESTMENT
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORPORATION
December 13, 1993
Susan W . Hicks
Technical Manager, Federal Government Division
File Q -l-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N .W .
Washington, D .C . 20004-1081
Re: Proposed Statement o f Position for Reporting o f Investment Contracts Held by Health 
and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-contribution Pension Plans 
Dear Ms. Hicks:
I  am commenting on behalf o f Lincoln National L ife Insurance Co. Lincoln National 
issues G IC and deposit administration contracts and has over 2000 clients with $3.2 billion 
invested in contracts which w ill be affected by the above statement.
In general, we applaud the concept o f allowing fully benefit responsive contracts owned by 
defined-contribution plans to be reported at contract value. Since most transactions in 
such contracts are processed at contract value, we agree that contract value is the most 
meaningful number to report.
You have asked for comments about specific sections of the SOP, and I  would like to 
address several sections where changes would be appropriate:
1. Effective date (Paragraph 17)
The effective date should be postponed to no sooner than 12 months after the statement is 
finalized, so that plans will have the time to implement necessary plan redesign or contract 
renegotiation.
The December 15, 1993 effective date listed in the exposure draft means that the statement 
will be effective before it is finalized. To comply with the language o f the draft, many plan 
sponsors will initiate plan changes or enter into negotiations with contract vendors to 
renegotiate contract provisions. Time is needed to adjust plan and contract design to the 
requirements of the final statement. Implementation before such changes are made could 
cause much confusion by requiring plans to report on a fair value basis temporarily and 
then reverting to a contract value basis.
2. Transition for existing contracts (Paragraph 17)
The final statement should include a transition period for existing contracts, in order to 
minimize the cost to plans of adding features to existing contracts and to reduce confusing 
reporting of contracts which cannot be renegotiated.
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As mentioned above, it will be the objective of most plans to report contracts at contract 
value. They w ill attempt to modify existing contracts which do not comply with the 
requirements o f the statement. Usually, this w ill entail adding benefit-responsive features 
to non-responsive contracts. In some cases, contract vendors may be unwilling to make 
these changes. I f  changes are made, there will normally be additional cost to the plan. In 
almost all cases, these changes would not be made in the absence o f the statement, since 
investment portfolios were structured so that existing non-responsive contracts would not 
have to be accessed for benefit payments at contract value. Therefore, these additional 
costs are the direct result of the statement and should be mitigated through transition 
provisions.
A  transition period would allow contracts to mature. Matured funds could be reinvested in 
contracts in compliance with the statement. This would avoid the expense o f modifying 
existing contracts.
A period o f five years would allow almost all existing contracts to mature without ill effect. 
A  shorter period would decrease proportionately the number o f contracts that would 
mature.
3. Plan restrictions on access to funds (Paragraph 15e)
There is a requirement in paragraph 10 to value contracts that are deemed not to be folly 
benefit responsive because o f plan restrictions at fair value. This language should be 
deleted from the final statement. The ability o f a plan sponsor to design plan features that 
offer participants an option which provides stable returns with reduced liquidity, while 
retaining contract valuation, should not be restricted. Valuation at contract value is 
appropriate i f  a contract’s terms permit and require contract value for withdrawals 
available under the plan.
In order to continue contract value reporting, a plan is required to provide reasonable 
access to funds. This language and the example given may cause several problems. There 
are a substantial number of plans where participants are not involved in investment 
decision making and do not have access to plan balances until they terminate their 
participation in the plan. For example, some plans have all assets invested in a single 
investment contract. Other plans have multiple investments, including benefit-responsive 
investment contracts, but investment decisions are made by plan fiduciaries, not 
participants. Transactions under such contract are executed at contract value, and contract 
value is the most appropriate reported value to participants, even though participants do 
not have access to funds in the contract before termination o f their participation in the 
plan.
When participants are involved in investment decisions, plans restrict participant activity 
for a variety of reasons. These include restrictions to control administrative cost, 
restrictions to preserve plan benefits for retirement purposes, and restrictions to protect 
participants from anti-selection and disintermediation caused by other participants. The 
purpose o f some plan restrictions is to protect the bulk of participants from the actions o f a
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minority o f participants. Lacking such restrictions, participants could take advantage of 
book value transactions in certain economic environments and arbitrage among investment 
options. Such activity can create investment losses in the guaranteed fund. The impact of 
these losses is ultimately borne by remaining participants through lower investment returns.
In existing plans, guaranteed products have attracted significant contributions from 
employees, in spite o f the existence o f some restrictions on movement o f money from these 
products. This demonstrates the willingness o f participants to sacrifice liquidity for stable 
and attractive investment return. The statement as drafted w ill reduce the investment 
choices available to participants by effectively prohibiting sponsors from implementing plan 
restrictions which allow them to purchase book value contracts at high yields. A ll 
investments have tradeoffs among features that contribute to risk or return.
4. Disclosure of market rate of interest (Paragraph 15g)
I  recommend that accounting disclosures about existing plan assets should not include any 
kind o f market rate o f interest. Disclosures should be limited to characteristics of existing 
contracts.
Presumably, the benefit o f disclosing a market rate would be to assist the investment 
decision maker in future investment decisions. The amount o f information needed to make 
investment decisions is the responsibility o f the plan fiduciary, or the participant in 404(c) 
plans. 404(c) regulations already cover the disclosure requirements which must be 
provided to plan participants.
A market rate o f interest could also be misleading. Current market rates and portfolio 
rates are not directly comparable. In addition, the wide variety of plan and contract 
provisions would make it difficult to determine a market rate which would be appropriate.
I  appreciate the opportunity to comment on the exposure draft. Please feel free to call me 
at 219-455-4723 i f  you have questions about my comments.
Sincerely
Mark Laurent
The M innesota M utual Life Insurance Company
400 North Robert S treet 
S t. Paul, M innesota 55101-2098 
Ph 612/298-3683
Jenean C . Cordon, FSA  Minnesota Mutual
Second Vice President and Actuary
December 13,1993
Ms. Susan Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, F ile Q -1-505
A IC P A
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue N W
Washington, DC 20004-1081
RE: COMMENTS ON PROPOSED STATEMENT OF POSITION ON REPORTING 
OF INVESTMENT CONTRACTS HELD BY HEALTH AND WELFARE 
BENEFIT PLANS AND DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSION PLANS
Dear Ms. Hicks:
I  am pleased to have this opportunity to comment on the above referenced Statement o f  Position. 
I  have over 20 years o f  experience in working w ith  insurance company contracts and pension 
plan sponsors that I  bring to m y comments.
I  th ink the Statement places appropriate focus on the plan participants. The statement notes that:
♦ "The prim ary objective ... is to provide information that is useful in  assessing the plans 
present and future ab ility  to pay benefits when they are due."
♦ "Inform ation that is useful to plan participants includes the amount they would receive 
currently i f  they were to withdraw or borrow funds from  or transfer funds w ith in  the 
plan."
I  believe that the statement's accounting guidelines fu lly  support this focus when the investment 
contract is a standard GIC type. Further, the examples illustrate many o f  the G IC variations in 
use today so it  is clear that the group that developed this Statement has thoroughly researched 
GIC and sim ilar contracts.
However, I  do not see in this statement, the same kind o f acknowledgment o f  another very 
common type o f  investment contract utilized by defined contribution plans and offered by many 
insurance companies. B rie fly , this contract:
♦ Permits and requires withdrawals at contract value fo r all benefit payments and loans.
♦ Permits transfers to other options but w ith  some lim ita tion. A  typical provision is that a 
participant can transfer each year 20% out o f  the guaranteed option into the alternative 
options.
Possibly, these types o f  restrictions would be considered to be "reasonable access" and therefore 
these investment contracts would be considered to be fu lly  benefit responsive. However, i f  that 
is not the case, consider the im plication o f  providing a plan participant w ith  a statement that 
shows fa ir value instead o f  contract value.
♦ This fa ir value, however it  m ight be calculated, would be more or less than the contract 
value.
♦ But, i f  the participant chooses to transfer, he or she can transfer 20% o f  the contract 
value.
♦ And, i f  the participant becomes eligible fo r a benefit, that benefit is the contract value.
The result is that this participant is very confused and does not have inform ation that 
includes "the amount that they would receive currently i f  they were to w ithdraw or 
borrow funds from  or transfer funds w ith in  the plan."
Therefore, plan participants in plans investing in the types of contracts described above, 
would benefit from a change to the Statement of Opinion clarifying that limitations on 
transfers do not prevent a contract from being fully benefit responsive.
Technical note: A contract, like an investment, cannot be both long 
duration and fully liquid. Typical GIC contracts protect against 
anti-selection by prohibiting transfers to competing fixed income 
options and requiring that transfers to an equity option remain there 
for a certain period, a so called equity wash. Types of contracts 
described in this letter tend to be a bit longer in duration than GICs 
and control anti-selection with the transfer limitation and do not 
require an equity wash.
M y final comment is on the effective date. This Statement is o f  great importance to plan 
sponsors and plan participants. I t  w ill be impossible fo r them to begin using this Statement 
before it  is finalized. Extensive changes in  participant statement preparation w ill be necessary 
fo r some plans. To a llow  these plans to make these changes, i t  w ou ld  be very he lp fu l i f  the 
effective date were delayed u n til December 1 5 , 1994.
Thank you fo r the opportunity to comment on this Statement o f  Opinion and thank you fo r your 
consideration o f  m y comments. I urge you not to require the reporting o f  a value that is not 
available to plan participants.
Sincerely,
Jenean C. Cordon
JCC\wh
cc: Melissa Kahn, Senior Counsel - American Counsel of Life Insurance
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December 13, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division
File Q-1-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Re: Exposure Draft-Proposed Statement of Position 
Reporting of Investment Contracts Held by
Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and
Defined Contribution Pension Plans
Dear Ms. Hicks:
Thank you for inviting industry comments on the above Proposed Statement of Position 
(SOP). I appreciate the opportunity to give AICPA the perspective of Nationwide Life 
Insurance Company (Nationwide), a life insurance company with substantial pension 
assets. Nationwide’s pension products include group annuity investment contracts with 
guaranteed and variable fund options which are used as funding vehicles for its 
customers’ defined contribution plans.
Although Nationwide finds the SOP to be carefully drafted and believes it provides useful 
accounting guidance to most plan sponsors, we are concerned about the impact of the 
benefit responsive definition on certain guaranteed investment contracts ("GICs") typically 
issued to small-to-medium sized defined contribution pension plans. Specifically, the SOP 
appears to provide more applicable accounting guidance to issuers of guaranteed 
investment contracts ("GICs") used for the large case market. Nationwide, therefore, 
suggests the following changes to the SOP.
1. Benefit Responsiveness
The AICPA SOP defines a fully benefit responsive contract (page 8, paragraphs 9 
and 10) as one which by its terms and the terms of the plan permit and require 
withdrawals at contract value for all participant-initiated events. These events 
include payments, loans, or transfers to other investment options offered to the 
participant by the plan. The SOP requires participants to have reasonable access 
to their funds. The SOP generally indicates that reasonable access is unrestricted
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access, with minor exceptions. The SOP indicates that fully benefit responsive 
contracts can be valued at contract value. Otherwise, the contract must be valued 
at fair market value.
Many guaranteed contracts issued to defined contribution pension plans contain 
provisions which prohibit transfers from a fixed option investment to a variable 
option investment after aggregate participant transfers exceed a specified 
percentage of the fixed option investment book value during a 12-month period. 
This restriction is essentially an interest rate anti selection provision. It protects the 
majority of plan participants from the actions of the minority of participants. 
Lacking such restrictions, participants could take advantage of book value 
transactions in certain economic environments and arbitrage among investment 
options. This activity can cause investment losses in the guaranteed fund. The 
impact of these losses is ultimately borne by remaining participants through lower 
investment returns.
The transfer provision is designed to serve the same type of function as a "equity 
wash" provision serves in many benefit-responsive guaranteed contracts issued to 
defined contribution plans. An "equity wash" provision typically provides that if a 
participant wants to transfer money from a guaranteed fixed investment option to 
a competing fixed investment option offered by the plan, such as a money market 
fund, the participant must first transfer the funds to an equity investment option for 
a specified period of time, often three months. Because a participant would be 
exposed to equity market risk during this three month period, a participant may be 
discouraged from transferring money from the guaranteed fund to another fixed 
investment option during a rising interest rate environment simply because of 
higher interest rates available in another investment option, e.g. a money market 
fund.
A benefit-responsive guaranteed contract otherwise meeting the definition of "fully 
benefit responsive" would not appear to be non-benefit responsive simply because 
the contract contains an equity wash provision. Although this provision imposes 
some limits on the free transfer of funds among plan options, an important factor 
is that contract value reflects the amount that a plan participant would actually 
"receive currently if they were to withdraw or borrow funds from or transfer funds 
within the plan", as stated in paragraph 8 on page 8 of the SOP. Contract value 
reporting would therefore appear to be appropriate for this type of contract.
However, the accounting treatment for a contract that limits aggregate contract 
level transfers from a fixed investment option to a percentage of the contractual 
book value during a 12-month period, but pays all benefits, loans, hardship 
withdrawals, or transfers (to the extent permitted) at contract value, is less clear. 
Paragraph 10 on page 8 requires that "all participant-initiated transactions 
permitted by an ongoing plan" be made at contract value "with no conditions, 
limits, or restrictions" in order to receive contract value accounting treatment. In
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addition, Example 2:A-8.c. of the Appendix states that a contract which pays 
benefits of up to 30 percent of the contract at contract value and any excess 
benefits at some adjusted value would be reported at fair value. These paragraphs 
seem to require "fair value" accounting treatment for these contracts.
However, the amount participants in this type of fixed contract would "receive 
currently if they were to withdraw or borrow funds from or transfer funds within the 
plan" would be contract value. That is, any benefit payment, loan, hardship 
withdrawal, or transfer (to the extent permitted), would be made at contract value. 
Under no circumstances would “fair value" be available. Since contract value is the 
only amount available to a plan participant, it would seem to be consistent with the 
stated intention to provide meaningful information to plan participants that these 
contracts be reported at contract value.
For example, paragraph A-3 of the Appendix states that the "valuation must reflect 
the ability of the plan to pay benefits from the perspective of the participants. This 
value is then reflected on participants’ statements to disclose the amount they can 
expect to receive when they exercise their rights to withdraw, borrow, or transfer 
funds under the terms of the plan." If a contract is required to disclose a "fair 
value" that is greater than contract value when contract value is all the participant 
can ever receive, then this requirement would appear to be violated.
In order to provide meaningful information to plan participants with respect to the 
"amount they would receive currently if they were to withdraw or borrow funds from 
or transfer funds within the plan", we believe that the AICPA should allow contracts 
that provide all benefit payments, loans, or hardship withdrawals at contract value 
to use contract value reporting, even if there are contractual limitations on transfers 
which are designed for the protection of plan participants. Reporting of a "fair 
value" for these contracts would lead to misleading results that would not be 
understood by plan participants.
In addition, a requirement to report "fair value" rather than contract value for this 
type of contract could lead to other inequitable results. Consider the situation of 
a defined contribution plan in which only one investment option, a "guaranteed 
option", is available. Because no other investment options are permissible under 
the SOP, there are no restriction on transfers. If this contract provides that benefits 
are always available at contract value, then contract value accounting is 
permissible under the SOP. However, if another investment option were added to 
the plan, but certain transfer restrictions were included in the "guaranteed option" 
contract to protect plan participants from the actions of other participants in a 
rising interest rate environment, contract value may no longer be available. This 
could lead to a situation where the addition of an investment option to a plan may 
add value to a plan participant, but lead to lower reported benefits in a situation 
where "fair value" is lower than contract value. This would be the case even
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though the plan provides the same access to contract value as the single fund 
plan.
Finally, to the extent that insurers amend contracts to eliminate restrictions on 
transfers in order to receive contract-value accounting treatment, a likely result may 
be a reduction in the level of interest rates credited to these contracts as insurers 
shorten their investment strategy for this type of product. This type of result would 
not be in the long-term best interest of plan participants.
Nationwide, therefore, recommends that reference to transfers be deleted from the 
proposal’s benefit responsive definition and from a discussion of the definition. 
Additionally, Nationwide recommends that the following example be added to 
Example 2 (pages 17 and 18).
e. The contract prohibits transfers from a fixed investment option to a variable
investment option if  aggregate participant transfers exceed 20 percent 
during a 12-month period as specified by the contract. The contract should 
be reported at contract value. Since the restriction is on transfers between 
investment options only, the contract is fully benefit responsive.
2. Effective Date
The SOP is effective for financial statements for plan years beginning after 
December 15, 1993. Since many plan years begin on January 1, the SOP would 
apply to some financial statements or participant statements issued after the first 
quarter of 1994. The software needed to produce the statements would have to 
be modified and extensive adjustments in procedures may have to be made to 
accommodate a change in reporting. Additionally, since the SOP is proposed and 
may be modified after the effective date. Nationwide recommends that the effective 
date be deferred to plan years beginning after December 15, 1994.
In addition, Nationwide recommends that a revised SOP include a transitional rule 
for existing contacts. The transitional rule should provide that the SOP would be 
effective for existing contracts at a future date beyond December 15,1994, to allow 
time for existing contracts to be renegotiated if permitted by the insurer, or to 
expire.
3. Applicability of the Benefit Responsive Definition to Employer-Directed Defined
Contribution Plans
Nationwide also has a concern with the broad scope of the benefit responsive 
definition. The SOP, on page 9, states that
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The plan itself must allow plan participants reasonable access to their funds. 
If access to funds is substantially restricted by plan provisions, investment 
contracts held by those plans may not be considered to be fully benefit 
responsive.
The SOP should clarify how the above definition and the proposal itself apply to 
contracts issued to defined contribution plans for which the employer alone has 
investment direction authority. The proposal refers only to participant-directed 
transactions. Nationwide is uncertain if or how the SOP applies to contracts where 
the participant has no right to direct its investments. These plans are often 
referred to as fiduciary or trustee directed plans. The above definition, if read 
literally, could make all contracts for employer-directed plans non-benefit 
responsive since the participant has no access to direct his funds. Nationwide 
does not believe that AICPA intended this result. Nationwide, therefore, 
recommends that AICPA clarify this issue.
If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact John Bath, 
Senior Actuarial Officer-Pensions (614) 249-2834 or Mary Jane Risen, Director, Pension 
and Public Sector Compliance, at (614) 249-8255.
Sincerely,
Peter F. Frenzer
President
JB:jn
T.RoweP r ic e
T. Rowe Price Stable Asset Management, Inc., 4435 Waterfront Drive, Suite 306 
P.O. Box 6239, Glen Allen, Virginia 23058-6239 804 -346-0227
Kenneth L. Walker 
President
December 13, 1993
Ms. Susan W . H icks, Technical Manager 
Federal Government D iv is ion 
F ile  Q -l-505
American Institute o f  Certified 
Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N .W . 
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Dear M s. Hicks:
I  am w riting  this letter in  response to Statement o f  Position 92-6, Accounting and 
Reporting by Health and Welfare Plans dated September 15, 1993. T . Rowe Price Stable Asset 
Management, Inc. commends the A .I.C .P .A . fo r its w ork in  bringing about defin itive guidelines 
fo r the valuation o f  Guaranteed Investment Contracts and other stable value alternatives.
W e note several items we wish to address w ith  regard to this SOP, as more fu lly  
described below. W e believe action on these items w ill further strengthen the SOP and its 
intended use.
1. Effective Date: W e suggest the effective date be changed to one hundred eighty 
days after release o f  the fina l regulations in  lieu o f December 15, 1993. Delay o f  
implementation w ill provide both issuers and plan sponsors alike the opportunity to deal w ith  
known facts; not probable facts. I t  w il l provide more time to develop prudent alternative 
strategies where appropriate, and eliminate the possibility that the plan sponsor m ight have to 
"pay up" in  any issuer renegotiation process due to lim ited time.
2. Non-Benefit Responsive Contracts: The language used throughout the SOP refers 
to fu l ly  benefit responsive features. Paragraphs 7 and 8 o f  FASB Statement No. 97 describes 
investment contracts which provide fo r annuity purchases. I f  an investment contract is 
purchased in a defined contribution plan exclusively fo r the purpose o f  provid ing annuity 
payments and not ongoing participant-initiated withdrawal payments, does the contract qua lify 
fo r contract value?
3. Fixed Income Fund Investment Restrictions: I t  has been our understanding 
throughout that contracts which proh ib it participant directed investment transfers to competing 
fixed income funds are elig ible fo r contract value. We suggest specific reference be made to 
provide defin itive guidance.
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4. Im plied Guarantee: The SOP makes reference to the term "...tha t provide(s) a 
guarantee by a financially responsible th ird  party o f  principal and previously accrued interest 
. . . " .  M ost synthetic GICs do not use the term "guarantee” , yet provide a zero net floo r rate. 
In  addition, most managed synthetic G IC  structures provide that credit r isk  are borne by the 
plan. In  this event, principal is not fu lly  guaranteed. W e suggest defin itive guidance on this 
issue.
W e continue to be concerned w ith  certain circumstances which require fa ir value 
accounting, even though the participant would ultimately receive contract value; e.g. Section 
3.18. An example would be the case where the plan lim its  access to funds only upon 
termination o f  employment, o r where the po rtfo lio  is not tota lly made up o f  100% benefit 
responsive contracts. I t  is possible that the participant could receive quarterly statements 
showing significant market value gains, yet, when paid his o r her distribution, would receive a 
book value payment much less than market, as the benefit responsive issuers were only obligated 
to pay pro-rata at contract value.
In  summary, we believe the draft SOP w ill provide guidance to those who both audit and 
utilize stable value instruments. C larification o f  some o f  the issues outlined above would be 
helpful.
Sincerely
Kenneth L . W alker
KLW :m m h
M&l Investment Management Corp.
1000 North Water Street Milwaukee, Wl 53202-6629 Tel 414 287-7300
December 13, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks, Technical Manager,
Federal Government Division,
File Q-l-505, AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Re: Reporting of investment contracts in defined contribution plans
Dear Ms. Hicks:
We are writing in response to the AICPA Exposure Draft regarding the reporting of 
investment contracts in health and welfare benefit plans and defined contribution 
pension plans. As trustee, custodian, and investment adviser for these types of plans, 
we would like to comment on two points proposed in the Draft.
First, in the Appendix, Example 6, A. 16, it is proposed that for a synthetic 
“repurchase” type investment contract, fair value be assigned to the option for the 
plan sponsor to sell the bond to the issuer when fair value of the bond is above 
contract value. We believe that valuation of such an option would be somewhat 
arbitrary given the absence of a market for the option, and would therefore suggest 
that such contracts be accounted for at contract value assuming that they provide 
the appropriate provisions for benefit responsiveness.
Second, the process of checking the provisions of each contract to determine if it 
meets the criteria for contract value accounting will be very time-consuming. In 
order to provide trustees, custodians, investment advisers and plan sponsors 
adequate lead time to check contracts for compliance, we would suggest an 
implementation date beyond that proposed in the Draft. Specifically, implementation 
for plan years beginning after December 15, 1994 would seem reasonable. 
Respectfully Submitted,
Tami L. Blonde, C.F.A.
Vice President
TLB/jse
Aetna Life Insurance and 
Annuity Company
151 Farmington Avenue 
Hartford, CT 06156 
203-273-0123
Thomas J. Hudson 
Consultant
Risk Management, RW57 
ALIAC Pensions 
203273-3556 
Fax:203 273-5207
December 14, 1993
Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q-1-505 
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1081
RE: Proposed Statement of Position
Reporting of Investment Contracts... Defined Contribution Plans
Dear Ms. Hicks:
Aetna Life Insurance and Annuity Company (ALIAC) appreciates the chance to comment 
on this exposure draft. Our comments reflect those of Aetna’s ’’small case” pension unit. 
You will be receiving a separate letter from Tim Geyer representing Aetna's large case 
pension group. We are in agreement with Tim's comments, and we'd like to add our 
comments from the small case view.
The draft reflects a major effort by those involved to tackle some difficult issues.
While the draft will lead to development of more uniform standards for reporting 
"investment contracts", much of the focus appears to have been on guaranteed 
investment contracts (GICs) as well as similar products sold by banks (BICs) and 
insurance company book value separate accounts. Because of that focus, we are 
concerned that it might undermine a significant class of contracts that appear not to be 
addressed and for which contract value reporting is appropriate.
In a nutshell: There's more to this than GICs and BICs!
The draft covers the dominant products (by asset volume) that insurers offer to "big plan" 
funding arrangements, characterized by GICs and book value separate accounts. The off- 
the-shelf products for the "small employer / keep it simple" market, which offer a variety 
of general account contract value options, will be unfairly treated in comparison to 
GIC/BIC contracts the way the SOP is currently written.
ALIAC provides coverage for about 10,000 small employers that might be impacted by 
the draft. Our contracts primarily fund defined contribution plans, though some defined 
benefit plans are also covered. Our products, like those of many other insurers, are 
designed for plan sponsors looking for a simple off-the-shelf funding arrangement. They 
offer fixed income (general account) and equity (pooled separate accounts, mutual funds) 
investment options. They are distributed through independent pension professionals that
L-607-B 
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Page 2
Susan W. Hicks
December 14, 1993
provide local servicing and counseling to the plan sponsor and its participants. Third party 
administrators are also involved in the servicing of these plans.
It is important that the treatment of these contracts be clarified such that these products 
are not subject to debate regarding "benefit responsiveness", and that certain contract 
types are not given more favorable treatment than others.
Our contracts normally provide for unadjusted transfers within the insurer's family of funds 
and unadjusted payments at retirement, death, disability, separation from service, hardship 
and loans. They're designed to be "participant benefit responsive". But, they include 
risk control features:
- A contingent deferred sales charge (CDSC) may be assessed on transfers to 
another company during the first few years of the contract's existence. This rear- 
end sales charge allows every dollar to be invested and recoups up front expenses 
from pre-mature contract cancellations. The CDSC generally lasts five years or 
less, follows a declining pattern (5%, 4%, 3%, 2% 1% and then disappears) and 
usually does not apply to benefit payments or transfers within the insurers family 
of funds.
- General Account contracts are designed for long term investing and, per state 
insurance law, may not earmark assets for any particular class of contract. One or 
more of the following generic risk control measures are built into off-the-shelf 
contracts for general account management purposes:
- A market value adjustment may be assessed on funds transferred to another 
funding institution or withdrawn prior to maturity of a "yield to maturity type 
of investment".
- Contingency provisions may limit the amount that can be transferred (within 
the contract) to or from fixed income options depending on interest rate 
movements.
- Alternatively, funds may be paid from the general account option to another 
funding agent in annual installments over a given period (e.g.., five years).
Where we and our insurance company competitors offer these contracts, they have been 
approved by the state insurance departments (all insurance funding vehicles are subject 
to state approval before being sold). Also:
- The Department of Labor has said that reasonable adjustments and expenses 
don't prevent a funding option from qualifying for 404(c) protection.
- Perhaps most importantly, these potential adjustments are disclosed to participants 
and plan sponsors in writing prior to acceptance of funds under the contract.
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The main issue we see: It won't make sense to report these contracts at other than 
contract value. This will only confuse.
If  for example, someone had a $10,000 account balance in a contract and all plan 
"benefits" (death, retirement, disability, termination of employment,...) would be at 
the $10,000 level, but there could be a 5% CDSC or a "market value adjustment" 
if the employer decided to discontinue the contract and move to another funding 
agent it would be wrong to report that account balance as only $9,500. The draft 
allows "contract value" here, as we read it, as long as there is no pending contract 
termination.
If  for the same individual, there might be some transfer restrictions to/from the 
general account (depending on interest rate levels), does this preclude a contract 
from being benefit responsive? If the contract said that no more than 50% of 
money in a general account (contract value) option could be transferred to the 
market value options in any one year, we're not sure what the draft would require. 
If all "benefits" are at contract value, what is the "fair value" in this situation, just 
50%? If the contract/plan meets 404(c) guidelines for fund options and reasonable 
access to funds, should this type transfer restriction result in a confusing "fair 
value" report? Should plans/contracts that allow only quarterly access to certain 
funds be allowed contract value accounting when plan/contracts which allow 
access to at least some portion of funds on any business day be required to report 
an artificial "fair value"?
It will be misleading to report these contracts at anything other than contract value and the 
SOP needs to reflect this type of small employer insurance contract.
The proper disclosures and controls are already in place to assure that plan sponsors and 
participants know what they have. Plan sponsors and participants need to select among 
liquidity/risk/return tradeoffs. To provide a higher yield on its fixed income option the 
insurer has to invest in longer duration assets, but, general account options must build in 
risk control features. The off-the-shelf contracts will tend to deal with risk through 
contract provisions, not the case specific plan underwriting that is applied to the GIC/BIC 
contracts. Plan specific underwriting for small plans would require higher selling 
expenses. This is not a realistic option given the increasing margin pressures from plan 
sponsors.
Insurance company general account funding options continue to play an important role as 
a stable return, stable value option. Across all o f our funding options, we see about 50% 
of deposits continue to be directed to the general account. "Contract value" funds that 
provide more stable returns, are an important plan option, especially for older individuals 
trying to assure the value o f their retirement "benefit".
The risk protections inherent in these contracts should not be considered in a way that 
leads them to be less competitive or worse, not available.
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Also important, some existing contracts do not allow for "pre-retirement" benefits, since 
they were designed for use with plans designed before the new style defined contribution 
plan.
- Initial products, those developed through the 1970s were designed when the 
retirement concept was in terms of "no withdrawals before retirement". They're 
meant to be restrictive, as was tax policy back then. These plans emphasized 
retirement benefits, not pre-retirement spending. Plan sponsors continuing with 
this type of "retirement" plan and contract, should not be subject to added 
reporting because their plan restricts benefits before retirement, and their contract 
meets their plan needs.
Implementation Issues
If the draft is adopted as is, insurers and plan sponsors will need time to respond, and 
guidance regarding what to report.
What plan/contracts would be subject to this new procedure?
• Only those funding 401 plans subject to audit?
- What if employers direct investments; not employees?
- If plan doesn't allow any pre-retirement benefits is that "benefit responsive"?
Timing
- How get done for 1994 plan year with no time to change systems/processes? 
Which reports would have to be at fair value?
- Plan sponsor's summary annual report to participants?
- Annual reports from "insurer" to plan sponsor?
How should fair value be determined?
- What rates/factors to use
- Will auditors have to accept the stated value?
- When contracts do not allow transfers, but pay full "benefit", is fair value equal 
to zero? Or is fair value some average that is between the "benefit" value and 
the "zero" available for transfer?
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The Q and A section implies some "interpretation" in reaching a  "benefit responsive" 
conclusion
- Apply to parallel situations for other than GICs and BICs?
- How much time/cost debating decisions?
Conclusion
In 1980, the Accounting Standards Board came to the following conclusion:
"The Board recognizes that presenting contracts with insurance companies at 
contract value is inconsistent with requiring all other plan investments to be
presented at fair value. However,.... the information required for determining
contract value is readily available, whereas a fair value approach would necessitate 
extra calculations, that.... might be extremely complex."
This statement is still true; complexity has increased. More and more types of funding 
arrangements are available with various investment strategies. Contract value reporting is 
appropriate, and understood. The introduction of "fair value" might add confusion rather 
than clarity.
In summary we suggest the following:
1. Clarify how the SOP applies to other than GIC's, BICs and book value separate 
accounts.
2. Allow for "retirement" plans that don't desire pre-retirement benefits. In general, 
contract value is appropriate when a contract is "benefit responsive" to the benefits 
provided by the plan.
3. Extend the effective date to allow necessary developments of process/system 
changes.
4. Replace example A.8.c. with the following to allow contracts with state approved, 
reasonable expense recoupment and risk control features to continue to be 
reported at contract value unless all "benefits" are discounted to reflect a specific 
adjustment.
Example:
An insurance company contract approved by the state insurance department where 
offered, has fixed income and equity investment options among its family of funds. 
The contract allows unrestricted transfers within its market valued funds (separate 
accounts or mutual funds) but may have restrictions on the amount of funds that 
can be transferred into or out of its fixed income book value options or cashed out 
at full contract termination. It also permits unadjusted access to funds for 
participant benefit payments at least for retirement, death, disability, separation 
from service, hardship withdrawals and loans if permitted by the corresponding 
plan. All participant "benefits" are paid at contract value.
Such contract is generally benefit responsive and may be reported at contract 
value.
We appreciate the chance to comment. And we'd welcome to the chance to meet with 
you and discuss our comments .
Thank you again.
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Sincerely,
Thomas J. Hudson
c: J. Geyer, Vice President & Actuary, Aetna 
J. Nikander, Assistant Vice President, Aetna
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VIA AIRBORNE EXPRESS
December 14, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division
File Q-l-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington D.C. 20004-1081
Re: Exposure Draft: Proposed Statement of Position on Reporting of Investment
Contracts Held by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined- 
Contribution Pension Plans.
Dear Ms. Hicks:
This letter is intended to provide our review and commentary on the September 15,1993 AICPA 
Exposure Draft referred to above. Certus Financial Corporation is a registered investment 
advisor under the Act of 1940 and specializes in the management of stable value assets, such as 
those described in the Exposure Draft. Currently, we manage in excess of $4 billion of stable 
value assets for over 300,000 defined contribution participants.
We support the AICPA's efforts in undertaking this project which will formalize many of the 
common practices of the stable value industry. We believe the proposed Statement of Position 
(SOP) reasonably and correctly codifies many of these practices. However, after studying the 
SOP we feel the need to express certain comments and concerns. We have passed along some of 
these comments to the GIC Association to incorporate in their response, but felt it was important 
to formulate an individual response as well.
I) Effective Date and Transition: page 16, Paragraph 17
We believe that the effective date of the SOP should be postponed until December 15, 
1994 and that a transition period should be established for non-benefit responsive 
contracts. The most compelling argument for postponing the effective date is the fact 
that the AICPA does not have any time to review the public commentary which is due 
on December 15, 1993. We suggest a one year deferral to keep the SOP in line with 
calendar year plans.
With respect to a transition period on non-benefit responsive contracts, we would 
suggest the following elements:
i ) All non-benefit responsive contracts purchased prior to December 31, 1993 be 
allowed the potential for contract value accounting.
i i ) Contract valuation for these non-benefit responsive contracts would be subject to 
the same issuer solvency considerations as are outlined for benefit responsive 
contracts in the revised paragraph 3.17 on page 11.
Mr. Susan Hicks
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i i i )  Contract valuation for non-benefit responsive contracts would be valid only if 
the plan sponsor has determined that there are no imminent events which 
would result in withdrawal or termination. Specifically, those plan sponsors 
that structured their portfolios to prevent withdrawals from their non-benefit 
responsive contracts in all but the most extraordinary circumstances, could 
reasonably account for them at contract value during the transition period. Plan 
sponsors should adhere to the same determination process as required under 
FASB Statement #5, Accounting for Contingencies.
II) Disclosure Requirements: page 16, Paragraph 16e
As you are aware, the Department of Labor (DOL) has recently released a new set of 
regulations pertaining to defined contribution plans. These regulations have several 
requirements with respect to participant communication.
The short list of disclosure requirements added to Paragraph 53 raises two issues:
i ) Some of these are redundant or potentially conflicting with respect to the 404(c) 
regulations.
ii)  There is no suggested format (nor is there generally a readily available format) 
within which to disclose "the basis and frequency of determining crediting 
interest rate resets and any minimum crediting interest rate under the terms of 
the contracts and any limitations on guarantees... on benefit responsive 
investment contracts."
We would like the SOP to state that compliance with the new DOL 404(c) 
regulations, as they pertain to participant communication/information, would 
be viewed as reasonable compliance with the SOP in this area.
III) Reporting of Contracts: page 8, Paragraph 4
We believe it is confusing and potentially contradictory to state that pension plans 
"should report fully benefit responsive investment contracts at contract value, which 
may or may not be equal to fair value..." It appears to us that throughout the SOP it is 
established that fair value on fully benefit responsive investment contracts is indeed 
contract value. It is important that this relationship be explicitly stated because 
various regulatory agencies will look to this SOP for guidance as to the fair value of 
these investment contracts. We believe the SOP establishes fair value equal to contract 
value for fully benefit responsive contracts by:
i) stating that participant withdrawals from fully benefit responsive 
contracts must always be made at contract value;
Mr. Susan Hicks
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ii)  establishing that the appropriate (and fair) value for an investment 
contract is that value which is relevant to the participant; and
iii )  requiring plan managers to consider a value other than contract value 
when either non-participant related withdrawals may occur or there 
are issuer solvency concerns. .
V) Reporting of Contracts: page 8, Paragraph 4
At the end of this paragraph the SOP states that if events occur which may result in 
solvency concerns or early terminations, plan sponsors may want to consider reporting 
these investment contracts "at less than contract value." This excludes consideration of 
those contracts which may be terminated at above contract value in some circumstances. 
We believe it would be more appropriate to suggest that when faced with these 
extreme circumstances, plan sponsors consider reporting the investment at other than 
contract value to accurately reflect the expected value that participants will realize.
V) Appendix: page 17 , A.2
Although the body of the changes to the Audit and Accounting Guide does not contain 
any specific required valuation methodology for the non-benefit responsive contracts (or 
portions of contracts), the Appendix does suggest that discounting cash flows would be 
acceptable. Further, it suggests that a contract's termination or penalty clauses are not 
particularly relevant unless a termination situation is eminent. We disagree with this 
recommendation for several reasons:
i) A discounted cashflow (or similar value) is not the most likely value a 
participant could expect to receive upon a withdrawal;
ii)  The expected termination value of a non-benefit responsive contract is the 
probable value in a withdrawal scenario;
iii)  Use of the termination value would be consistent with revised paragraph 3.17 
on page 11 which determines the fair value of benefit responsive contracts in 
contingency circumstances; and
iv) The unique nature of these investment contracts makes the most relevant value 
to participants either carrying value (contract value) during normal plan 
operation or a termination value during extreme withdrawal conditions.
We believe that the SOP should allow for the possibility of contract value for non­
benefit responsive contracts beyond the transition period suggested earlier in section I of 
this letter. The responsibility should be placed on plan fiduciaries to determine the 
appropriate, fair, and relevant value for non-benefit responsive contracts. Under 
paragraph 3.17, plan sponsors are required to determine when benefit responsive 
contracts should be carried at other than contract value. A similar determination can be 
made by plan sponsors as to when non-benefit responsive contracts should be carried at 
other than termination value.
Mr. Susan Hicks
December 14, 1993
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Thank you in advance for your time and consideration of our comments. I am available to 
answer any questions or to provide any additional input into your review process should it be 
needed.
Very truly yours, 
Robert A. McCormish
Cooper Industries
P.O.Box 4446 
Houston, Texas 77210
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Ms. Susan W. H icks
Techn ica l Manager
Federal Government D iv is io n  
F i le  Q -l-505
American I n s t i t u t e  o f  C e r t i f ie d  
P u b lic  Accountants
1455 Pennsylvan ia  Avenue, N.W. 
W ashington, DC 20004-1081
Dear Ms. H icks :
Th is  l e t t e r  is  in  response to  Statem ent o f  P o s it io n  92-6 , A ccounting  and 
R eporting  by H ea lth  and W elfa re  Plans dated September 15, 1993. Our 
comments are as fo llo w s :
• E ith e r  the  e f fe c t iv e  date  should be extended to  p lan  years 
beg inn ing  a f te r  December 15, 1994 o r c u r re n t c o n tra c ts  should 
be g ra n d fa th e re d . The c u rre n t e f fe c t iv e  date  o f  December 15, 
1993 does no t p rov id e  enough tim e  f o r  Plan sponsors to  d iv e s t  
t h e i r  funds o f  n o n -b e n e fit  respons ive  c o n tra c ts  w ith o u t paying 
premiums o r p e n a lt ie s .
• A comment made in  paragraph "3 .1 8 " in d ic a te s  th a t  " i f  access to  
funds is  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  r e s t r ic te d  by p lan  p ro v is io n ,  investm ent 
c o n tra c ts  he ld  by those Plans may no t be considered  to  be f u l l y  
b e n e f it  re s p o n s iv e ."  The sta tem ent o f  P o s it io n  goes on to  g iv e  
s p e c i f ic  examples, however, one example th a t  was no t id e n t i f ie d  
is  the  "e q u ity  wash ru le "  p lan  r e s t r ic t io n ,  which is  ty p ic a l in  
many f ix e d  income fund inves tm en ts . T h is  r u le  r e s t r ic t s  
p a r t ic ip a n ts  from  d i r e c t ly  t r a n s fe r r in g  t h e i r  F ixed Income Fund 
investm ents to  competing funds such as our Money M arket Fund, 
and re q u ire s  th a t  t ra n s fe rs  be made f i r s t  th rough  a non­
competing fund such as our E q u ity  Fund. I t  is  u n c le a r whether 
t h is  p lan  r e s t r ic t io n  would a f fe c t  the  d e f in i t io n  o f  f u l l y  
b e n e f it  respon s ive .
• The a d d it io n a l d is c lo s u re  re q u ire d  in  paragraph "4 .2 6 " to  
report the average yield for the investments and the crediting 
in te r e s t  ra te  f o r  investm ents cou ld  p o s s ib ly  be m is le a d in g  to  
p a r t ic ip a n ts .  S ince t h is  c a lc u la t io n  may no t re p re se n t the
1001 Fannin, Suite 4000 
Houston, Texas 77002 
713 739-5400
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a c tu a l ea rn ings rece ive d  by th e  p a r t ic ip a n t ,  t h is  a d d it io n a l 
in fo rm a tio n  may, in  fa c t ,  m is lead a user o f  these f in a n c ia l 
sta tem ents in to  th in k in g  t h is  re tu rn  is  what he should o r  cou ld  
re c e iv e  from  in v e s tin g  in  t h is  Fund. T y p ic a l ly ,  we re p o r t  on a 
q u a r te r ly  b a s is , the  investm ent fu n d 's  ra te  o f  re tu rn ,  which 
in c lu d e s  a l l  cash f lo w  tra n s a c tio n s  in c lu d in g  expenses th a t  are 
pa id  from  the  funds . T h is  in fo rm a tio n , we b e lie v e , is  o f  more 
use in  a s s is t in g  p lan  p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  d e c id in g  what investm ent 
funds to  t ra n s fe r  in  o r  ou t o f .  R eporting  a d d it io n a l m arket 
ra te s  o f  in te r e s t  and aggregate gross in te r e s t  c a lc u la t io n s  may 
o n ly  confuse the  users o f  these f in a n c ia l s ta tem en ts .
C u rre n t ly ,  our F ixed Income Fund, made up p r im a r i ly  o f  
Guaranteed Investm ent C on trac ts  is  viewed as a s ta b le  
investm ent w ith  de te rm inab le  income and p r in c ip a l .  I f  F a ir  
Value Accounting  is  re q u ire d , th e re  cou ld  be c ircum stances 
where re p o r t in g  would va ry  the  re tu rn s  on a s h o r t term  b a s is , 
and change the  s ta b le  re tu rn  na tu re  o f  t h is  Fund from  p e rio d  to  
p e r io d . For t h is  reason, we b e lie v e  every e f f o r t  shou ld be 
made to  m in im ize  the  accoun ting  tre a tm e n ts  th a t  would t r ig g e r  
u n re a liz e d  m arket f lu c tu a t io n s  in  c o n tra c ts  th a t  are expected 
to  be he ld  to  m a tu r ity .
We a p p re c ia te  the  o p p o r tu n ity  to  comment. 
S in c e re ly , 
Donald R. Sheley
V ice P re s id e n t & C o n tro l le r
DRS\1214d:amkrow
The GIC Association, Inc
P.O. Box 1594
Lake Oswego, OR 97035
Ph. (503)697-8616 
FAX (503) 636-1594
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Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q-1-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Re: Exposure Draft - Proposed Statement of Position on Reporting of Investment 
Contracts Held by Health & Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution 
Pension Plans.
Dear Ms. Hicks.
This letter sets forth our comments on the AICPA's September 15, 1993 Exposure 
Draft entitled "Proposed Statement of Position on Reporting of Investment 
Contracts Held by Health & Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution 
Pension Plans." We support the proposed Statement of Position and believe this 
standard in many ways will improve current practice.
In response to your specific request for comments, we would like to submit the 
following input.
1. Timing of Implementation: Page 16 - Paragraph 17
We recommend that the effective date of this SOP be for financial statements with 
plan years beginning after December 15, 1994. We believe this is reasonable 
because there will not be enough time between the comment period ending 
December 15, 1993 for the AICPA to review comments, issue the SOP, and have 
plan fiduciaries comply with the SOP between December 15, 1993 and January 1, 
1994.
In addition, we recommend a transition period for contracts — presently held in 
health & welfare and defined contribution pension plans and purchased prior to 
September 15, 1993 — that do not presently meet all of the proposed requirements 
to be considered "fully benefit responsive." This would be consistent with the FAS 
No. 110 which grandfathered DAs and IPGs issued prior to the date of the exposure 
draft.
Judy W ilson We believe these contracts should continue to be valued at contract value until plan
Protective Life insurance Co. y e a r s  beginning after December 15, 1998. We make this recommendation because 
executive director: the present contracts were purchased on behalf of plan participants with the 
Larry H. Mylnechuk understanding that they would be carried at contract value. To change the valuation
methodology on existing contracts could cause undue concern about the meaningful
SERVING PARTICIPANT AND PROFESSIONAL NEEDS IN THE STABLE VALUE MARKETPLACE
value of the account statement balances and/or financial damage to the plan 
participants. Fair valuation of existing contracts resulting in a premium or a discount 
would create a bias against participants entering or existing the fund, and create 
significant confusion regarding appropriate valuation of actual benefit payments.
Should plan sponsors wish to maintain a stable value portfolio as an investment 
option for their participants, this transition period would enable them to restructure 
the type of contracts purchased to comply with the "fully benefit responsive" 
provisions of this proposal. Requiring immediate compliance for previously placed 
contracts might result in a significant cost to plan participants, either through 
unexpected wrap charges or lower yield if contract provisions were renegotiated.
For many contracts this might not even be possible.
The proposed transition period would also limit the difficulty and expense inherent in 
trying to value partially benefit responsive contracts.
2. Inclusion of Market Interest Rate: SOP Cover Letter
Relating to the issue of reporting a "market rate of interest for fully benefit 
responsive contracts," we suggest that the current SOP without this requirement is 
appropriate. Market values are only appropriate in certain circumstances such as: 
when there is an active secondary market, the issuer is financially unsound, the 
contract is not fully benefit responsive, or a triggering event has occurred which will 
result in premature termination. Otherwise, contract value is the only appropriate 
valuation that should be reported. The main issue is: "What can the participant 
expect to receive at the present point in time if the account is accessed?" Any 
valuation or interest-rate scenario that differs from the value that would be received 
would, at best, confuse the primary users of the financial statements and, in the 
worse case, mislead these plan participants.
3. Valuation Implications Due to Plan Restrictions: SOP Cover Letter 
We are not currently aware of any ERISA or IRS Codes implications that, by 
definition, will arise from a plan restriction causing a contract to be valued at other 
than contract value. It is not a matter that has been extensively researched by our 
organization. This issue should be specifically addressed to the Department of Labor 
and the IRS.
We are concerned that the plan not be required to create a situation in which it 
would increase its fiduciary liability exposure. This might occur if a plan is required 
to report contracts at fair value when they are unable to deliver fair value to 
participants when contracts held in the portfolio are accessed.
Each plan sponsor must comply with its fiduciary responsibility to disclose any 
material items that will impact the plan participant and the value of plan assets. This 
is done through many means in addition to plan financial statements: SPDs, 
participant communications, mandated education -ala DOL 404(c)- and periodic 
participant statements. Disclosure should include: restrictions that will impact 
contract valuation, liquidity provisions, access restrictions, rates of return, penalties 
on any withdrawal or transfer and any significant event that will affect the value of 
plan assets. However, we believe that each plan fiduciary should have the discretion
to determine the best means to fulfill its responsibility to disclose financial 
information to plan participants.
Therefore, no further disclosure should be required in the SOP other than fulfillment 
of current fiduciary reporting responsibility.
4. Types of Plans Covered: Page 8-9 - Paragraph 10; Page 11 - Paragraph 
#15(e)(3.18); Page 13 - Paragraph #15(i)(4.14); Page 15-16 - Paragraph 
#16(c)(30)
We recommend that full benefit responsiveness be defined as it was in the 2/17/93 
draft SOP. This prior SOP defined full benefit responsiveness as permitting all 
participant-initiated requests permitted by the plan to be withdrawn at contract 
value.
If this recommendation were adopted, it would entail deleting the following section 
in each of the above listed paragraphs:
"For example, if plan participants are allowed access at contract value to all or a 
portion of their account balances only upon termination of their participation in the 
plan, it would not be considered reasonable access and, therefore, investment 
contracts held by that plan would generally not be deemed to be fully benefit 
responsive. If however, a plan limits participants' access to their account balances to 
certain specified times during the year (for example, semiannually or quarterly) to 
control the administrative costs of the plan, that limitation generally would not affect 
the benefit responsiveness of the investment contracts held by that plan."
As currently written, the proposed SOP and its definition of fully benefit responsive 
contracts addresses issues relating primarily to 401(k)-type plans. There are other 
defined contribution plans, such as many multi-employer (Taft-Hartley) annuity 
plans, and some Section 457 and profit sharing plans which currently have benefit 
responsive contracts that will not meet the proposed "access" standards defined in 
the SOP. The contracts within these plans still transfer the risk of benefit payments, 
as designed by the plan, to a financially responsible third party. The participants of 
these plans are still the main users of the financial statements and bear the investment 
risk of the portfolio. Selection of a contract-valued asset by the plan fiduciary was 
made specifically to provide a stable return for conservative plan participants. Any 
adjustment in value from contract value will create significant concern among these 
plan participants and might force them to invest in shorter-term, lower-yielding 
assets to provide stable valuation. In the long run, this would significantly impact 
the retirement benefits of millions of participants.
If necessary, reasonable access examples might be contained in the "Application of 
Fair Value & Contract Value Reporting For Defined-Contribution Plan Investments" 
attached to the SOP. In our Attachment A, we have included examples of 
reasonable access for the different types of plans, both Health & Welfare and 
Defined-Contribution Pension Funds.
In  conclusion, the SOP w ill be a positive event fo r investors in stable asset 
investments. There are a number o f  significant issues that should be clarified, and 
we hope this brie f commentary w ill be useful in defining the outstanding issues.
Thank you fo r the opportunity to  present our views. We look forward to  the 
issuance o f  the final SOP. Please feel free to  contact Larry Mylnechuk, Executive 
Director o f  the GIC Association w ith  any questions.
Harold H. M orley
Chairman, Contract Valuation Committee
enc.
ATTACHMENT A
Example #1: Benefit responsive contracts in a participant elected deferred compensation 
plan, such as a 401(k) plan.
For participant directed deferred compensation plans, it would not be considered reasonable 
access to plan assets if plan participants are only allowed access at contract value to all or a 
portion of their account balances upon termination of their participation in the plan. Therefore, 
investment contracts held by this type of plan would generally not be deemed to be fully benefit 
responsive. If, however, a plan limits participants' access to their account balances to certain 
specified times during the year (for example, semiannually or quarterly) to control the 
administrative costs of the plan, that limitation generally would not affect the benefit 
responsiveness of the investment contracts held by that plan.
Example #2: Contracts in a health & welfare plans (e.g. medical, vacation, strike fund, 
training funds, etc.)
Investment contracts in a health & welfare fund may be deemed to be fully benefit responsive if 
all participant initiated events allowed under the plan can be paid at contract value. These 
events may be either voluntary (e.g. taking accrued vacation & applying for training programs) 
or involuntary (e.g. applying for strike benefits & medical payments due to claims.) Should 
100% of the benefits allowed under each plan not be covered under the benefit responsive 
provisions, the contracts would generally not be deemed to be fully benefit responsive and 
should be carried at fair value for any portion of the contract that will not cover plan allowed 
benefits.
Example # 3: Contracts held in Taft-Hartley annuity plans or some non-participant 
directed Section 457 plans.
In these plans, reasonable access is determined by the purpose of the plan and is contained 
within the collective bargaining agreement which establishes and supports the plan. Each 
negotiating cycle, official representatives of the plan participants and employers are able to 
negotiate on the issue of reasonable access in the specified plan. Since the participants of these 
plans are the primary users of the financial statements, bear the investment risk of their 
accounts, and participate in the definition of the benefits allowed under the plan, all investment 
contracts which cover 100% of the benefits due under the plan can be considered benefit 
responsive. Contracts which do not cover 100% of the benefits of the plan generally would not 
be deemed to be fully benefit responsive and should be carried at fair value for any portion of 
the contract that will not cover allowed benefits.
Example # 4: Contracts held in Employer Directed Profit Sharing plans.
In these plans also, reasonable access is determined by the purpose of the plan. Plans which 
contain provisions that allow withdrawals, at no penalty, prior to termination from the plan 
should also be deemed to have granted reasonable access. The participants of these plans are 
the primary users of the financial statements, bear the investment risk of their accounts, and can 
determine the timing of withdrawals. All investment contracts which cover 100% of the benefits 
due under the plan can be considered benefit responsive. Contracts which do not cover 100% 
of the benefits of the plan generally would not be deemed to be fully benefit responsive and 
should be carried at fair value for any portion o f the contract that will not cover allowed 
benefits.
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PROFIT SHARING COUNCIL OF AMERICA ■  THE PROFIT SHARING AND 401 (K) ADVOCATE
10 South Riverside Plaza, Suite 1460, Chicago, Illinois 60606-3802 312.441.8550 Fax: 312.441.8559
December 14 , 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q-l-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Re: Exposure Draft - Proposed Statement of Position on Reporting of 
Investment Contracts Held by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and 
Defined-Contribution Pension Plans.
Dear Ms. Hicks:
The Profit Sharing Council of America (PSCA), on behalf of its 1,200 member 
companies that sponsor profit sharing and other defined-contribution plans and 
their two million participating employees, has the following comments 
concerning the Exposure Draft:
Effective Date. The effective date should be delayed by one year. Paragraph 17 
provides that the new accounting procedures are effective for plan years 
beginning after December 15,1993. The closing date for comments is also 
December 15 , 1993, and it is likely that publication of the final requirements will 
not take place until some time later. It will be impossible for many plan sponsors 
and their service providers to reprogram their valuation accounting systems 
within this time frame. For example, calendar year plans with daily valuation 
will have to be in compliance by January 1 , 1994.
Transition Period. PSCA recommends that for investment contracts purchased 
before December 16 , 1993 (Old Contracts), the new accounting rules be applied 
for plan years beginning after December 15, 1996. The proposed SOP would 
require existing contracts that are not fully benefit responsive to be reported at 
fair value. Such an accounting change, which could flow through to the account 
statements of individual participants, would create sudden, unexpected changes 
in account values that would be disconcerting to plan participants who expect 
stable account values. A three-year transition period will allow many Old 
Contracts to mature. For those Old Contracts that do not mature, the delayed 
implementation would give plan sponsors the opportunity to:
• Negotiate a fully benefit responsive feature with the current investment 
contract provider.
• Negotiate a fully benefit responsive wrapper with another financially 
responsible institution.
• Explain to participants why their account balances will fluctuate after 1996.
Earlier application of the new rules to Old Contracts would be permitted, 
provided that they were applied to all Old Contracts purchased before the 
effective date. For investment contracts purchased after the effective date, the 
new accounting rules would be applied as provided in the Exposure Draft.
If a transition period is not allowed, PSCA recommends that fair value reporting 
for Old Contracts not be included in individual participant statements. If such 
reporting is required, significant and unfair discrepancies could occur. For 
example, current low interest rates probably will result in contracts that have a 
fair value higher than their contract value. To report this higher value to 
participants would inflate their plan balances. If this inflated plan balance was 
paid to retiring employees, the remaining employees would suffer a loss, because 
on a fair value basis the contract assets, which are fixed, would be depleted to the 
detriment of remaining employees. If the inflated plan balance is not paid, plan 
participants will challenge the final benefit payout.
Class-Year Contracts. Existing class-year contracts should be exempt
(grandfathered) from the non-benefit responsive valuation requirements. Under 
class-year contracts participants agree to withdrawal and transfer restrictions in 
exchange for higher interest rate guarantees. Plan participants elect to participate 
in these contracts on an individual good faith basis. Existing class-year contracts 
should be allowed to continue under current accounting until they mature.
Inclusion of Market Interest Rate. Fully benefit responsive contracts that are 
reportable at contract value should not be reported at a "market rate of interest." 
Such reporting would be misleading and would thoroughly confuse participants, 
which could easily result in their making incorrect investment decisions.
Other Code Provisions. Defined-contribution plans that do not permit 
distribution of benefits prior to termination of employment should not cause the 
underlying contracts to be deemed non-benefit responsive. For example, money- 
purchase plans, by regulation, do not permit benefit distribution until 
employment is terminated.
Thank you for considering PSCA’s comments. Please contact me if you have any 
questions.
Sincerely
David L. Wray 
President
American Council of Life Insurance
Stephen W. Kraus 
Chief Counsel, Pensions
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December 15, 1993
M s . Susan Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division,
File Q-l-505
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Dear M s . Hicks:
On behalf of the American Council of Life Insurance (the 
"ACLI") I am pleased to submit our comments on the AICPA's 
Proposed Statement of Position for Reporting of Investment 
Contracts Held by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and 
Defined-Contribution Pension Plans (the "SOP"). The ACLI is the 
major trade association of the life insurance business. Its 634 
member companies have, in the aggregate, 90% of the assets of all 
life insurers in the United States and account for more than 93% 
of the funds related to all pension business with insurance 
companies.
The ACLI is most appreciative of the efforts expended by the 
AICPA in drafting this SOP. We applaud you for the SOP'S 
important and realistic financial statement reporting requirements 
with regard to investment and insurance contracts used to fund 
stable value accounts in health and welfare plans and defined 
contribution pension plans. For the most part, the SOP provides 
clear and explicit guidance to accountants who prepare financial 
statements for these plans. We commend the AICPA for recognizing 
the underlying and guiding principle of stable value funds: that 
when plan participants are assured, and do in fact receive, 
contract value when they withdraw money from these funds, contract 
value is the appropriate amount to be reported on the p lans' 
financial statements.
While we are generally supportive of the SOP, we do have 
several concerns with certain aspects of the draft, as discussed 
below:
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WASHINGTON. D C. 20004-2599 
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Reasonable Access
The SOP requires- that not only the terms of the investment 
contract be examined to determine whether the contract is fully 
benefit responsive, but the terms of the plan also be examined. 
Specifically, the SOP requires that plan participants be allowed 
’’reasonable access" to their funds. If access to their funds is 
"substantially restricted" by the plan, then the investment 
contracts held by that plan, which would otherwise be considered 
fully benefit responsive and reported at contract value, would not 
be considered to be fully benefit responsive and would be required 
to be reported at fair value.
By insisting that the terms of a plan be examined to 
determine whether participants have reasonable access to their 
funds and, further, whether access to funds is substantially 
restricted by the plan, the SOP creates a difficult analysis to 
determine what is reasonable access. This difficulty can arise in 
several contexts, particularly with respect to defined 
contribution pension plans where in-service withdrawals are 
limited. Accordingly, we urge the AICPA to revisit the issue of 
creating criteria for reasonable access at the plan level as a 
qualification for a contract to be fully benefit responsive.
Defined Contribution Pension Plans
The example in paragraph 10 of the SOP appears to 
overlook the type of defined contribution plan which is 
specifically intended for retirement savings, i.e., a defined 
contribution pension plan. These plans do not always provide 
participant access through in-service withdrawals, investment 
direction and loans, as these provisions are viewed as 
counter-productive to the objectives of the plan.
Since the purpose of a pension plan is to provide 
retirement benefits, the right of an employee to make 
withdrawals from a plan is restricted. Such restrictions are 
compelled by IRS rules covering qualified programs. For 
example, money purchase pension plans are required by law to 
limit access to a participant’s account balance (other than 
voluntary employee contributions) during the accumulation 
stage. Thus, a pension plan must not permit participants, 
prior to any severance of employment or termination of the 
plan, to withdraw all or part of the funds accumulated on 
their behalf consisting of employer contributions or the 
earnings thereon. In addition, such plans do not provide 
participants with the opportunity to direct investments.
Individuals under these plans typically become eligible 
for benefit distributions at normal or early retirement, 
death, disability or termination of employment. These 
participants receive the same benefit guarantees under 
investment contracts and therefore require the same contract
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value information as do participants in plans which have more 
liberal withdrawal provisions. Therefore, the proposed use 
of fair value for plans with more restricted access during 
active employment would have the effect of creating 
inconsistencies and inequalities in reporting financial 
information for contracts containing the same benefit 
responsive features at termination or retirement.
We submit that both participant groups should be able to 
rely equally upon the contract values reported under 
investment contracts that are fully benefit responsive based 
on plan provisions. This view is supported by paragraphs 6 
and 7 of the A ICPA’s explanation of the scope of the SOP, 
which notes that plan participants, as the primary users of 
the p l a n ’s financial statements, are chiefly interested in 
"the value of the assets" that can "currently be made 
available..." We interpret this language to mean that the 
appropriate value to reflect on a participant's benefit 
statement from a pension plan that only allows withdrawals 
upon termination of employment or retirement (whether normal 
or early) is what that participant would receive from the 
pension plan were he/she to terminate employment at that 
point or, if eligible, retire at that point.
A participant’s benefit from a defined contribution plan 
depends on the value of the investments that comprise his/her 
benefit account. The committee recognizes this when it 
states in paragraph 7 that "the pla n ’s net assets available 
to pay benefits equal the sum of participant individual 
account balances." Contract value, then, as the sum that is 
payable to participants from investment contracts, either 
in-service or following termination of employment, is more 
relevant for the users of financial statements.
As required by law, the money purchase pension plan does 
not allow in-service withdrawals; nor does it allow plan 
loans. The plan also does not permit plan participants to 
choose into which investment options they can put their 
account assets. However, all benefits to participants under 
the plan are stated in contract value terms. We believe 
these plans do provide "reasonable access" in the context of 
the purpose of money purchase plans and participants' 
understanding of the terms of their plans. Consequently, we 
believe contract value reporting remains the best accounting 
basis for these plans. Furthermore, we believe that it would 
be quite inappropriate for the SOP, or plan auditors in the 
future, to hold money purchase plans to "reasonable access" 
provisions that 401(k) plans normally provide.
Disclosure of Market Interest Rate for Contracts Reported at
Contract Value
The AICPA has requested comments as to the need to disclose a 
market rate of interest for fully benefit responsive contracts
-4-
that are reported at contract value. The thought behind this 
request is that with such information, plan participants would be 
better able to make informed investment decisions.
In our view, this type of disclosure would not be helpful to 
participants, but would instead create confusion and possibly 
mislead participants. Most importantly, current market rates and 
portfolio rates are not directly comparable. The most important 
interest rate to the participant is the rate that has been 
recently credited to the contract, and the rate that will be 
credited to the contract in the near future. Moreover, the wide 
variety of plans and contract provisions would make it difficult 
to determine a market rate that would be appropriate.
In addition, at any given time many plans will typically have 
a portfolio of investment contracts with a number of providers. 
This creates an additional problem. If market rate disclosure 
were required, a plan sponsor would have to collect information 
from all of those providers and create a method of presentation to 
participants that would be meaningful. First, it is not clear 
that such information would be readily available from providers. 
Second, it would be extremely difficult for a plan sponsor to 
translate this information in a way that would be useful to 
participants even if it were available. For example, a plan 
sponsor offers participants a blended interest rate that reflects 
three existing contracts with interest rates of 9%, 8%, and 7%, 
respectively and a new contract with an interest rate of 6%. 
Information regarding the market rates of the existing contracts 
would not assist, and more likely confuse, participants in gaining 
a better understanding of the investment under the plan.
The only "market” values which GIC issuers have historically 
reported to contractholders are surrender values, which contain 
penalties for early termination of the contract. Because plan 
sponsor transactions can only occur at the surrender values and 
participant transactions can only occur at book, no realistic 
market value of the ongoing contract has been needed. Therefore, 
disclosure of a market rate of interest for fully benefit 
responsive contracts reported at contract value should not be 
required.
Basically, we feel this disclosure is unnecessary because the 
SOP already appropriately provides for the reporting of investment 
contracts in the way that is most meaningful to participants. By 
focusing on the principle that what is reported is what the 
participant can expect to receive, the SOP captures the essence of 
what is most useful to participants.
Guide Sections, 7.37 and 7.39b
The SOP includes amendments to the Guide in Sections 7.37 and 
7.39b (third bullet), both of which refer to valuation at fair 
value only. We support these amendments; however, we are 
concerned that the principle that contract value is appropriate
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for fully benefit responsive contracts established elsewhere in 
the SOP could be overlooked. We propose, therefore, that the 
suggested amendments be expanded to include a reference such as 
"see Section 3.17 with respect to defined-contribution pension 
plans and Section 4.12 with respect to defined-contribution health 
and welfare plans." This would make that relationship clear to 
guide users.
Effective Date
The draft states that the SOP is effective for financial 
statements for plan years beginning after December 15, 1993. As 
many plans are calendar year plans, they will have only two weeks 
to come into compliance, prior to the effective date of the SOP.
We believe it is inappropriate to make the SOP effective prior to 
its finalization, since there may be revisions to the draft prior 
to its finalization. Further, since plans that wish to maintain 
book value accounting may have to undergo numerous changes to 
comply with the SOP, possibly including contract renegotiations 
and plan design changes, we urge the AICPA to change the effective 
date to plan years beginning after December 15, 1994. This will 
provide time for the AICPA to finalize the SOP and for plan 
sponsors to make the necessary adjustments to comply with the 
final statement.
Transition Rule
As mentioned above, many plans may need to renegotiate their 
insurance and investment contracts with their issuers. This could 
he an extensive process, once plan sponsors and issuers become 
aware of the final SOP requirements. Due to pricing and other 
considerations, some issuers may be reluctant to make contract 
changes. Further, in cases where contract changes are made, these 
new contracts may have to be filed with state insurance
departments for approval. Such approval usually takes a
considerable amount of time to receive. Accordingly, we ask that 
the AICPA provide at least an additional one year transition 
period beyond the December 15, 1994 effective date we are 
requesting for existing contracts to come into compliance with the 
final SOP.
We appreciate the opportunity to furnish these comments on 
the proposed SOP. If you have any questions or need any additional 
information, please do not hesitate to let us know.
Sincerely,
Stephen W. Kraus
S W K :kmc
Arthur
Andersen
A rthur A ndersen & Co. SC
Arthur Andersen & Co.
December 15, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q-1-505 
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20004-1081
69 West Washington Street 
Chicago IL 60602-3002 
312580 0069
Dear Ms. Hicks:
This letter contains our comments on the AICPA's exposure draft of a proposed statement of position 
(SOP), Reporting o f Investment Contracts Held by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined 
Contribution Pension Plans. We support the AICPA's efforts to clarify the accounting guidance in this 
area and we generally agree with the provisions of the SOP. We agree that plan assets should be 
measured and reported at values that are meaningful to the primary financial statement users—plan 
participants. Our specific comments are included below.
Issues for W hich Comment Is Specifically Requested
Effective Date and Transition
Contract value accounting is important to many plan sponsors, and a stable asset value is important to 
many plan participants. Many investment contracts currently owned by defined contribution plans were 
purchased in part to achieve book value accounting for the plan and stable account values for the 
participants. To the extent that those existing contracts are not fully benefit responsive, the proposed 
SOP would require them to be reported at fair value. Such an accounting change, which we believe 
would flow through to the account statements of individual participants, could create sudden, 
unexpected changes in account values that would be disconcerting to participants who expected stable 
account values. To avoid this result, we suggest a delayed effective date as follows:
o The new accounting should be required to be applied for plan years beginning after December 
15, 1996. Earlier application of the new accounting would be permitted. During the three-year 
delayed implementation period, many of the existing contracts will likely mature. For those 
contracts that do not mature, the delayed implementation would give plan sponsors an 
opportunity to (1) negotiate a fully benefit responsive feature with the investment contract 
provider, (2) negotiate a fully benefit responsive wrapper with another financially responsible
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enterprise, or (3) communicate to participants why their account balances will be less stable after 
1996. In addition, if contracts will be reported at fair value, some plans’ underlying accounting 
and computer systems may have to be modified.
Disclosure of a Market Rate of Interest for Fully Benefit Responsive Contracts
We believe that the financial statements of defined contribution plans have two primary objectives, not 
just the one identified in paragraph 7 of the Exposure Draft. The second objective should be to provide 
information to plan participants that is useful in assessing the plan's investment performance and making 
personal investment decisions. Such investment decisions include decisions to transfer investments in 
plans that have participant directed investment choices and decisions to liquidate investments versus 
borrowing from the plan for plans that permit participants to borrow.
o When market yields exceed the yield on a fully benefit responsive investment contract, the fair 
value of the investment contract (where fair value is estimated by discounting the future cash 
flows at a market interest rate for investments of similar quality and duration) is less than its 
contract value . In this situation, from the participant’s point of view, the benefit responsive 
feature represents an early redemption premium. The participant could perhaps obtain more 
value by redeeming early than by holding to maturity depending on the other investment options 
available under the plan.
o Conversely, when the yield on a fully benefit responsive investment contract exceeds market
yields, the fair value of the investment contract (where fair value is estimated by discounting the 
future cash flows at a market interest rate for investments of similar quality and duration) 
exceeds its contract value. In this situation, from the participant's point of view, the benefit 
responsive feature represents an early redemption penalty. The participant could perhaps obtain 
less value by redeeming early than by holding to maturity depending on the other investment 
options available under the plan.
We believe that the disclosures in paragraph 14 should be expanded to require disclosure of either (1) 
the fair value of fully benefit responsive investment contracts (where fair value is estimated by 
discounting the future cash flows at a market interest rate for investments of similar quality and 
duration) or (2) the market yields currently available on fixed income securities with quality and 
duration comparable to the investment contract. We believe either of those disclosures could be useful 
to participants in assessing the plan's investment performance and making personal investment decisions.
A rthurA ndersen
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Investment Contracts Recorded at Fair Value
We agree with the approach in the Exposure Draft of limiting contract value accounting to fully benefit 
responsive contracts as defined in paragraphs 9 and 10. Some partially benefit responsive contracts 
that, for example, pay benefits of up to 30 percent of the contract at contract value, are designed to pay 
all expected withdrawals over the life of the contract at contract value. However, we do not believe 
that it is possible to define in a clear or operational manner which partially benefit responsive contracts 
are sufficiently benefit responsive to be measured at contract value. The approach in the Exposure 
Draft, by contrast, is understandable and easy to apply. We also concur with measuring each individual 
contract separately. No aggregation or fund of contracts can be fully benefit responsive unless every 
individual contract is fully benefit responsive. We are not aware of any problems or ERISA or IRC 
implications that arise from the requirement to account for partially or non-benefit responsive 
investment contracts at fair value.
O ther Comments
Paragraph 9
We suggest including the word "liquidity" immediately before the word "guarantee." This 
clarifies the type of guarantee and agrees with the discussion in paragraph A. 6.
Paragraph 10
The paragraph indicates that the plan must allow participants "reasonable access to their funds." 
We suggest that reasonable be defined as at least on an annual basis.
Some have read paragraph 10 of the Exposure Draft to require that a fully benefit responsive 
investment contract permit investment transfers. We do not believe the Exposure Draft has such 
a requirement. However, we suggest that the final Statement be clarified to indicate that the 
requirement is reasonable access to funds without termination of employment. That access can 
be provided through withdrawals, loans, or transfers, but not necessarily all three.
Paragraphs 11, 15.b, 15.i, 16.b
Paragraph 4.10 of the Audit Guide, as revised, still indicates that plans not subject to ERISA 
annual reporting requirements must follow such requirements. Paragraph 3.15 o f the Audit 
Guide indicated the same point; however, it was replaced by the changes in paragraph 15.e of 
the proposed SOP. The SOP should indicate the accounting to be followed without referring to 
outside regulations. The existing and proposed language places an undue level of effort on plans
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to monitor changes in ERISA even when they do not fall within its jurisdiction. We propose that 
the last sentence of paragraph 4.10 be deleted.
Paragraphs 15.g, 15.1, 16.e
We suggest that the language in the additions to paragraphs 3.23, 4.26 of the Audit Guide and 
paragraph 53 of SOP 92-6 be revised as shown below:
p. A general description of the basis and frequency of determining crediting interest rate 
resets and any minimum crediting interest rate under the terms of the fully benefit 
responsive investment contracts and any limitations on related liquidity guarantees (for 
example, premature termination of the contracts by the plan, plant closings, layoffs, plan 
termination, bankruptcy, mergers, and early retirement incentives) onbenefit responsive 
investment contracts.
Paragraph 15.j
Paragraph 4.15, as amended by paragraph 15.j of this proposed SOP, should be adjusted to 
reflect the changes in paragraph 4.26 for sub-paragraphs 4.26.i and 4.26.j.
Paragraph A.2
As worded, the paragraph implies that a measurement method other than fair value or contract 
value is required.
We suggest that the paragraph be clarified as follows:
A. 2 The fair value of I nvestments contracts that do not provide a liquidity guarantee as
discussed in paragraph A. 1 may be valued determined according to the guidance of 
FASB Statements 35 and 107 Generally, this may be estimated by discounting the 
related cash flows based on current yields of similar investments with comparable 
duration. In determining the similarity of investments, appropriate consideration should 
be given to the credit quality of the contract issuer. Generally, contract termination 
(penalty) clauses need not be considered absent information that would indicate the 
plan's intent to terminate the contract.
A rthur
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Inconsistency Between Examples in Appendix
We believe that Examples 4 and 6 (paragraphs A. 11 and A. 16) are inconsistent. In A. 10, the 
plan may terminate the contract at any time and receive the value of the assets in the separate 
account. If market interest rates decline, this would permit the plan to capture the appreciation 
in the assets. Conversely, if market interest rates increase and the investments depreciate, the 
plan would look to the issuer to pay contract value for participant-initiated withdrawals. A. 11 
concludes that the contract should be reported at contract value.
By contrast, A. 16 deals with a situation in which the plan has an option, but not an obligation, to 
sell the bond to the contract issuer if funds are needed for participant-initiated withdrawals. 
Similar to A. 10, the option permits the plan to capture the appreciation of the bond if market 
interest rates decline but protects the plan against depreciation of the bond if market interest 
rates increase. A. 16 concludes that the contract should be reported at the greater of contract 
value or the fair value of the bond.
We believe that A. 16 has the appropriate conclusion and that A. 11 should be conformed to 
A. 16. If the plan has the ability to capture the appreciation of the investments at a point in time, 
it is inappropriate for the plan to carry the contract at a lower contract value.
Paragraphs A. 10 and A. 11
Aside from the inconsistency in examples 4 and 6 as noted above, the wording in paragraph 
A. 10 suggests that the interest is adjusted at the time of an initiated transaction. The wording 
should suggest that the contract credits interest on a formula basis.
We suggest that the paragraph be clarified as follows:
A. 10 A financially responsible issuer pays contract value for participant withdrawals,
regardless of the value of the assets in the separate account. On an ongoing basis, the 
credited interest rate used to determine the contract value is a function of the relationship 
between the outstanding contract value and the value of the assets in the separate 
account The rate is reset periodically, daily, monthly, quarterly, and so on, by the issuer 
and cannot be less than zero There may or may not be a specified maturity date on the 
contract. The contract holder may terminate the contract at any time, and receive the 
value of the assets in the separate account.
A. 11 The contract should be reported at contract value because participants are guaranteed 
return of principal and accrued "formula" interest.
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Paragraph A. 13
The paragraph includes a phrase "When considered together." In  these situations, the assets and 
wrapper would always be considered together. However, the language suggests that there may 
be some cases where they would not be considered together.
We suggest that the paragraph be clarified as follows:
A. 13 Inasmuch as trust assets are owned by the plan, the wrapper contract and the assets in 
trust should be separately valued and disclosed. The wrapper contract would be valued 
at the difference between the fa ir value o f  the trust assets and the contract value 
attributable by the wrapper to such assets. When-considered together, -Thus, the 
combined carrying amounts o f  the trust assets and the wrapper contract should be 
reported at w ill equal the wrapper contract value because participants are guaranteed 
return o f  principal and accrued interest.
Paragraphs A. 14 and A. 16
Aside from the inconsistency in examples 4 and 6 noted above, the term "issuer" could be 
interpreted differently. It could be interpreted as "contract issuer" or "bond issuer".
We suggest that the paragraph be clarified as follows:
A. 14 Under this arrangement contract, the plan purchases a bond and places it in trust. The 
plan then contracts with a financially responsible third party to provide benefit 
responsiveness. Under the contract, should the bond need to be sold to meet a 
participant-initiated withdrawal benefit, loan, or transfer, the plan is obligated to sell the 
bond to the financially responsible third party contract issuer, and the third party issuer is 
obligated to buy the bond. The transaction price is defined under the contract (for 
example, amortized cost). The financially responsible third party issuer is not obligated, 
however, to purchase securities that are in default.
A. 16 If the contract provided only an option for the sponsor to sell the bond to the financially 
responsible third party issuer, rather than an obligation to do so, contract value would 
only apply when the fair value of the bond was less than contract value, because the 
option would then have value. Fair value may be determined as the greater of the 
estimated discounted cash flows or the option price.
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* * * * * * * *
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to the Exposure Draft of the Proposed Statement of Position 
and will be happy to discuss any of our comments at your convenience.
Very truly yours,
A r t h u r  A n d e r s e n  Co ,
Arthur Andersen & Co.
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Ms. Susan W . Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division
File Q -l-505
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N W  
Washington, D C  20004-1081
Dear Ms. Hicks:
The Black &  Decker Corporation is pleased to comment on the September 15, 1993 
E xposure D ra ft of the A IC P A  proposed Statement of Position (SOP) Reporting o f 
Investment Contracts Held  by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribudon 
Pension Plans (herein referred to as the Exposure D raft).
Regarding the proposed requirement to value investment contracts that are deemed not to  
be fully benefit responsive at fair value, the cover letter to the Exposure D ra ft questioned;
"In particular, are there any E R IS A  or Internal Revenue Code implications 
that should be considered, and what, if  any, additional disclosures should be 
considered?"
A t the present time, it remains unclear to us how the provisions of the Exposure D raft 
interact with regulatory provisions imposed by the Federal government. W e have received 
differing, albeit informal, opinions of individuals fam iliar with such regulations as to whether 
a G A A P  requirement to value non-benefit responsive contracts at fair v a lu e  would require 
like accounting in the individual plan participants’ account statements (herein referred to 
as the Account Statements). Some of those whom we consulted believe this to be the case 
while others believe that contract value accounting may still be appropriate in certain 
instances. Those others argue that the use of a "mark-to-market" approach in the Account 
Statements by a plan which has the intent and ability to hold non-benefit responsive 
contracts to maturity would be, at best, misleading to plan participants. They point out that 
the logical conclusion of fair value accounting in the Account Statements is that a plan 
would be required to execute plan transactions at fa ir value. In  cases where a plan has the 
ability and intent to hold the non-benefit responsive contracts to maturity, use of fa ir value 
for plan transactions may, at worst, resu lt in  a  disproportionate sharing of risk am on g  p lan  
participants, which is contrary  to the provisions of E R IS A .
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In  order for the Employee Benefit Plans Committee of the A IC P A  to receive responsible 
comments to the Exposure Draft, we believe that it is imperative that the E R IS A  and 
Internal Revenue Code ( IR C ) implications be made known to all potential respondents. 
In  addition, we believe that it  is likely that the Committee w ill receive fewer comment 
letters than if  such implications had been fully addressed. W e urge the Committee to fully  
address these implications and consider re-exposure of the Exposure Draft.
Irrespective of the Committee’s actions on potential re-exposure, we believe that the 
effective date as proposed in the Exposure D ra ft does not permit plans sufficient time to 
react to its provisions. The required adoption date o f January 1, 1994 for calendar year 
plans does not provide sufficient time for such plans to address the E R IS A  and IR C  
requirements i f  it  is determined that symmetry is required in a plan’s G A A P  financial 
statements and its underlying Account Statements. Accordingly, we recommend that the 
Committee provide for a delayed effective date in the event that the Exposure D ra ft is 
adopted.
Paragraphs 6 through 8 of the Exposure D ra ft note that the primary users of defined 
contribution plan financial statements-plan participants—require information that is useful 
in assessing the plan’s present and future ability to pay benefits when they are due. Further, 
it is noted that information useful to plan participants "includes the amounts they would 
receive currently i f  they were to  withdraw or borrow funds from or transfer funds within the 
plan." W e believe that plans may demonstrate the intent and ability to hold non-benefit 
responsive contracts to maturity; this may be accomplished due to sufficient liquidity in  the 
plan, by pre-funding of contributions by the plan sponsor, or by obtaining loans from the 
plan sponsor. In  cases where the intent and ability to hold non-benefit responsive contracts 
can be demonstrated by the plan, we believe that die information useful to plan participants 
is contract value not fa ir value. Accordingly, we urge the Committee to modify the 
provisions of the Exposure D raft to permit contract value accounting for non-benefit 
responsive contracts for which plans can demonstrate their intent and ability to hold to 
m aturity. Such a valuation alternative would be consistent with that afforded under SFAS 
115 Accounting fo r Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities.
Should you wish to discuss any of the comments included in this letter, please contact Tina  
M cM ullen  at (410) 716-3567.
Sincerely,
Kenneth A  Kelly  
Corporate Controller
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company
John-Hancock Place
Post Office Box 111
Boston, Massachusetts 02117
(617)572-9930
Jeanne M. Livermore
Senior Vice President
Investment and Pension Group 
Guaranteed and Stable Value Products
OFFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE SPONSOR 
1994/1996 U.S. OLYMPIC TEAMS
December 15, 1993
Via Fax
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q-1-505 
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. 
Washington, D .C  20004-1081
Re: Exposure Draft - Comments on the Proposed Statement o f  Position on Reporting o f
Investment Contracts Held by Health & Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution
Pension Plans
Dear Ms. Hicks:
The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company is one o f  the nation's leading insurance 
companies. For over half a century we have been a major provider o f  products and services to 
sponsors o f all form s o f  pension plans. Currently, we are managing over $25 billion o f  assets 
supporting both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. As one o f  the firs t issuers o f  
guarantee investment contracts, we have developed a  substantial expertise with guaranteed 
products.
In that light, we welcome the opportunity to offer our comments to you. A t John Hancock, 
we fee l the AICPA has done an excellent jo b  o f identifying and responding to the critical issues 
involved in the reporting o f  investment contracts by defined contribution pension plans. The 
result is a  well thought out document that clearly recognizes that the essential feature o f  these 
contracts is that they provide benefits to participants at book value. By tying the concept o f  full 
benefit responsiveness to the contract value reporting, the AICPA has responded directly to the 
needs o f plan sponsors and participants.
We offer the following comments on certain portions o f  the draft:
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Disclosure o f Market Rate o f Interest
The AICPA has requested comments as to the desirability o f  disclosing a  market rate o f  
interest fo r  fu lly benefit responsive contracts that are reported a t contract value. The 
thought behind this request is that with such information, plan participants would be better 
able to make informed investment decisions.
To fulfill such a requirement, a  plan sponsor would first need to acquire accurate 
information and then develop a  means o f  presenting that information in the financial 
statements in a way that would be meaningful to users. We believe the information simply 
doesn't exist in the normal procedures o f  GIC issuers.
Except fo r  plan-provided benefit responsiveness, GIC's are illiquid There is no active 
market from  which realistic values can be derived This means that any so-called market 
value would, o f  necessity, be subject to approximations and assumptions. GIC contracts do 
provide fo r  a market value adjustment in the case o f  a  plan sponsor initiated surrender o f  
the contract. In this case, however, the adjustment includes penalties resulting from  
premature termination. These surrender values are clearly inappropriate fo r  disclosure 
since they would only be realized in an actual event and do not represent an actual current 
value. This is also true fo r  separate account and synthetic GIC's to the extent they are 
invested in illiquid asset classes.
It has been suggested that money market rates could serve as a  proxy fo r  a contractual 
market rate. Money market rates in this context would be inappropriate due to limitations 
caused by the comparison o f  what are basically generic money market rates to individually 
underwritten investment contracts that take into account specific plan and cash flow  risks. 
Such a  comparison would be further distorted by differences o f  duration, liquidity and 
credit characteristics between money market funds and investment contracts.
As a major issuer o f  GIC's, we are highly reluctant to provide estimates o f  current market 
values as a part o f  our regular procedures. Differences between these estimates and 
contract surrender values would inevitably lead to confusion and potential legal disputes 
with plan sponsors.
I f  a market comparison rate is available, we perceive a  greater anti-selection risk to 
ourselves. This increased risk would eventually evidence itself through decreased yields to 
participants as issuer risk charges are increased. This cost to participants fa r  outweighs 
any benefit from the disclosure information.
We fee l that the unavailability o f  accurate market value data, coupled with the difficulty 
faced  by plan sponsors in explaining why the information is being presented and how it is to 
be used, leads to the conclusion that the use o f  a  market value reference rate is not 
workable on a practical basis.
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Interpretation o f Reasonable Access
The AICPA also sought comments on the requirement o f  valuation a t fa ir  value o f  
investment contracts deemed not to be fu lly benefit responsive due to plan restrictions.
It -would seem difficult fo r  an auditor to conclude that contracts issued to a  given plan must 
be valued a t fa ir  value simply because it has fewer form s o f  access available to participants, 
-when all payments are in fa c t p a id  a t contract value and such payments can occur over the 
participant's fu ll investing period  Certainly the absence o f  additional investment options in the 
plan should not be the basis fo r  a  determination o f  failure to provide reasonable access.
While the multi-fund 401(k) plan has become thought o f  as the "typical" defined 
contribution plan, according to 1987 Form 5500 data as reported in 1992 by the Department o f  
Labor, only 8% o f  all defined contribution plans -were 401(k) plans and only 38% o f  defined 
contribution plan participants -were 401(k) participants1. Other plans represent a  variety o f  
types - profit sharing, deferred profit sharing, thrift, money purchase, etc. - many o f  -which are 
single fund in nature.
In fact, from an analysis o f  approximately 2800 defined contribution plans that John 
Hancock has provided investment contract quotes to, -we estimate that 3-5% are single-fund, 
employer directed plans that use investment contracts specifically fo r  the purpose o f  providing 
contract value benefits.
While these plans do not allow investment transfers, they permit in-service or hardship 
-withdrawals. Loans are often permitted Non-hardship -withdrawals may often occur with a  tax 
penalty. Retired and term vested participants may leave funds in the plan and withdraw or roll­
over to an IRA at any time. In fact, the IRS requires that plans allow these participants to leave 
their funds in the plan. After age 70 1/2 phased withdrawal becomes mandatory. Transactions 
occur continually over the expected life o f  the participant and spouse (if married). This can 
cover a time frame o f  20-30 years during which contact value payments will be made.
Reflective o f situations where transactions that participants can initiate transactions when 
investment options are not available are:
1. U.S. Department o f  Labor, Trends in Pensions, 1992 P. 164.
According to the U.S. Department o f  Labor, fu lly 9 percent o f  employees participate in 
capital accumulation defined contribution plans, as distinct from  retirement plans2 3. 
Capital accumulation plans are defined as those -which allow employer, as -well as 
employee, contributions to be -withdrawn before retirement. It is unknown how many o f  
these employees have employer-directed plans invested in GIC's. However, fo r  those -who 
do, there is an ongoing need fo r an accurate assessment o f  the current value o f  the fund  
so that the participant may know whether to leave funds in the plan or withdraw. Only 
contract value reporting provides an accurate value o f  the withdrawal amount fo r  
participants in these plans.
Twenty-four percent o f  participants in defined contribution savings and thrift plans are 
allowed to withdraw employer contributions a t any time prior to disability, retirement age 
or termination o f  employment3  For such employees, whether in single or multi-fund 
plans, this option to withdraw may only be meaningfully evaluated fo r  investment 
contracts i f  contract value reporting is allowed
Many plans, (including 401(k)) allow participants to deposit post-tax contributions. These 
contributions are always subject to immediate withdrawal from the plan at contract value.
Additionally, there are plans that offer various investment options but which encourage, or 
require, the use o f  stable value funds as participants approach or enter retirement. This practice 
is consistent with the intent o f  pension plans to provide fo r  the accumulation o f  funds over a  
participant's working life and income during his retirement. The idea is to preserve the value o f  
the accumulated balance and maintain stability o f  income fo r  retirees. Although participants in 
this situation may not transfer to other investment options, there are significant opportunities fo r  
benefit payments at book value.
An example o f  the way retirees value principal stability is found in John Hancock's own 
plan. Forty-three percent o f  the John Hancock Stable Value Fund assets belong to retirees. O f  
the retirees who choose to leave their funds in the plan, approximately 90% opt to leave the 
assets in the stable value fund, although other investment options are available to them.
Regular reports o f  their funds at contract value are important to them in determining whether to 
make fu ll or partial withdrawals from the plan. Such reports would be equally valuable and 
necessary i f  only that one fu n d  option were present.
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2. U.S. Department o f  Labor, Employee Benefits in Medium and Large Private 
Establishments, 1991, M ay 1993, p. 104.2.
3. Ibid pg. 117
Page 5
December 15, 1993
Letter to: Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Even when participants elect to receive their funds a t retirement, rather than leaving them in the 
plan, 52 percent have the option to elect installment payouts.4 Since the participant is assured 
the right to a  series o f  payouts a t contract value, it is important that the fund value be reported 
to him on that basis. Where funds are left invested in the plan, payout on a  gradual basis is 
mandatory after age 701/2. This is a  gradual fund reduction occurring over many years. 
Ultimately then, even i f  the participants have no ability to transfer to another investment option 
within the plan, there are many ongoing opportunities fo r  transactions a t book value, where the 
provider incurs market risk. It is critical that fund values be reported at contract value.
Plans which restrict participants solely to the GIC option have done so precisely because 
principal protection and liquidity offered are most appropriate fo r  their participants. Requiring 
fa ir  value reporting fo r  these funds would create an enormous amount o f  havoc and disruption 
in the defined contribution marketplace - fo r  no valid cause.
Amendments to Guide Sections 7.37 and 7.39b
The SOP includes amendments to the Guide in Sections 7.37 and 7.39b (third bullet) both o f  
which refer to valuation a t fa ir  value only. We support these amendments; however, we are 
concerned, since this is the only reference to GIC's in the auditing o f  investments section, 
that the principle that contract value is appropriate fo r  fu lly benefit responsive contracts 
established elsewhere in the SOP could be missed. We propose, therefore, that the 
suggested amendments be expanded to include a  reference such as "see Section 3.17 with 
respect to defined-contribution pension plans and Section 4.12 with respect to defined- 
contribution health and welfare plans." This would make that relationship clear to Guide 
users.
Effective Date and Transition
The Exposure Draft suggests that the SOP be effective fo r  plan years beginning after 
December 15, 1993, with accounting changes to be adopted as o f  the beginning o f  the plan  
year. In effect, a  calendar year plan would be required to implement any accounting 
changes as o f  January 1, 1994, even though the provisions o f  the SOP will not have been 
finalized. Assuming the SOP is finalized by the FASB during 1994, in order to allow plan  
sponsors affected by this SOP adequate opportunity to evaluate their plan provisions, 
portfolios, contracts, etc., and to be able to implement any necessary accounting change - 
especially as they pertain to transactions involving benefit payments, loans, or transfers - it 
would be preferable to defer the effective date to plan years beginning after December 15, 
1994, with conforming accounting changes to be made as o f  the beginning o f  that plan year.
4. Ibid pg. 117
Page 6
December 15,1993
Letter to: Ms. Susan W. Hicks-
Again, we thank you fo r  the opportunity to offer these comments. We compliment you on the 
positive results you have achieved on a  difficult and complex subject and look forward to the 
issuance o f  the final Statement o f  Position.
Sincerely,
Jeanne M . Livermore
Senior Vice President
Guaranteed & Stable Value Products
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December 15, 1993
Ms. Susan W . Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q -l-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N .W .
Washington, D .C . 20004-1081
VIA FAX: (202) 638-4512
Re: Exposure Draft -  Proposed Statement o f Position on Reporting o f Investment Contracts Held 
by Health &  Welfare Plans and Defined Contribution Pension Plans.
Dear Ms. H icks:
This letter sets forth our comments on the A IC P A ’s draft September 15, 1993 Exposure draft 
entitled "Proposed Statement o f Position on Reporting o f Investment Contracts Held by Health 
&  Welfare Plans and Defined Contribution Pension Plans". W e support the efforts as expressed 
in the Statement o f Position as a means o f providing a consistent standard practice for valuing 
these contracts.
The A ICPA guidelines for Statement o f Position on G IC  contracts appears to minimize the 
discussion and actual presence of traditional insurance components in many o f these contracts.
General Comments
Fundamentally, interest crediting rates are utilized substantially as a determining factor after 
credit when selecting contracts. This factor is a means o f a "common denominator" method of 
evaluating alternative issuers. Historically, issuing contracts with maturities is relatively new. 
Insurers always experienced difficulty marketing and explaining investment contracts without 
maturities. Contracts with maturities satisfy customer needs by permitting the pension trustee 
to reconsider its option periodically without making open ended commitments to contracts 
without maturities.
FASB needs to be consistent in recognizing the presence o f insurance within contracts whether 
they are open end or closed end, with maturities. Pension policy should not be dictated through
Guaranteed interest Contracts •  Single Premium Deferred Annuities •  Single Premium immediate Annuities
-  •  Funding A greem ents
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accounting methodology. Many large profit sharing plans settle liabilities through the purchase 
of annuities at retirement time. Many o f these plans invest through open end contracts which 
provide death, annuity, disability and other benefits. In addition, annuity benefits are paid 
commencing with Normal Retirement Date. Insurers agree to aggregate pre and post interest 
experience in determining ultimate benefits, ultimate investment returns, and ultimate annuity 
prices through dividends and participation credits to the contract.
Accounting treatment should not be different for contracts that are longer term in nature merely 
because the plan provisions are long term in nature. I f  contractual benefits are transferred to 
a responsible third party an insurance function is present.
Insurance Present in  Contracts
Insurers provide viable contractual guarantees and functions. Participant benefits are often paid 
in lump sum or annuity for death, retirement, disability, and other events. Plan design often 
permits participant initiated events in 401 (k) plans and these events when insured at book value 
are provided in exchange for a risk adjusted rate or yield on the contract. The risk adjustment 
is for: death, retirement, disability, termination o f employment, and investment transfer.
Cost of Insurance
Most consumers understand that insurance requires payment of a premium. Investment contracts 
with insurance features operate to provide an interest accumulation component. This is the 
primary benefit o f these contracts. Investment contracts with insurance features charge a 
premium in the form o f "Risk Adjusted Yields" determined by the issuer. Contracts containing 
provisions for these events provide for loss. This loss is not insignificant. It  is real. These 
attractive features are a requirement of some contract structures that are long term in nature 
because long term benefits are prescribed by the plan.
Historically during the late 70’s and early 80’s participants were permitted to withdraw liberally 
from investment contracts within certain plans. The interest and investment losses for 
investment contracts appeared on the insurer balance sheets -  not on the participant statements. 
These losses occurred because the benefits were contractually guaranteed; therefore, the issuer 
paid.
Contracts are drafted pursuant to the style o f benefits. So long as participants are provided 
benefits by a responsible third party, contract value should prevail whether that provision is long 
term or short term.
Market Interest Rate
Market interest rate does not relate in any way to G IC  fond rates. Users o f financial statements, 
the participants, can move freely within the context o f a given plan design regardless o f current 
market rates. Transactions for the G IC  account are not done based upon market rates unless the 
style o f G IC  Fund management is to acquire contracts annually or manage the Stable Asset 
Account through an "insured" rate. Participant events should be covered at book value within 
the contracts in order to carry these assets at contract or book value.
The New York GIC Exchange*
A Division of Qualified Annuity Services
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Pension Benefit Contracts
Investment Contracts with insurance benefits are purchased from financially responsible insurers. 
There should be no valuation concern i f  these contracts contain elements o f insurance whether 
for long range or short range plan events. There is no secondary market for these contracts. 
In  many instances, benefits are provided pursuant to "annuity plans". Examples are TSA 403(b) 
annuity plans and defined benefit IRC  Sec 412(1) fully insured plans. These contracts are 
provided pursuant to IRS rules and regulations.
Plan Design
Merely because plans do not provide for distribution o f accumulated assets is not justification 
to value other pension benefit contracts at something other than contract value. Merely because 
benefits are limited by plan design in an effort to maintain the long term nature o f some plans 
is not reason to ignore the presence o f insurance within the contracts. This concept should not 
be based upon or guided by the perception that participant control or lack o f direct control over 
assets should determine their value. Degree o f participant control should dictate the guidance 
on valuing these contracts. The presence o f insurance risk is what should govern their valuation 
approach.
Contracts are drafted according to plan design requirements. The plan design and plan of 
operation dictates the style o f benefit benefits to be presented to employees. As long as 
participants are provided benefits by a responsible third party, then contract value should prevail. 
The issue is whether financial responsibility is transferred or assumed. The frequency o f events 
that relate to some plans Should not dictate policy for others.
Unilateral Contracts
Responsibilities are driven by events that are either insured or uninsured. Insurance contracts 
are unilateral contracts. Offers of risk are made by the insured (the plan and its operation) to 
the issuer which are then requested to be transferred to insurers. The insurer w ill assess the risk 
and determine the degree o f risk. I f  the risks are agreeable, the insurer agrees to undertake that 
risk and the events related to it in exchange for a premium which is expressed in the form of 
"Risk Adjusted Yields". This in effect is the "premium" or consideration necessary to form a 
policy of insurance.
The unilateral nature of the contract requires the party to assess risks fully. To do otherwise 
is irresponsible financial underwriting. GICs and stable asset accounts are quasi "self- insured" 
or "massively co-insured" pools of assets designed to operate in tandem with each other within 
the context of a specific plan. So much emphasis is placed upon the maturity and bond features 
of these contracts that the presence of insurance is diminished. It should always be present in 
order to be carried at contract value.
Participant related insured events need to be discussed throughout the Statement. Certain 
sections such as A 1 do not even mention death, retirement or disability as event risks. This 
needs to be present in examples given. There is a lack o f emphasis upon the insurance elements 
necessary to form part of the contract. This needs reinforcement throughout Investment 
contracts with benefits provided pursuant to a plan should receive contract value accounting.
f f l  The New York GIC Exchange
A Division of  Qualified Annuity Services
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I t  is hoped that these comments are helpful in keeping the issues distinct. Insurance is supposed 
to be a promise. That promise is accepted by the insurer and it is transferred to financially 
responsible parties. Not allcontracts conform to this principle.
I t  is our opinion that the Statement o f Position w ill greatly clarify the issues. Distinguishing 
between risk events and securities has been greatly clouded by many issues. Please feel free to 
contact me with any questions you may have.
Sincerely,
QUALIFIED ANNUITY SERVICES/THE NEW YORK GIC EXCHANGE
Joseph B. Bellersen, Jr.
President
JBB:gah
File: G IC  Valuation - AICPA
 The New York GIC Exchange
A Division of Qualified Annuity Services
1251 Avenue of the Americas 
New York. NY 10020
Telepho n e  2 l2  819 5000
Price Waterhouse
December 15, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
R e: R eportin g  o f  Investm ent C ontracts by H ealth  and W elfare B en efit
P lans and D efin ed -C ontrib iition  P en sion  P lans
F ile  Q - 1 - 5 0 5
Dear Ms. Hicks:
We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the Exposure Draft of the above- 
captioned proposed SOP.
Specific comment was requested regarding a requirement to disclose a market rate of 
interest for fully benefit responsive contracts reported at contract value. We believe 
that such disclosure would be useful information for a plan participant and suggest 
that the U.S. Treasury Securities rate for similar maturities could be an appropriate 
benchmark.
We agree with the accounting and disclosure requirements of the proposed SOP; 
however, we offer the following suggestions which, if implemented, we believe would 
improve the document:
A ddress the accou n tin g  for investm ent con tracts held  by c o lle c t iv e  investm ent
funds
Many banks and insurance companies sponsor funds that invest in investment 
contracts. Investment in these funds is restricted to defined contribution pension 
plans. These funds typically maintain some level of highly liquid securities, a 
liquidity buffer, to fund anticipated levels of benefit responsive withdrawals. The 
investment contracts in these funds are usually benefit responsive once the liquidity 
buffer is exhausted. The investment contract can be terminated without penalty for 
non-benefit responsive withdrawals, e.g. contract termination, if notification is given 
one year in advance.
3We do not believe that a restriction of this nature is so significant as to disqualify the 
investment contract from reporting at contract value. However, due to the prevalence 
of this type of restriction, the proposed SOP should address it.
U se FA SB Statem ent N o . 5  term in ology in  paragraph A .2
In paragraph A.2 the proposed SOP states that contract termination penalties need not 
be considered "absent information that would indicate the plan’s intent to terminate 
the contract". We believe that the wording should conform to FASB Statement No. 5  
terminology, i.e., unless it is probable that the plan will terminate the contract.
R eq u ire  d isclosu re  o f  average y ield  on ly  for  p eriod s fo r  w h ich  a statem ent o f
ch an ges in net assets availab le  fo r  b en efit is  p resen ted
Paragraph 14 of the proposed SOP requires disclosure of the average yield for each 
period for which a statement of net assets available for benefits is presented. We 
believe that the disclosure of the average yield during a period should be required for 
each period for which a statement of changes in net assets available for benefits is 
presented.
* * * * * *
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with the Employee Benefit Plans 
Committee.
Very truly yours,
F IN A N C IA L  E X E C U T IV E S  
IN S T IT U T E
Joseph A. Sciarrino
Vice President and Technical Director
December 10, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q-l-505
American Institute of CPAs
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Ms. Hicks:
The Committee on Corporate Reporting (CCR) of the Financial 
Executives Institute (FEI) is pleased to comment on the AICPA's 
September 15, 1993 proposed Statement of Position (SOP) entitled, 
"Reporting of Investment Contracts Held By Health and Welfare Plans 
and Defined-Contribution Pensions Plans.”
Although CCR believes the proposed SOP represents an improvement to 
SOP 92-6 and the AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide, "Audits of 
Employee Benefit Plans," by expanding the circumstances under which 
reporting at contract value is appropriate beyond contracts with 
insurance companies, it opposes the requirement to report 
individual investment contracts contained in defined contribution 
plans at fair value. In assessing benefit responsiveness, the 
Committee believes the plan assets as a whole, including any 
guarantees, should be the criterion as opposed to individual 
investment contracts. In this regard, if a plan as a whole is 
determined to be "fully benefit responsive," individual contracts 
should be recorded at contract value.
Fair value reporting requirements for contracts not deemed to be 
fully responsive because of plan restrictions appear appropriate. 
However, we disagree with the "reasonable access" component of the 
definition of "fully responsive" contained in paragraph ten. If 
the plan provides that the benefits to be provided are at contract 
value, the plan should be reported at contract value regardless of 
the timing of the availability of those benefits to individual 
participants. It is not appropriate for an accounting standard to 
attempt to dictate the structure of a benefit plan by specifying 
how and when a participant may access his funds.
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If the final SOP continues to require application of fully benefit 
responsive criteria on an individual contract basis, the transition 
requirements should be modified to allow prospective application to 
investment contracts purchased (by defined contribution plans) 
after the SOP's effective date. Prospective treatment is necessary 
to prevent plan participants from incurring incremental costs that 
may result from modifying or selling existing non-benefit 
responsive contracts to make plans fully benefit responsive.
Paragraph four of the ED discusses the applicability of SFAS No. 5 
on the reporting of investment contracts. CCR believes the 
proposed SOP should provide detailed examples of fully benefit 
responsive investment contracts that should be reported at less 
than contract value. Moreover, the example provided should be 
modified as follows . . . ” or the reasonable probability of 
premature termination of the contract by the plan.”
Finally, CCR opposes any requirement to disclose a market rate of 
interest for fully benefit responsive contracts that are reported 
at contract value. Any linkage between a market rate of interest 
and reporting at contract value is problematic and potentially 
misleading.
This response was developed by the AICPA Subcommittee of the CCR. 
The individual on the Subcommittee who prepared the response was 
Dave Fitzpatrick of General Motors. Should you have any questions 
or comments, he can be reached at (313) 556-4167.
Sincerely
Joseph A. Sciarrino
JAS/afc
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
One Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10010-3690
MetLife
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Fred P. Hauser, F.S.A.
Senior Vice-President and Controller
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q-l-505
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081 
Dear M s . Hicks:
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company appreciates this opportunity to 
respond to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' 
(AICPA) Proposed Statement of Position, "Reporting of Investment 
Contracts Held by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined- 
Contribution Pension Plans." We strongly support the Committee's 
conclusion that defined-contribution plans should report investment 
contracts with fully benefit responsive features at contract value.
MetLife suggests that the Committee reconsider the criteria for 
reasonable access at the plan level as a qualification for 
contracts to be deemed fully benefit responsive. We feel that the 
qualification for benefit responsiveness should remain at the 
contract level. The access in certain plans, such as money 
purchase plans, is restricted because of Internal Revenue Service 
regulations. Participants in such plans currently enjoy the same 
benefit guarantees under investment contracts as do participants in 
plans which have more liberal access provisions, and therefore need 
the same contract value information. We believe that the use of 
fair value for plans with more restrictive access provisions would 
create inconsistencies and inequalities with reporting financial 
information for contracts containing benefit responsive features.
Further, we believe that the proposed change to the last sentence 
of paragraph 7.37 of the AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide Audits of 
Employee Benefit Plans should be modified to state that "These 
contracts are unallocated and are to be included as plan assets at 
either their contract or fair values, as appropriate." This 
modification would reflect the Committee's view that contract value 
is the most meaningful information for participants in fully 
benefit responsive investment contracts. Similarly, we also 
believe that the proposed change to the third bullet of paragraph 
7.39b of the AICPA Guide should be modified to state that the 
contract value, and not the fair value of funds invested in fully 
benefit responsive contracts should be confirmed.
We support the exclusion of a requirement for disclosure of a 
market rate of interest. The determination of such a market rate 
would be inherently arbitrary and subjective. It would also not be 
meaningful to fully benefits responsive contractholders, who are 
guaranteed access at contract and not at market value.
The Committee has requested comment regarding the proposed 
effective date and transition. We feel that there is not 
sufficient time to implement this Statement of Position for plan 
years beginning after December 15, 1993, and therefore the 
effective date should be postponed.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments on the Proposal with 
the Committee or staff.
Sincerely,
Fred P. Hauser
Senior Vice-President and Controller
December 10, 1993
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J. Michael Kelly
Vice President - Controller GTE GTE Corporation
One Stamford Forum 
Stamford, CT 06904 
203 965-2000
December 1 3 , 1993
Ms. Susan W . H icks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division
F ile  Q-1-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N .W . 
Washington, D C  20004-1081 
Dear Ms. Hicks:
GTE is pleased to have the opportunity to comment on the A IC P A ’s proposed Statement o f 
Position, “ Reporting o f Investment Contracts Held by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans 
and Defined-Contribution Pension Plans” . GTE is the largest U.S. based local-telephone 
company and the second-largest cellular-telephone company in  the United States, based on 
the population o f  our market areas served. Other GTE businesses include telephone 
directories, government systems, satellite-based telecommunications and telecommunica­
tions products and services. GTE is a preparer o f  financial statements that include such 
contracts.
In general, we support the provisions o f the proposed statement. In  order to ensure 
that preparers have sufficient time to apply its provisions, however, we recommend 
that the effective date not occur until the year fo llow ing the issuance o f the final 
statement We agree that the provisions o f the statement, once finalized, should be 
adopted as o f the beginning o f  the year and that restatement o f  prior years financial 
statements is not necessary.
We support the proposal to report benefit responsive contracts at contract value and non­
benefit responsive contracts at fa ir market value. We also support the disclosures of:
• the average yield on benefit responsive investment contracts fo r each period fo r which a 
statement o f  net assets available fo r benefits is presented;
• any significant adverse change in the credit worthiness o f the issuer o f  such a contract; 
and
• the amount o f valuation reserves recorded against such contracts, i f  any.
In response to your question, we believe that the average yield on benefit responsive 
investment contracts is the most relevant interest rate related information to users o f 
financial statements o f this nature. The disclosure o f the current market rate o f  interest 
fo r sim ilar benefit responsive contracts or any other interest rate information is considered 
unnecessary. Users o f  financial statements have numerous sources o f market information 
against which to evaluate returns on investment contracts.
Ms. Susan W . H icks 
December 13,1993 
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GTE is pleased to have had the opportunity to express its opinions regarding the A IC P A ’s 
proposed statement o f position.
Very tru ly  yours,
I
J. M ichael Ke lly  
JM K:pb
151 Farmington Avenue 
Hartford, CT 06156
James A. Geyer
Vice President & Actuary
Guaranteed Products, YCC3
203-275-4514
Fax: 203-275-4555
December 15, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division
F ile  Q-1-505
A IC P A
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N .W . 
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
RE: PROPOSED STATEMENT OF POSITION: REPORTING OF INVESTMENT 
CONTRACTS HELD BY HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS AND 
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSION PLANS
Dear Ms. Hicks:
I  appreciate this opportunity to comment on the Exposure D raft. M y  comments reflect those 
o f  Aetna's large case pension business unit. You have received a separate letter from  our 
Aetna L ife  Insurance and Annuity Company (AL IAC ) business units, which market to smaller 
employers. Aetna decided to issue separate letters to give you a sense fo r  the d ifferent issues 
and concerns that are present in  the small vs. large case business units.
Overall, we found the Exposure D ra ft w e ll thought out, w ith  appropriate conclusions drawn 
that contract value reporting represents the most meaningful basis fo r the reporting o f 
benefit responsive contracts. W e have seen and participated in  drafting the A C L I response to 
you, and agree w ith  a ll o f  the comments being made there. To summarize these:
•  "Reasonable Access" - potential fo r confusion in  interpretation
•  Effective date - too soon; should be 12/15/94.
•  Transition Rules - there should be reasonable rules provided, fo r example, fo r existing 
fixed maturity contracts which represent a reasonably small percentage o f  a sponsor's total 
assets.
•  Disclosure o f  market interest rate - too complex and unlike ly to add meaningful o r useful
data.
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•  Proposed changes to 7-37 and 7-39 b - need to c la rify  that fa ir  value disclosure is not 
needed fo r  fu lly  benefit responsive contracts.
Rather than expanding further on a ll these points, we w i l l  focus on several additional concerns 
not presented in  the A C L I letter, plus address a few extra points on the "reasonable access" 
issue.
D efin ition o f  F u lly  Benefit Responsive
W e believe the defin ition is too extreme, in  that i t  suggests that any lim itations on participant 
withdrawals o r transfers in  an investment contract, and perhaps even in  the plan, w il l  cause a 
contract to fa il the defin ition. This appears to potentially contradict the fundamental principles 
you have la id out (which we fu lly  support), namely,
•  the objective o f  a plan's summary level reporting is to give users inform ation regarding the 
plan's ab ility  to pay benefits when due,
•  values should be reported that are meaningful to financial statement users, and
•  plan participants are the prim ary users fo r defined contribution plans.
Given this, we believe the two crucial tests fo r whether contract value reporting should be used 
are: (1) that participants' prim ary rights to their account balances under the plan are stated in  
terms o f  contract values, and (2) that the terms o f  the investment contract regarding benefit 
responsiveness are substantially aligned w ith  participants' rights under the plan. Stated 
differently, i f  the plans' lia b ility  to participants is stated in  contract value terms, and i f  the 
plans' assets (i.e ., its investment contracts) support these contract value obligations to 
participants, then contract value reporting by the plan fo r both its assets and liab ilities w ill 
provide the most meaningful information.
The proposed draft includes the guidance that " i f  access to funds is substantially restricted by 
plan provisions, investment contracts held by those plans may not be considered to be fu lly  
benefit responsive" (paragraph 10). This clause is inconsistent w ith  the basic principles 
articulated above and w il l  like ly  create much concern and confusion among plan sponsors and 
their auditors. Where does one draw the line fo r "substantially restricted"? M ost plans do 
have restrictions on transfers by participants between the stable value fund option and 
"competing funds" such as money market funds, but a llow  transfers between the stable value 
option and a ll other plan funding options. I  assume that this is not a "substantial restriction", 
since participants s till have reasonable access to their funds, but I  suspect that others may 
disagree.
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The concept o f  "substantially restricted by plan provisions" does not f i t  w ith  the basic 
principles presented. The more important concept should be that a plan's obligations to 
participants are defined in  contract value terms, not whether participants can withdraw/transfer 
their funds at any time w ithout restriction. The nature o f  stable value funds is that there must 
be reasonable restrictions on withdrawals and transfers to m itigate reinvestment and 
disintermediation risks; otherwise no one would be w illin g  to w rite  stable value benefit 
responsive contracts, except perhaps w ith  very short term interest guarantees.
M y  second crucial test suggested was a need to have contract restrictions aligned w ith  plan 
restrictions. The draft appears to recognize this w ith  the words "investment contracts 
m ust...provide fo r a ll participants-initiated transactions permitted by an ongoing plan and 
contract value w ith  no conditions, lim its , o r restrictions" (paragraph 10; emphasis added). I  
believe your intent is that investment contracts can have "conditions, lim itations, or 
restrictions", as long as those restrictions are aligned w ith  restrictions in  the plan. 
Unfortunately, as presented, these words are already causing much confusion; several plan 
sponsors have contacted us to express their concerns that restrictions in  our contracts and their 
plans w il l  cause problems.
The words "no conditions, no lim its, o r restrictions" appear more absolute than intended. The 
examples in  A .8 .a . and A .8 .b  indicate that plan termination, plan spin-off, plan amendment, 
and la yo ff restrictions do not invalidate contract value reporting. You seem to be on the right 
track, but using the absolute words in  the text and then these examples in  the back w il l  cause 
confusion as to what restrictions are O K vs. not OK. W e suggest adding a princip le in  the text 
that contract restrictions that refer to events that are out-of-the-ordinary and not anticipated at 
the tim e the financial statements are prepared, such as plan termination, etc., do not invalidate 
contract value reporting.
Use o f the W ord "Guarantee"
The defin ition o f  fu lly  benefit-responsive contracts in  the A IC P A  draft includes the wording 
"provides a guarantee by a financially responsible th ird party o f  principal and previously 
accrued in terest...". This wording is potentially confusing. F irst, some m ight read "th ird  
party" as being other than the insurer who wrote the benefit responsive G IC o r sim ilar 
contract. Some parts o f  the financial community associate the word "guarantee" w ith  
coverages that on ly financial guarantee insurance companies can offe r, and thus could conclude 
that they need to purchase an additional "w rap" to qua lify fo r contract value accounting.
This (inappropriate) v iew  could be reinforced by reference to paragraph 4, where the SOP 
speaks o f  "a decline in  the credit worthiness o f  the contract issuer o r th ird  party guarantor"
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this potential confusion could be cleared up by adding " ( i f  d ifferent from  contract issuer)" after 
the word "guarantor".
G IC Pools
The SOP may adversely affect G IC  pooled products. G IC  pools are generally trusts o r 
insurance company separate accounts that purchase GICs from  m ultip le  other insurers; defined 
contribution plans buy in to the pool and share in  the underlying GICs. The GICs are written 
to provide fu ll benefit responsiveness to the plans participating in  the pool and a ll transactions 
between the plan sponsor and the pool are at contract value.
G IC pools have become very popular investment vehicles fo r defined contribution plans. In  
fact, according to an article in  the November 29, 1993 issue o f  Pensions and Investments, 
there were $15.5 b illion  invested in  G IC  pools at 9/30/93, up $4.3 b illio n  from  9/30/92.
The potential problem w ith  the draft arises from  the last sentence in  paragraph 10, i.e ., that 
"contracts that provide fo r prospective interest adjustments may s till be fu lly  benefit responsive 
provided that the terms o f  the contract specify that the crediting interest rate cannot be less 
than 0" (emphasis added).
A  G IC pool contract m ight be viewed as one that provides fo r "prospective interest 
adjustments" since interest earned is a function o f  the investment income the pool realizes on 
a ll o f  the G IC contracts. Interest rates fo r  the life  o f  the contract o r even the next accounting 
period are not set in  advance; instead, investment earnings are determined at the end o f  each 
accounting period. However, the G IC pool contract itse lf does not provide o r "specify" any 
exp lic it guarantee, even 0% , to the plan sponsor. However, each plan sponsor does im p lic itly  
share in  the guarantees o f  the underlying GICs and their benefit responsiveness.
M ost G IC  pool providers would not want to issue a 0% guarantee, since doing so would 
expose them to credit risk. However, this should not invalidate contract value reporting, just 
as regular G IC  purchases are O K unless there has been a material decline in  the 
creditworthiness o f  a contract issuer (as noted in  paragraph 4).
W e believe contract value is clearly appropriate fo r G IC pool contracts, since the true 
substance o f  benefit responsiveness is no different fo r a plan that purchases m ultip le benefit 
responsive G IC contracts itse lf vs. a plan that invests in  a G IC  pool which in  turn invests in  
m ultip le benefit responsive GICs. To eliminate any possible confusion on this point, we 
suggest changing the last sentence to "s till be fu lly  benefit responsive provided that the 
crediting rate cannot be less than zero.” This recognizes the im p lic it guarantees that are 
present through the underlying GICs, but does not require an exp lic it guarantee in  the G IC
Page 5
Susan W. Hicks
December 15, 1993
pool contract itself. I f  credit problems develop which could threaten the 0% , these should be 
handled as in  paragraph 4.
Thank you again fo r this opportunity to comment. I f  I  can be o f  any assistance, o r i f  you 
would like  any further explanation regarding the points made above, please do not hesitate to 
call (203-275-4514).
Sincerely,
James A. Geyer
jag845:cmd
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ITT ITT CorporationWorld Headquarters
M erlin  L. A lper
Vice President and 
D eputy Controller
December 20, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager, Federal Government Division
File Q-l-505
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 2004-1081
Subject: Draft SOP: Reporting of Investment Contracts Held by 
Health and Welfare Benefit and Defined-Contribution 
Pension Plans ("Plans")
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft SOP 
("ED"), which specifies that "fully benefit responsive" 
investment contracts held by the Plans are to be reported at 
contract values, and that Plans report other investment 
contracts at fair value. We support the general objective to 
measure and report at "values that are meaningful to financial 
statement users" (ED paragraph 8), but it appears to us that the 
ED defines too narrowly circumstances for which contract values 
are the most relevant measures.
The ED proposals for choosing between contract-value and 
fair-value accounting are presented in the context of SFAS No. 
110, which (a) required that defined benefit pension plans 
report investment contracts at fair value, and (b) asked the 
AICPA to review valuation for defined-contribution plans.
Reporting at fair value for defined benefit plans in Statement 
No. 110 was adopted as most relevant to "the plan's ability to 
pay benefits." The FASB considered and rejected the argument 
that defined benefit plans receive contract value at maturity of 
investment contracts and should report on that basis.
Subsequently, however, the FASB issued Statement No. 115, which 
includes reporting held-to-maturity debt securities at amortized 
cost. While Statement No. 115 literally does not cover 
"investment contracts," debt securities and investment contracts 
seem to be nearly identical in substance. In fact, in Statement 
No. 97, the FASB said that "... accounting for investment 
contracts issued by insurance enterprises should be consistent 
with the accounting for interest-bearing and other financial 
instruments" (cited in SFAS No. 110 as part of the rationale for 
reporting investment contracts at fair value)•
1330 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10019-5490 
Telephone (212) 258-1808
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It is not dear to us that Statements No’s. 97, 110, and 115 
provide a clear context necessitating fair-value reporting for 
some of the circumstances in the scope of the ED, We do not see 
reasons for the conclusion in ED paragraph 10 that if members' 
access to plan funds is available only upon termination of their 
participation (thereby failing the "reasonable access to funds" 
criterion proposed in the ED), then contract value reporting 
would not be permitted. We believe that it is more reasonable 
and more consistent with analogous situations in GAAP for 
defined contribution plans to report investment contracts at 
contract value unless the contract is impaired or will not be 
held to maturity. (Incidentally, comments on draft SOP's would 
be helped substantially by inclusion of "basis for conclusions" 
section to explain the ED's underlying rationale.)
There will be a disconnect between (a) contract value
commitments to participants in technically not-fully-benefit 
responsive contracts, and (b) fair-value reports that 
participants will receive. The proposed reporting will not be 
meaningful to such participants.
The ED asked for respondents' views on requiring disclosures of 
market rates of interest for contracts reported at contract 
value. We believe that such disclosure would be unnecessary, 
confusing to users/plan participants, and difficult to 
implement.
we think that the proposed application for plan years beginning 
after December 15, 1993, provides too little time for plans to 
convert to the new reporting basis, whatever that might be; 
plans that perform monthly valuations would need to convert to 
the new basis for the end of the next month. We suggest 
application for plan years beginning after December 15, 1994.
Sincerely,
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325 WEST COLLEGE AVENUE •  P.O. BOX 5437 •  TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32314 
TELEPHONE (904) 224-2727
November 15, 1993
Susan W. Hicks, Technical Manager
Federal Government D ivision
American Institute o f  Certified Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W .
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081 
RE: F ile Q -1-505
Dear Ms. Hicks:
This comment letter sets forth the views o f  the Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards 
Committee o f  the Florida Institute o f  Certified Public Accountants (the "FICPA Committee”) 
on the A IC P A ’s Proposed Statement o f  Position, "Reporting o f  Investment Contracts Held by 
Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution Pension Plans."
The comments in  this letter were derived from  a discussion o f  the SOP in  a recent meeting 
attended by ten members o f  the FICPA Committee. The members who participated in  this 
discussion collectively possess a broad knowledge o f  health and welfare benefit plans and 
defined-contribution pension plans.
GENERAL COMMENTS
In  general, the Committee endorses the proposed statement o f  position, believing that is a 
reasonable fo llow -up to Financial Accounting Standard No. 110 and w ill provide greater 
consistency o f  financial reporting among various types o f  benefit plans.
SPECIFIC COMMENTS
W ith  respect to specific comments solicited by the AICPA, we have the fo llow ing responses:
■ The FICPA Committee believes the effective date o f  this Statement o f  Position should 
be fo r plan years beginning after the date o f  final adoption o f  such a statement o f  
position. (Paragraph 17).
■ Although the FICPA Committee believes that some statement o f  rate disclosure may 
be useful to the financial statement user, we were unable to determine how to define a 
rate that would be a reasonable disclosure.
Susan W. Hicks, Technical Manager
Federal Government D ivision
American Institute o f  Certified Public Accountants 
November 15, 1993
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■ The FICPA Committee is not aware o f  any ERISA or Internal Revenue Code issues 
that would conflic t w ith  this proposed statement o f  position.
CONCLUSION
In  conclusion, we believe that this proposed statement o f  position is a reasonable approach to 
accounting fo r investment contracts by defined-contribution and health and welfare benefit 
plans and could be issued in  its present form  w ith  the exception o f  pushing back the effective 
date as discussed above.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide this response to the Exposure Draft. Representatives 
o f  this Committee are available to discuss the contents o f  this letter w ith  the A ICPA.
Stephen H. Kartell, C.P.A., M .B .A .
Chairman
(904)468-5340
Committee on Accounting Principles and Auditing Standards 
Florida Institute o f  Certified Public Accountants
Response Coordinated by Audrey W. Lewis
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MANAGEMENT, INC.
December 14, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q-1-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
Re: Exposure Draft - Proposed Statement of Position on Reporting of Investment Contracts Held 
by Health & Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution Pension Plans.
Dear Ms. Hicks:
Morley Capital Management was the first stable asset manager to become a registered investment 
advisor. Founded in 1982, we presently manage over $6 billion in stable assets, 65% in separate 
client portfolios and 35% in open-ended stable asset pooled funds. Our clients (representative list 
attached) represent a broad spectrum of institutional stable asset investors.
On behalf of these clients, we are submitting comments on the AICPA's September 15, 1993 
Exposure Draft entitled "Proposed Statement of Position on Reporting of Investment Contracts 
Held by Health & Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution Pension Plans." The following 
is our response and you will note is almost identical to that which was submitted by the GIC 
Association valuation committee. Our firm actively participated in this committee and we believe 
this response reflects the opinions of the clients we serve.
In general, we support the proposed Statement of Position and believe this standard in many ways 
will improve current practice.
In response to your specific request for comments, we would like to submit the following input.
1. Timing of Implementation: Page 16 - Paragraph 17
We recommend that the effective date of this SOP be for financial statements with plan years 
beginning after December 15, 1994. We believe this is reasonable because there will not be 
enough time between the comment period ending December 15, 1993 for the AICPA to review 
comments, issue the SOP, and have plan fiduciaries comply with the SOP between December 15, 
1993 and January 1, 1994.
In addition, we recommend a transition period for contracts -- presently held in health & welfare 
and defined contribution pension plans and purchased prior to September 15, 1993 — that do not 
presently meet all of the proposed requirements to be considered "fully benefit responsive." This 
would be consistent with the FAS No. 110 which grandfathered DAs and IPGs issued prior to the 
date of the exposure draft.
We believe these contracts should continue to be valued at contract value until plan years 
beginning after December 15, 1998. We make this recommendation because the present contracts 
were purchased on behalf of plan participants with the understanding that they would be carried at
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2contract value. To change the valuation methodology on existing contracts could cause undue 
concern about the meaningful value of the account statement balances and/or financial damage to 
the plan participants. Fair valuation of existing contracts resulting in a premium or a discount 
would create a bias against participants entering or exiting the fund, and create significant 
confusion regarding appropriate valuation of actual benefit payments.
Should plan sponsors wish to maintain a stable value portfolio as an investment option for their 
participants, this transition period would enable them to restructure the type of contracts 
purchased to comply with the "fully benefit responsive" provisions of this proposal. Requiring 
immediate compliance for previously placed contracts might result in a significant cost to plan 
participants, either through unexpected wrap charges or lower yield if contract provisions were 
renegotiated. For many contracts this might not even be possible.
The proposed transition period would also limit the difficulty and expense inherent in trying to 
value partially benefit responsive contracts.
2. Inclusion of Market Interest Rate: SOP Cover Letter
Relating to the issue of reporting a "market rate of interest for fully benefit responsive contracts," 
we suggest that the current SOP without this requirement is appropriate. Market values are only 
appropriate in certain circumstances such as: when there is an active secondary market, the issuer 
is financially unsound, the contract is not fully benefit responsive, or a triggering event has 
occurred which will result in premature termination. Otherwise, contract value is the only 
appropriate valuation that should be reported. The main issue is: "What can the participant 
expect to receive at the present point in time if the account is accessed?" Any valuation or 
interest-rate scenario that differs from the value that would be received would, at best, confuse 
the primary users of the financial statements and, in the worse case, mislead these plan 
participants.
3. Valuation Implications Due to Plan Restrictions: SOP Cover Letter
We are not currently aware of any ERISA or IRS Codes implications that, by definition, will arise 
from a plan restriction causing a contract to be valued at other than contract value. It is not a 
matter that has been extensively researched by our organization. This issue should be specifically 
addressed to the Department of Labor and the IRS.
We are concerned that the plan not be required to create a situation in which it would increase its 
fiduciary liability exposure. This might occur if a plan is required to report contracts at fair value 
when they are unable to deliver fair value to participants when contracts held in the portfolio are 
accessed.
Each plan sponsor must comply with its fiduciary responsibility to disclose any material items that 
will impact the plan participant and the value of plan assets. This is done through many means in 
addition to plan financial statements: SPDs, participant communications, mandated education -ala 
DOL 404(c)- and periodic participant statements. Disclosure should include: restrictions that will 
impact contract valuation, liquidity provisions, access restrictions, rates of return, penalties on any 
withdrawal or transfer and any significant event that will affect the value of plan assets. However, 
we believe that each plan fiduciary should have the discretion to determine the best means to fulfill 
its responsibility to disclose financial information to plan participants.
Therefore, no further disclosure should be required in the SOP other than fulfillment of current 
fiduciary reporting responsibility.
34. Types of Plans Covered: Page 8-9 - Paragraph 10; Page 11 - Paragraph #15(e)(3.18);
Page 13 - Paragraph #15(i)(4.14); Page 15-16 - Paragraph #16(c)(30)
We recommend that full benefit responsiveness be defined as it was in the 2/17/93 draft SOP.
This prior SOP defined full benefit responsiveness as permitting all participant-initiated requests 
permitted by the plan to be withdrawn at contract value.
If this recommendation were adopted, it would entail deleting the following section in each of the 
above listed paragraphs:
"For example, if plan participants are allowed access at contract value to all or a portion of their 
account balances only upon termination of their participation in the plan, it would not be 
considered reasonable access and, therefore, investment contracts held by that plan would 
generally not be deemed to be fully benefit responsive. If however, a plan limits participants' 
access to their account balances to certain specified times during the year (for example, 
semiannually or quarterly) to control the administrative costs of the plan, that limitation generally 
would not affect the benefit responsiveness of the investment contracts held by that plan."
As currently written, the proposed SOP and its definition of fully benefit responsive contracts 
addresses issues relating primarily to 401(k)-type plans. There are other defined contribution 
plans, such as many multi-employer (Taft-Hartley) annuity plans, and some Section 457 and profit 
sharing plans which currently have benefit responsive contracts that will not meet the proposed 
"access" standards defined in the SOP. The contracts within these plans still transfer the risk of 
benefit payments, as designed by the plan, to a financially responsible third party. The participants 
of these plans are still the main users of the financial statements and bear the investment risk of 
the portfolio. Selection of a contract-valued asset by the plan fiduciary was made specifically to 
provide a stable return for conservative plan participants. Any adjustment in value from contract 
value will create significant concern among these plan participants and might force them to invest 
in shorter-term, lower-yielding assets to provide stable valuation. In the long run, this would 
significantly impact the retirement benefits of millions of participants.
If necessary, reasonable access examples might be contained in the "Application of Fair Value & 
Contract Value Reporting For Defined-Contribution Plan Investments" attached to the SOP. In 
our Attachment A, we have included examples of reasonable access for the different types of 
plans, both Health & Welfare and Defined-Contribution Pension Funds.
In conclusion, the SOP will be a positive event for investors in stable asset investments. There are 
a number of significant issues that should be clarified, and we hope this brief commentary will be 
useful in defining the outstanding issues.
Thank you for the opportunity to present our views. We look forward to the issuance of the final 
SOP. Please feel free to contact me with any questions.
Cordially
Harold H. Morley 
President/CEO
enc.
4ATTACHMENT A
Example #1: Benefit responsive-contracts in a participant elected deferred compensation plan, 
such as a 401(k) plan.
For participant directed deferred compensation plans, it would not be considered reasonable access to 
plan assets if plan participants are only allowed access at contract value to all or a portion of their 
account balances upon termination of their participation in the plan. Therefore, investment contracts held 
by this type of plan would generally not be deemed to be fully benefit responsive. If, however, a plan 
limits participants* access to their account balances to certain specified times during the year (for example, 
semiannually or quarterly) to control the administrative costs of the plan, that limitation generally would 
not affect the benefit responsiveness of the investment contracts held by that plan.
Example #2: Contracts in a health & welfare plans (e.g. medical, vacation, strike fund, training 
funds, etc.)
Investment contracts in a health & welfare fund may be deemed to be fully benefit responsive if all 
participant initiated events allowed under the plan can be paid at contract value. These events may be 
either voluntary (e.g. taking accrued vacation & applying for training programs) or involuntary (e.g. 
applying for strike benefits & medical payments due to claims.) Should 100% of the benefits allowed 
under each plan not be covered under the benefit responsive provisions, the contracts would generally not 
be deemed to be fully benefit responsive and should be carried at fair value for any portion of the contract 
that will not cover plan allowed benefits.
Example # 3: Contracts held in Taft-Hartley annuity plans or some non-participant directed 
Section 457 plans.
In these plans, reasonable access is determined by the purpose of the plan and is contained within the 
collective bargaining agreement which establishes and supports the plan. Each negotiating cycle, official 
representatives of the plan participants and employers are able to negotiate on the issue of reasonable 
access in the specified plan. Since the participants of these plans are the primary users of the financial 
statements, bear the investment risk of their accounts, and participate in the definition of the benefits 
allowed under the plan, all investment contracts which cover 100% of the benefits due under the plan can 
be considered benefit responsive. Contracts which do not cover 100% of the benefits of the plan 
generally would not be deemed to be fully benefit responsive and should be carried at fair value for any 
portion of the contract that will not cover allowed benefits.
Example # 4: Contracts held in Employer Directed Profit Sharing plans.
In these plans also, reasonable access is determined by the purpose of the plan. Plans which contain 
provisions that allow withdrawals, at no penalty, prior to termination from the plan should also be 
deemed to have granted reasonable access. The participants of these plans are the primary users of the 
financial statements, bear the investment risk of their accounts, and can determine the timing of 
withdrawals. All investment contracts which cover 100% of the benefits due under the plan can be 
considered benefit responsive. Contracts which do not cover 100% of the benefits of the plan generally 
would not be deemed to be fully benefit responsive and should be carried at fair value for any portion of 
the contract that will not cover allowed benefits.
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REPRESENTATIVE CLIENT LIST
Corporate and Government Clients
Blount Inc.
Electrolux
Freightliner Corporation
Glaxo Americas Inc.
Grey Advertising
Mattel, Inc.
Milliman and Robertson, Inc.
Nebraska Public Power District
Occidental Petroleum
Reynolds & Reynolds, Inc.
SBS Trust Company
State of California Deferred Compensation Plan 
Stone Container Corporation 
Tektronix, Inc.
Taft-Hartley Clients
Hotel & Restaurant Employees International Union Pension Fund 
IBEW-NECA (Over 70 local unions and chapters participating)
Indiana State Council of Plasterers & Cement Masons Pension Fund 
Indiana State Council of Carpenters Pension Fund 
Intermountain Iron Workers Tax Deferral Plan
Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry
Kansas Construction Trades Open End Pension Trust Fund
National Asbestos Workers Pension Fund
No. California Retail Clerks Pension & Individual Account Funds 
Roofers 195 Annuity & Pension Funds 
Southern California Lumber Retirement Trust Fund 
Telephone Workers Savings & Security Plan
Timber Operators Council, Inc., International Woodworkers of America
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December 15, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks,
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q-1-505 
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004 - 1081
Dear M s . Hicks s
The following is our response to the Exposure Draft on the Proposed 
Statement of Position, "Reporting of Investment contracts Held by 
Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution Plans," 
dated September 15, 1993.
As trustee and/or custodian for the assets of a number of Defined 
Contribution and Health and Welfare Benefit plans, changing the 
valuation requirements for investment contracts held by such plans will 
require a degree of lead time to develop the necessary operational 
processes of receiving such values from a different party. Until now, 
such values were derived from statements provided by the GIC issuer.
In addition, moving from this current environment will also require a 
degree of communication with our client base so as to inform them of 
the new operational manner in which we will be receiving values for 
their GIC investments.
Rather than an effective date for plan years beginning after December 
15, 1993, we would strongly urge that the AICPA change this requirement 
to begin for plan years beginning after December 15, 1994.
We will be looking forward to the final issuance of your Statement of 
Position.
Respectfully,
/co
Carlos Hernandez 
Trust Officer
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The University 
of Alabama 
System
Office of Internal Audit - UAH 
Madison Hall 212 
Huntsville, AL 35899 
Phone:(205) 895-6037 
Fax: (205) 895-6187 
BITNET: UAHSLA@UAHVAX1
MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
Jim Robertson, Chair
ASCPA Audit Standards & Procedures Committee
Sylvia L. Ayers, CPA  
Director of Internal Auditing, UAH
SUBJECT: Response to Proposed SOP
"Reporting of Investment Contracts Held by Health 
and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution 
Pension Plans"
DATE: November 15, 1993
Effective._Date and Transition
Appears reasonable.
Disclosure Requirements
In the AICPA letter accompanying the proposed SOP, it was 
noted that the AICPA Employee Benefit Plans Committee had 
considered requiring disclosure of a market rate of interest 
for fully benefit responsive contracts reported at contract 
value. I also agree that this additional information would 
be beneficial to the users of the financial statements, 
particularly to plan participants. The market interest rate 
should be based on similar contracts with similar maturity 
dates and similar quality/media investment features. 
Reporting of Contracts
Concur with valuing non-fully benefit responsive contracts 
at fair value when there are plan restrictions.
DEC 21 '9 3  1 5 :4 3  L IF E  ACCOUNTING P .2 /4
CIGNA Corporation
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Hartford, CT 06152 
(203) 726-4630
Gary A. Swords 
Vice President and 
Chief Accounting Officer
CIGNA
December 21, 1993
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Federal Government Division 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1081
RE: File No. Q-1-505
Dear Ms. Hicks:
CIGNA, as a leading provider of benefit plan products and services, has been actively 
following the development of the Proposed Statement of Position (SOP), "Reporting 
of Investment Contracts Held By Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined- 
Contribution Pension Plans," and is pleased to provide comments thereon. We 
support the proposed SOP's conclusions concerning the importance of reporting 
relevant information to plan participants and agree that the information useful to 
plan participants 1.) includes the amounts they would receive currently i f  they were 
to withdraw, borrow or transfer funds under plan terms and 2.) is determined by 
considering whether plan investments provide for payment of benefits to plan 
participants in accordance with plan terms (fully benefit responsive). However, we 
strongly believe that significant changes are required to meet the SOP’s objectives.
By requiring that plan terms allow a participant reasonable access to funds, we 
believe that the proposed SOP's definition (in paragraph 10) of a fully benefit 
responsive contract is inappropriate. We believe that an investment contract’s 
benefit responsiveness should be determined based on a plan participant's access to 
funds under the plan terms, not the specific terms of such access. As long as the 
contract is benefit responsive under the plan terms, contract value reporting to plan 
participants represents the amounts that plan participants would receive under plan 
terms. If however, a benefit responsive contract is limited by plan terms to paying 
benefits only after retirement or death, reporting for such a contract at market value, 
because plan terms lim it participant access to funds, would not provide useful
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information to plan participants. If the contract provides benefits at retirement or 
death at contract value, versus an alternative plan investment such as a stock fund 
that pays benefits at market value, then the pertinent information to a plan 
participant is contract value, regardless of the date that benefits can be received.
The Department o f Labor, in  fact, requires that the statements of account balances 
provided by plan sponsors to participants reflect amounts that participants are 
actually eligible to receive under the terms of the plan. In the case of an investment 
contract that is benefit responsive under the terms of the plan, but fails to meet the 
proposed SOP's definition of fu ll benefit responsiveness, application of the proposed 
SOP would result in a difference between the values in  plan financial statements and 
the amounts shown on the participants' statements of account balances. We believe 
this disjoint is not useful to plan participants, resulting in  plan financial statements 
that are confusing at best, and potentially misleading.
Paragraph four of the proposed SOP provides examples of an event that may affect 
the value of a fully benefit responsive contract, including, "...the possibility of 
premature termination of the contract by the plan." Because this event would be 
evaluated under the special disclosure requirements of SFAS 5, "Accounting for 
Contingencies," we believe this language should refer to "... the reasonable 
possibility o f premature termination of the contract by the plan." In addition, we 
believe that the proposed SOP should provide examples of a fully benefit responsive 
investment contract that should be reported at less than contract value, such as a 
probable premature termination of the contract by the plan which would result in a 
payment to the plan that is less than the contract value.
Paragraph 14 requires disclosures for benefit responsive investment contracts that 
describe interest crediting rates and terms along with any limitations on guarantees. 
Because this information is superfluous if  the investment contract is carried at fair 
value, the requirements should be limited to fully benefit responsive contracts 
carried at contract value.
Finally, the proposed transition requirements should be conformed to paragraphs 8 
and 9 of SFAS 110, "Reporting by Defined Benefit Pension Plans of Investment 
Contracts," as follows:
•  Accounting changes to conform to the provisions of the proposed SOP must 
be implemented by restating the beginning balance of net assets available for 
plan benefits for the earliest period presented. Allowing implementation at a 
date other than the beginning of the first plan year presented would reduce 
the comparability of financial information and its usefulness to plan 
participants.
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•  For practical reasons, deposit administration funds purchased by defined
benefit healthcare welfare benefit plans prior to the issuance of this proposal 
should be "grandfathered” and reported at contract value.
In closing, we support the proposed SOP's focus on providing relevant financial 
information to the primary users of defined contribution plan financial statements 
but believe that the changes noted above are essential in meeting the objective. We 
would be happy to provide clarification or additional assistance i f  necessary.
Very truly yours,
Gary A. Swords
Kwasha Lipton
Street Address Telephones Mail Address
2100 North Central Road 
(at Bridge Plaza North)
Fort Lee
201 592  1300 
212270 6800
Post Office Box 1400 
Fort Lee, NJ 07024
Fax:
201502 0075
December 21, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division
File Q -l-505
AICPA
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Re:
AICPA Proposed Statement 
O f Position
Dear Ms. Hicks:
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with our comments in regard to the exposure draft of an 
AICPA proposed Statement of Position (SOP), Reporting o f Investment Contracts Held by Health and 
Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution Pension Plans. Kwasha Lipton is an employee 
benefits consulting firm and serves as the recordkeeper for over 160 defined-contribution pension 
plans covering over 700,000 participants. In addition, Kwasha Lipton has served as the investment 
consultant for approximately 25 defined contribution pension plans which have in total close to 
$ 1 billion in investment contract assets.
Our comments are specifically addressed to defined-contribution pension plans and relate primarily 
to the requirement to value at fair value those investment contracts that are deemed not to be fully 
benefit responsive because of plan restrictions. This requirement is contained in paragraph 10 of the 
proposed SOP. It is not uncommon for an employer to have a retirement plan that imposes certain 
restrictions on all or a portion of the plan accounts. These restrictions are in place solely for 
purposes of benefit design; are entirely independent of the plan's investment vehicles; and are in no 
way controlled by any contract issuer.
Two common plan structures of this type are:
1. Money purchase pension plans which provide for an annual employer contribution to the 
individual accounts of plan participants. Although plans of this type are defined contribution 
plans, they are qualified under IRS rules as pension plans. As such, distributions to participants 
prior to their termination of employment are not allowed. Typically, money purchase plans do 
not have alternate investment funds which allow for transfers of accumulated balances, nor do 
they have loan features. It is not uncommon for money purchase plans to be invested partially 
or fully in investment contract assets.
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2. Retirement savings plans which typically incorporate a 401 (k) feature that allows for participant 
contributions to be made on a pre-tax basis. Common plan provisions include company 
matching contributions, a variety of investment options, the ability to transfer funds among the 
investment options, in-service withdrawals, and loan provisions. By law, pre-tax contributions 
may not be withdrawn during employment and prior to age 59-1/2, except under hardship. In 
addition, some retirement savings plans have provisions that restrict the participant's access to a 
portion of their funds. For example, some plans mandate that the company matching 
contributions may not be withdrawn during employment, and must be invested in a "fixed 
income fund" which, at some times, may be comprised entirely of investment contracts. Upon 
termination of employment, the full amount of the participant's vested account balance will be 
available.
In general, we concur with the recommendation that only benefit responsive investment contracts 
should be reported at contract value. However, we believe that benefit responsiveness should be 
judged solely on the basis of the terms of the contract and not on the basis of plan provisions that do 
not directly relate to such contracts.
In determining whether contract value reporting is appropriate, the fact that a participant is not 
permitted under the plan to make in-service withdrawals or transfers between investment options 
should not be the controlling factor. Rather, contract value reporting is appropriate so long as the 
participant is permitted to make contract value withdrawals and transfers whenever such withdrawals 
or transfers are permitted under the plan, and so long as any plan restrictions do not explicitly 
reference amounts held in investment contracts. We believe that paragraph 10 of the proposed SOP 
(and all other references that define "benefit responsiveness") should be changed accordingly.
If this change were made, and if the accounts to which restrictions apply (e.g, pre-tax amounts or 
money purchase contributions) happen to be invested in an investment contract, that contract could 
still be considered fully benefit responsive — for example, where the contract provides that, if every 
plan participant were to terminate employment on the same day, each participant would receive full 
payment of his/her account balance with accumulated contract interest.
We believe that this suggested change to the proposed SOP would allow contract value to continue 
to be used in the majority of situations and would therefore eliminate a great deal of confusion and 
misunderstanding that will arise on the part of plan participants if fair value is mandated.
In order to avoid even more confusion and misunderstanding we further believe that, wherever fair 
value is required, it should only be used for purposes of reporting and disclosure for the plan as a 
whole. Fair value should not be required in the reporting of participant account values, except 
under extraordinary circumstances, under which FASB Statement No. 5 would so require (for 
example, a significant decline in the creditworthiness of the contract issuer). This is because the 
individual investment contracts which comprise the fixed income fund of the retirement savings
Kwasha Lipton
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
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plan or the money purchase plan are generally structured to provide all amounts on a contract value 
basis. Typically, each year, a new investment contract is negotiated to accept all participant and 
company contributions and to pay all plan benefits on a contract value basis. Each contract has a 
specified maturity date and a guaranteed interest rate for the term of the contract.
Under such a structure, assume a participant has a $100 contribution credited to his account during 
1994. Under the terms of the plan's underlying investment contracts, when this participant 
terminates employment he will receive exactly $100 plus contractual interest earnings. If prevailing 
interest rates have declined since the underlying investment contract was negotiated, the participant 
will not receive any more than the $100 principal plus contractual interest earnings. Likewise, if 
prevailing interest rates have risen since the underlying investment contract was negotiated, the 
participant will not receive any less than the $100 principal plus contractual interest earnings.
Therefore, except under extraordinary circumstances, reporting fair value for any portion of a 
participant's account balance would, in our opinion, provide no useful information to the 
participant, and in many cases will be misleading. The only useful and proper information about an 
individual participant's account is its current value on a contract value basis, since this is the only 
basis on which the participant will be able to receive a distribution.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide these comments on the proposed SOP. If you have any 
questions or would like additional information, please do not hesitate to call.
Respectfully submitted,
% B'&uf
Randolph B. Root, F.S.A 
Partner
Lawrence J. Sher,F.A
Partner
RBR/LJS:wp
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December 15, 1992
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division
File Q-l-505
American Institute of CPAs
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Re: Proposed Statement of Position Titled "Reporting of Investment Contracts
Held by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution 
Pension Plans
Dear Ms. Hicks:
The New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants is pleased to 
submit its comments on the subject exposure draft. The comments represent 
the views of the Society's Financial Accounting Standards Committee.
The Committee basically agreed with the proposed amendment, but would suggest 
that an effort be made to further clarify the definition of a "fully benefit 
responsive investment contract" found in paragraphs 9 and 10. For example, 
what is the degree of "financial responsibility" required of a third party? 
Is an investment contract fully or not fully benefit responsive if a plan 
participant has taken retirement at age 55 but is permitted access to the 
funds only after age 59 1/2? Because of the elusiveness of this newly coined 
expression in paragraph 9, such clarifications are needed.
The Committee also gave consideration to the issue of requiring disclosure of 
a market rate of interest for fully benefit responsive contracts reported at 
contract value. Unfortunately, similar to the experience of the Employee 
Benefit Plans Committee, the Society's Committee could not reach a consensus 
on what the market rate should represent.
If you wish to further pursue the comments herein, please let us know and we 
will arrange for someone from the Committee to contact you.
Sincerely,
Robert Kawa, CPA 
Chairman, Financial Accounting 
Standards Committee
RK/WMP/jz
cc: F in a n c ia l  A ccou n tin g  Standards
Accounting & Auditing Chairmen 
John Burke, CPA
Walter M. Primoff,C PA 
Director, Professional Programs
Committee
A L U M INUM COMPANY OF AMERICA
December 21, 1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager, Federal Government Division
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-1081
RE: File Q-l-505
Reporting of Investment Contracts Held by Health and Welfare 
Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution Pension Plans
Dear M s . Hicks,
The Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) appreciates the
opportunity to express its views on the A I C P A 's proposed
Statement of Position, ’’Reporting of Investment Contracts Held by 
Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined-Contribution Pension 
Plans” . Alcoa generally does not support the position taken by 
the AICPA in the Exposure Draft. This viewpoint is consistent 
with A l c o a ’s response submitted to the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board on the Exposure Draft of FASB Statement No. 110, 
’’Reporting by Defined Benefit Pension Plans of Investment 
Contracts".
The exposure draft requirements appear to be based upon the 
following:
1) FASB Statement No. 110, which requires that defined-benefit 
pension plans report investment contracts issued by either an 
insurance entity or other entity at fair value.
2) Fair value provides the most meaningful measure of a defined- 
contribution p l a n ’s present and future ability to pay benefits 
when due.
3) Defined Contribution Plan participants, the primary users of 
the financial statements have an interest in monitoring the 
financial condition of the Plan since they incur the 
investment risk.
Alcoa agrees "that the primary objective of a defined-
contribution p l a n ’s financial statements is to provide
information that is useful in assessing the plans's present and 
future ability to pay benefits when due".
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Although Alcoa agrees with the intent of the proposed amendment, 
we disagree that fair value provides the most meaningful measure 
of a defined contribution p l a n ’s ability to pay benefits when 
due. The amendment would allow "Fully Benefit Responsive” 
investment contracts to be valued at contract value (which may or 
may not be fair value), and "other contracts" to be valued at 
fair value. The result would be inconsistent methods to value 
these similar contracts. The remainder of this discussion will 
focus on our belief that all investment contracts issued by 
insurance companies (referred to as Guaranteed Investment 
Contracts or GIC's) be valued at contract value. Contract value 
provides the most meaningful measure of these contracts to the 
users of the Plan's financial statements.
GIC's are nontradeable financial instruments and therefore the 
Plan will recognize cash flows according to the terms of the 
contract. As interest rates move in the market place, the value 
the these GIC's would fluctuate - if they were tradeable 
securities and if there was an established market. Since there 
is no secondary market, recording GIC's at fair value would 
either overstate or understate the plan's ability to meet present 
or future benefit payments. Plan participants, the primary users 
of the financial statements, place their money in GIC options 
precisely for this reason - to avoid investments such as stocks 
and bonds, that would expose them to market volatility.
The cost of implementing fair value as the measure of the value 
of GIC's would be significant without providing the added 
benefit of a more accurate and reliable means of valuation.
Since there is not a secondary market for the contracts, there 
would be two primary means of measuring fair value.
1) The market value of similar investments with similar 
terms.
2) The present value of estimated future cash flows of the 
GIC using a discount rate commensurate with the risks 
involved.
Both of the fair value methods seem to be deficient in providing 
an accurate and reliable method of measuring the value of a GIC 
due to the subjectivity of selecting a similar financial 
instrument or a discount rate commensurate with the risk of the 
contract.
Pursuant to FASB Statement No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies, 
if Plan Management is aware that an event has occurred that may 
affect the value of a GIC (i.e., decline in creditworthiness of 
the contract issuer or third party guarantor or possible 
premature termination of the contract by the Plan), disclosure of 
the event or reporting the GIC at less than contract value may be 
appropriate. Under either the fair value or contract value 
method, the issuer's credit quality would be evaluated when 
preparing the financial statements. Therefore, we believe that
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reporting fair value at the time of the event is appropriate.
In summary, we believe that measuring and reporting investment 
contracts with insurance companies that are held by defined- 
contribution plans at contract value provides the primary users 
of the financial statements with the most meaningful information 
upon which to base their decisions. Our opinion is based upon 
the following points:
1) Contract value most accurately reflects the p l a n ’s ability 
to meet present and future benefit payments.
2) It is a cost effective method of measurement.
3) The credit quality of the issuer would need to be 
evaluated under either the fair value or contract value 
method.
4) Fair value does not provide a realistic interim valuation 
of a GIC since a GIC is a nontradeable financial 
instrument in which the holder can only recognize cash 
flows according to the terms of the contract.
Again, thank you for providing us with this opportunity to 
respond.
Sincerely,
Earnest J. Edwards
EJE:gpw
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■  Phone 212 773 3000
December 21,1993
Ms. Susan W. Hicks
Technical Manager
Federal Government Division, File Q-1-505 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-1081
Proposed Statement of Position “Reporting of Investment Contracts Held by 
Health and Welfare Benefit Plans and Defined - Contribution Pension Plans”
Dear Ms. Hicks:
We are pleased to provide our comments on the proposed amendment to the AICPA Audit and 
Accounting Guide, Audits o f Employee Benefit Plans (the “Audit Guide”), and SOP 92-6, 
Accounting and Reporting by Health and Welfare Benefit Plans referred to above.
We support the conclusion in the proposed SOP that defined contribution plans should report at 
contract value only those investment contracts with fully benefit responsive features and that 
other investment contracts should be reported at fair value. We also would accept accounting for 
all investment contracts held by defined contribution plans at contract value, given current 
practice and the potential disruption the change to fair value might cause for some plans. 
However, the Financial Accounting Standards Board in Statement 110, Reporting by Defined 
Benefit Pension Plans o f Investment Contracts, established the use of fair value in accounting for 
investment contracts. Accordingly, we believe that, the proposed SOP appropriately recognizes 
the distinct features of investment contracts that are fully benefit responsive.
We agree with the conclusion in the proposal that disclosure of a market rate of interest for fully 
benefit responsive contracts should not be required. Given the variety of rates and the variety of 
investment contract and plan provisions available in the marketplace, we do not believe that such 
a disclosure would be useful to and or fully understood by plan participants.
Finally, given the expected timing of the release of the final SOP, we believe the effective date 
should be delayed by one year to years beginning after December 15,1994.
We appreciate the opportunity to present our comments and would be pleased to discuss any 
aspect of this letter with the AICPA staff at your convenience.
Very truly yours,
APPWP
Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans
Lynn D. Dudley
Director of 
Retirement Policy December 29, 1993
Susan W . H icks
Technical Manager
Federal Government D ivision
F ile  Q -l-505
A IC P A
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N .W . 
Washington, D .C . 20004-1081
Re: A IC P A  Proposed Statement o f  Position, Reporting o f  Investment Contracts Held
by Health and W elfare Benefit Plans and Defined Contribution Pension Plans
Dear Ms. Hicks:
The American Institute o f  Certified Public Accountants ( "A IC P A ’’) published an exposure 
draft o f  the above-captioned proposed Statement o f  Position ("SOP") dated September 15,1993. 
The SOP would a llow  investment contracts to be reported at contract (book) value provided that 
certain conditions are satisfied.
The Association o f  Private Pension and Welfare Plans (" APPW P") membership includes 
a substantial number o f  defined contribution plan sponsors, insurance companies and investment 
firm s extremely interested in  issues involving investment contracts. The APPWP thus welcomes 
the opportunity to comment on the A IC P A  exposure draft on behalf o f  its membership.
We want to commend the A IC P A committee fo r its efforts in preparing the basic 
fram ework proposed fo r the accounting treatment o f  investment contracts purchased by qualified 
defined contribution plans. The focus on the "benefit responsive" features o f such contracts 
provides an appropriate measure o f value fo r plans which define benefits payable to participants 
in terms o f  a current lump sum account balance. In addition, the SOP would properly apply the 
same treatment to sim ilar contracts regardless o f whether the issuer is an insurance company, 
a bank, or another type o f financial institution.
The fo llow ing discussion is intended to respond to the A IC P A ' s solicitation o f comments 
on several issues and to ask fo r clarification w ith respect to several aspects o f the defin ition o f 
a benefit responsive investment contract.
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(1) M arket Rate o f  Interest Disclosure:
The A IC P A  letter which accompanied the publication o f  the exposure draft invited 
comments whether the SOP should require disclosure o f  a "market rate" o f  
interest fo r investment contracts reported at contract value. The basic intent 
appears to be the creation o f  an objective benchmark fo r use by participants 
making investment decisions.
I t  is not surprising that the A IC PA committee was unable to reach a consensus 
on this issue. I t  is even more doubtful that a consensus could be developed in  the 
retirement industry in general regarding a proper benchmark, because the question 
is actually rather subjective in nature.
Our major concern, however, is that such inform ation may confuse rather than 
assist participants in terms o f  what i t  represents. Plan administrators may w e ll 
conclude that they must spend more attention on c la rify ing what the benchmark 
does not represent than on what the description does represent.
(2) Reasonable Access Requirement:
The A IC P A  cover letter also asked fo r comments w ith respect to the SOP requirement that in 
order fo r the contract value standard to apply, the defined contribution plan in  question must 
provide plan participants w ith  "reasonable access" to their plan accounts. The SOP only refers 
to permissible restrictions based on frequency o f  access. However, plans restrict access fo r 
various reasons:
■ A  qualified money purchase pension plan may not a llow  the withdrawal 
o f  employer contributions p rio r to the termination o f  service.
■ Some p ro fit sharing (401(k)) plans retain the account balances o f  retirees 
(or employees relatively close to retirement) in the investment contract(s) 
to avoid investment vo la tility .
■ The investment contract(s) balance may be "frozen" during the period that 
the investment contract is phased out as an investment option under the 
plan.
Provided that the investment contract parallels the availability provisions o f the plan, and the 
participant is entitled to contract value whenever he or she has access to the account, contract 
value appears to provide the only meaningful financial measure o f  value. Otherwise, the 
financial statements would provide a different value from  that used to determine distributions and 
exchanges.
Susan W . H icks 
December 29, 1993 
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(3) Contract Descriptions:
The SOP would require financial statements to provide a general description o f 
rules fo r changing the contract interest rate and any contract lim itations on book 
value withdrawals. Presumably, the disclosure may be provided fo r a plan’ s 
investment contract portfo lio  in general terms. Attempting a contract-by-contract 
narrative fo r portfo lios w ith  a number o f  contracts would be an exhaustive task 
at best, and no participant would read such a lengthy document.
In  addition, the SOP would require disclosure o f  the average yie ld and current 
interest rate in  the aggregate by investment option fo r each reporting period. I t  
is not clear whether this information would be required on a monthly o r quarterly 
basis. I f  that is so, the information is not available under current procedures used 
by most plans.
(4) Contract Termination Provisions:
The examples provided in the SOP Appendix are extremely helpful. We would 
suggest clarification whether a contract that ceases participant 
withdrawals/exchanges during the termination phase o f  the contract would cease 
to qua lify fo r contract value treatment during the termination period. For 
example, some "participating’’ contracts operate in this fashion during a 5-year 
installment payout period.
(5) Effective Date:
F ina lly , we suggest that the effective date be deferred until the firs t plan year 
beginning after the issuance o f the SOP in  fina l form . Only at that time w ill plans 
know fo r sure what information w ill be required fo r reporting purposes.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
We would be pleased to provide any additional information o r clarification on these 
comments or on any other issue which the A IC P A  may deem useful in  putting the SOP into fina l 
form .
Sincerely,
Lynn D . Dudley 
D irector o f  Retirement Policy
